

“No leisure from pleasure”: Economy, Spirituality and the Psyche in Huxley’s
Brave New World

2025.01.15.

Jelige: mangó

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
1. Consumerism as an Economy of Stability: The Societal Management of Pleasure in the World State.....	6
2. The Economy of the World State’s Psyche.....	9
3. Misfits, Hatcheries and Crematoriums: Nonproductive Expenditure in the World State....	13
4. (The Absence of) Spirituality in the World State.....	18
4.1. Solidarity Service: Bataillean Eroticism in the World State	19
4.2. A Case Study of John the Savage: Asceticism and Sacrifice.....	23
Conclusion.....	28
Works Cited.....	30

Introduction

“You can’t have a lasting civilization without
plenty of pleasant vices” (Huxley, *Brave* 209)

In an article commemorating the 75th anniversary of the publication of Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* (1932), Caitrin Keiper writes that “[w]e live in a time of biotechnological leaps forward that have made the term ‘Brave New World’ almost a reflex for commentators worried we are rushing headlong toward a sterilized post-human society, engineered to joyless joy” (41). The cultural function of Huxley’s novel appears to be rooted in its continued relevance, including the way it has been read in academic circles. Regarded as dystopia, utopia, satire and science fiction (see, for example, Claeys, Parrinder, Firchow, Seed), it has been analysed through the lens of biopolitics, postcolonialism and gender studies (see Ağır, Pakzad, Moosavinia and Pour). While not debating the relevance of these approaches, my interpretation takes its cue from Laura Frost’s discussion of the World State as a “culture of pleasure” (71) and from what Keiper has termed “joyless joy.” The World State’s fixation on the idea of stability has been widely discussed; my premise is the centrality of pleasure to the understanding not only of the operation of the world depicted in Huxley’s novel but also of the maintenance of its stability. Throughout the text, the inhabitants of the State discuss how happiness—the traditional goal of human existence—has now become “the bedrock of socio-political stability” (Diken 155): the State’s philosophy is that “[t]here isn’t any need for a civilized man to bear anything that’s seriously unpleasant” (Huxley, *Brave* 209). The key to this policy is the equation of “happiness” with “pleasure”, similarly to how, in his theory of civilisation, Sigmund Freud equates happiness with “strong feelings of pleasure” (*Civilization* 16). While “pleasure is not characteristically associated with dystopic texts, in which negation and repression are the more common notes” (Frost 70), the premise of the State’s economy is that pleasure is to be attained via participating in consumer economy and various prescribed collective activities, showing how pleasure and power “seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another” (Foucault 48). My argument is also informed by Jean-François Lyotard’s observation that “[e]very political economy is libidinal”, meaning that political economy is difficult to differentiate from the economy of psychic energy (108). I shall use the term “economy of pleasure” to highlight the significant role pleasure plays in subeconomies of various kinds within the World State.

The working of the State itself might best be grasped in terms of its economic principles. Huxley “strongly opposed the belief that progress, especially progress through science, would bring about a perfect world” (Matter 147), and was critical of modern, mass cultural pleasures (Frost 70n4). While Huxley’s novel is part of the wider trend within early 20th-century science fiction which focused on imagining a scientifically planned society, its writing was prompted by his observation that “none of his contemporaries imagined a planned society in which capitalism would remain the driving force” (Congdon 93). As Derek D. Miller writes, “[t]he most prevalent themes in *Brave New World* are centred around the industrial and economic systems in novel”, and, in this world, “[c]onsumerism and productivism are the purpose of life” (“Threat”; cf. Bode 343). This aspect also sets Huxley’s vision of the future apart from most 20th-century dystopias—among them George Orwell’s *1984* (1949), the most obvious point of comparison for *Brave New World*—, which tend to focus on (oppressive) political systems (cf. Huxley, *Revisited* 258–59). *Brave New World* is characterised by a lack of political worldbuilding, which might be explained by how, in this world, politics is driven by economics: in the World State, which has control over the entire planet, the main function of the leaders, the World Controllers, is the management of the State’s economy. The starting point of my analysis is that the political system of the World State is predicated on conversions between the State’s “national” economy and what we might call the economy of the psyche, as the consumerist pleasures that keep the economy afloat also significantly impact what we might call the economy of the individual psyche, where “happiness” is frequently interpreted as physical gratification. Thus, what follows shall be concerned with the dichotomy of the collective and the personal, and the transactions and conversions between these two levels which determine and drive the State’s economy.

In this world, the individual and collective organisation of pleasure might best be grasped by viewing them as parts of the same economic system, where “economic”, used in the broadest sense, refers to all those phenomena of the World State which entail production, resource management and the flow of energy. Not forgetting the role of economy in its traditionally accepted sense in the State, the essay aims to move towards an economic reading in the wider sense suggested above, drawing primarily upon the theories of two of Huxley’s contemporaries: Austrian psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, and French philosopher and intellectual Georges Bataille.

The narrative itself appears to call for a Freudian reading: it is mentioned early on that the figures of Freud and Ford have been merged for ideological purposes (see Huxley, *Brave* 33), while “Freudian ideas are plainly on display” (Buchanan 27) in the text. A Freudian

perspective¹ will inform the close reading of the effects of the World State's policies on the psychic economy of its subjects as well as of the relationship between the individual and society, particularly in terms of (non)conformity with regard to the norms ingrained and imposed by the State.² I will suggest that, although Huxley himself felt ambivalent about psychoanalysis (see *Letters* 647; cf. Buchanan 26–27; Saracino 16), there are numerous elements which enable us to approach *Brave New World* from this perspective. While conventionally Freudian psychoanalysis is used to examine the workings of the individual's psyche, the scope of Freud's theory of the pleasure principle, combined with Bataille's ideas,³ might be extended to enable us to carry out a general analysis of the workings of World State society, as several motifs related to its operation are reminiscent of Freud's economic model of the flow of psychic energy. Bataille's theory of what he calls "general economy" is based on the notions of "nonproductive expenditure" and excess, his theory of eroticism engages with the spiritual dimension of sexual experience, while his ideas on religious sacrifice incorporate the insights of contemporary anthropology as well as his continuing interest in Surrealism—schools of thought which were close to Huxley's own interests. One reason why Huxley's narrative might be rewardingly read in the context of Bataille's theories is that both were conceived as reactions to the global crisis of the interwar years:⁴ a time of industrial capitalism, the spread of radical ideologies and the first blossoming of consumer culture—the complex phenomenon that Oswald Spengler proclaimed "the decline of the West", partly due to the loss of spiritual significance (399). A novel of ideas, *Brave New World* is rooted in the same anxieties as Bataille's theories and Freud's late speculations about culture.

Notoriously, in the World State, all areas of life are "related to sex either directly or indirectly" (Yoon 888). Therefore, it is not surprising that the text is littered with small details concerned with sexuality. The best-known aspect of the novel's portrayal of sexuality is how, in line with Huxley's positive view of the eugenics movement of his time (Congdon 84; Hart 110), in this world, sexual intercourse has been "completely severed" from procreation (Frank 75). The State has regulated sexual activity, including viviparous reproduction, through science,

¹ Although its foundational framework largely remained unchanged, the specifics of Freudian psychoanalysis underwent significant changes even during Freud's lifetime. To circumvent the complications which might arise from this, my interpretation of *Brave New World* shall be based on Freud's later theories.

² Psychoanalytic analyses tend to read the novel through the lens of one specific Freudian concept, like the uncanny (Pettman), the death drive (Serdar), the Oedipus complex (Buchanan), the Ego–Superego–Id division (Datta and Dutta), while Saracino focuses on the Oedipus complex and Huxley's ambiguous views on psychoanalysis.

³ Bataille rose to prominence after Freud's death, making it possible for him to engage with Freud's ideas—a task he undertook on several occasions. See, for example, *Eroticism* 47; 71; 200; 222; *Visions* 15; 72; 160. Bataille, who underwent psychoanalysis in 1927 (Noys 13; cf. Buse 3), was one of the founding members of the short-lived Society of Collective Psychology (Buse 4).

⁴ For the significance of the interwar context for Bataille, see Noys 113.

psychedelic advancements and quasi-religious biweekly gatherings called “Solidarity Services”, making promiscuity “a prescribed activity” (Diken 154; cf. Hart 109). As Huxley writes, “all are permitted to indulge their sexual impulses without let or hindrance” (*Revisited* 258). Adults follow the dictum that “everyone belongs to everyone else” (*Brave* 34; 37; 40; 104; 110; 180), marriage has been abolished, while children’s “erotic play” (26–27) is encouraged as entirely natural. The general promiscuity entails that, as Bülent Diken writes, “the body becomes a networked common good, a public property” (154). The sexual act itself is also handled as a transaction in the World State’s economy, which manifests itself in language: intercourse is discussed in terms of possession and use (Huxley, *Brave* 34; 37; 50), fitting in with how, on a larger scale, too, sexuality is part of the State’s economy of pleasure.

Given Huxley’s fascination with mysticism (see Vignone 17), it is not surprising that spirituality is an important dimension of the novel. The handling of this subject should be seen in light of Huxley’s anthropological assertion that the “religious instincts of those who have no recognized religion ... find expression in a surprising variety of non-religious ways” (“Substitutes” 250). Interpreters of Huxley’s novel have noted that the World State is characterised by a fundamental absence of spirituality. As, for example, Richard McDonough writes, “*Brave New World* displays what would happen if the Western world, realizing that its confident belief in continual progress had not worked out as expected, were to ... paper over the lack of spiritual depth by employing foreign technologies” (“Huxley”). According to Brad Congdon, Huxley “portrays a society in which the wrong kinds of mythology and organization have been designed to channel individuals’ religious emotions. ... Capitalism exists not to satisfy the demands of the economy but, instead, the individual religious emotion” (96–97). Some interpreters, however, identify a concrete form of religious sentiment in the World State: Sebastian Vignone proposes that through the drug called “soma”, the State creates “an alternative to religion”, by which its subjects can “feel divinity” within themselves and their environment (2). I would like to suggest that we cannot regard the State’s drug culture as a new kind of religion. Rather, the State exemplifies how religion, spirituality and the sacred are incompatible with the idea of a society that takes consumerism to the extreme. The aforementioned main themes—the collective–personal dichotomy, economy and sexuality—are closely connected to the State’s refusal of the very idea of the transcendental. This is precisely why Bataille’s spirituality-focused theories are helpful in highlighting the full extent to which the World State can be said to be void of any kind of spiritual sentiment.

The argument is structured around three key areas of the economy of pleasure in *Brave New World*: centralised consumer economy, the economy of the psyche and the economy of

life events, all of which are connected to erotic and pseudo-spiritual experience. I shall argue that the fundamental absence of genuine spirituality in the World State is the inevitable corollary of the restricted nature of its economy of pleasure.

1. Consumerism as an Economy of Stability: The Societal Management of Pleasure in the World State

The rudimentary level of economics in the World State has to do with World Controller Mustapha Mond's basic assertions that there is a "price we have to pay for stability" (Huxley, *Brave* 194) and that "[h]appiness has got to be paid for" (201). The World State is a utopia insofar as it has realised humanity's long-held dream of happiness: the idea that human beings "strive for happiness, they want to become happy and remain so" (Freud, *Civilization* 16) is as old as Plato's *Symposium*. The State has also solved the fundamental paradox of modern society identified by Jean Baudrillard—that while society claims there is constant progress, "satisfaction is increasingly in deficit" (182). Finally, considering how "[m]an's need for pleasure and its profound influence on his behavior are an essential part of his nature" (Scitovsky 70), the goal of the World State to ensure "happiness" as the default emotion of its subjects appears to be a logical one. Mond's statements suggest that the State conceives of pleasure first and foremost in economic terms, articulating it with reference to financial transaction as well as viewing it as the tool of achieving the State's ultimate goal, social stability, which is referred to as "[t]he primal and the ultimate need" (Huxley, *Brave* 36; cf. 5). As Mond also says, "[t]he ethics and philosophy of under-consumption [were] [s]o essential when there was under-production; but in an age of machines and the fixation of nitrogen—positively a crime against society" (44–45). The State enforces a "consumer-oriented mentality" (Miller 1; cf. Peller 65): underconsumption is to be avoided at all costs, and plenitude is preferable to moderation and restraint. In this way, the State's vision is in line with capitalism's fantasy of indefinite and controlled growth, although, in what is an extreme example of centralised economy, economic fluctuations have been eliminated (Parrinder 16; cf. Congdon 97).

At first glance, the meaning of happiness appears fuzzy throughout the novel: the World State does not differentiate between different degrees and types of positive emotions (such as contentment, bliss, delight or exhilaration). In fact, the State's definition of happiness is an aggregate of different kinds of pleasure. The most obvious of these is the reduction of happiness to pleasurable physical sensations—sensory gratification—, not taking into account its possible emotional (mental) manifestations. In this world of instant gratification, the great fear of the citizens is that they might be "compelled to live through a long time-interval between the consciousness of a desire and its fulfilment" (Huxley, *Brave* 38). Diken identifies a key aspect of the State's management of pleasure—that "[t]he fear of the 'interval', of time, is also the fear

of desire. And to extinguish passion, the brave new world adopts applied science as the cornerstone of its materialism” (154–55). Thus, the idea of control is important in yet another sense: although the State’s society is hedonistic (154), pleasure is not unrestrained. Instead, it exists between certain pre-defined—engineered—boundaries, through specific state-regulated activities: the “feelies”—cinematic experience accompanied by various physical sensations—, the ritualistic “orgy-porgy” of Solidarity Services, and the daily consumption of soma.

Consumer society is built on creating desires that can only be fulfilled through objects of desire created by consumer society itself. The aforementioned activities function as products to be enjoyed within the State’s consumer economy, through which “‘happiness’ is ... reduced to sheer consumerism” (Diken 153). Moreover, the State’s citizens are encouraged to publicly perform their consumption, in the spirit of the idea that “the level of consumption is the just measure of social merit” (Baudrillard 84). Thus, the second kind or degree of pleasure is that of consumerism—the feeling of pleasure caused by the fulfilment of desires. The centrality of consumerism to the narrative is rooted in Huxley’s “new perspectives on and more radical objections to Western industrial society” (Bode 343). Huxley himself referred to the system that appears in *Brave New World* as “[t]he nightmare of total organization” (*Revisited* 238; cf. 259). From an economic point of view, the World State might be described both as a fine-tuned, hyper-efficient consumer and leisure society, and as an example of Mussolini’s supercapitalism, which he defined as “the utopia of unlimited consumption”, the ideal of which is “the standardization of the human race from the cradle to the grave” (Falasca-Zamponi 137; cf. Huxley, *Brave* 5). The most prominent examples of consumption and standardisation in the novel are the various complicated sports of the State (obstacle golf, centrifugal bumble-puppy, escalator squash and Riemann-surface tennis), which all require specialised equipment. People are conditioned to enjoy (*consume*) these sports, because this “keeps ... factories busy” (*Brave* 18; cf. 42)—conditioning creates a reason for the production of goods, but this is only a symptom of how, in general, life under this regime has been reduced to functionality. As the Director of the Central London Hatchery and Conditioning Centre states at the beginning of the novel, “[i]magine the folly of allowing people to play elaborate games which do nothing whatever to increase consumption. It’s madness” (25). What the Director says also fits into the wider scheme of wanting people to prefer the new cultural products, such as the feelies (as Mond explains, “we don’t want people to be attracted by old things. We want them to like the new ones” [193]), and the general logic of consumerism expressed by the proverbs “[e]nding is better than mending. The more stitches, the less riches” (42; cf. 104; 112). Cogs in a highly

regulated machinery, recreational activities in the World State are one way of controlling and harnessing the energy present in the psyche and the world as a whole so as to ensure stability.⁵

Huxley's novel presents this world as fundamentally defined by the individual's constant pleasure and gratification: it is a place where "[p]eople are happy; they get what they want, and they never want what they can't get. ... [T]hey're so conditioned that they practically can't help behaving as they ought to behave" (193–94; cf. 209). The last sentence highlights how the state uses pleasure as a political tool for maintaining control over individuals. As Huxley writes, "[i]n 1984 the lust for power is satisfied by inflicting pain; in *Brave New World*, by inflicting a hardly less humiliating pleasure" (*Revisited* 259; cf. Diken 156). It is possible to see the World State as a travesty of the utilitarianism conceptualised by Jeremy Bentham and his disciples in the 19th century (utility is the benefit- and pleasure-producing property of objects and acts): pleasure is commodified and manipulated through biopolitical means to ensure conformity, and Raphaële Chappe's proposition that "self-development [is] being shaped concurrently with consumption itself" ("Utility") does not hold true for the State.⁶ Conditioning means that individuality is moulded to fit within strict boundaries: hypnopaedia (sleep conditioning), neo-Pavlovian conditioning (conditioning while children) and a eugenically maintained caste system delimit how pleasure and satisfaction are to be attained—from the privileged yet restricted Alpha to the dronelike Epsilon, not only is everyone engineered to be content with the caste they have been born into, but also conditioned to find happiness based on the ideological biases of their caste. In a way, the State is artificially swelling individual wants: "Many of our wants are not innate and biologically determined, but are acquired by learning" (Scitovsky 67).

Finally, as the Director also states at the beginning of the novel, "that is the secret of happiness and virtue—liking what you've *got* to do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their unescapable social destiny" (Huxley, *Brave* 12; cf. 196). The most apparent economic implication is that the World State requires all energy to be spent productively—put simply, everything and everyone has a purpose and has been created with the sole aim of fulfilling that specific purpose (64; cf. Diken 154).

⁵ Mond also speaks of art and science in economic terms: "that's the price we have to pay for stability. You've got to choose between happiness and what people used to call high art" (Huxley, *Brave* 194) and "that's another item in the cost of stability. It isn't only art that's incompatible with happiness; it's also science" (198). In the vein of utilitarianism, art could be "useful" by providing pleasure, however, as the Director explains, the State eliminates anything which could make people "sit down and think" (47). Art has also become irrelevant because citizens would not be able to understand it: "you can't make tragedies without social instability", Mond tells John (193).

⁶ In the World State, identity is to remain constant. As Mond says, "[c]haracters remain constant throughout a whole lifetime" (Huxley, *Brave* 47), which can be connected to how stability is in general preferable to change: "we have our stability to think of. We don't want to change. Every change is a menace to stability" (198).

2. The Economy of the World State's Psyche

At the beginning of the novel, Mond identifies the key principle of the World State: “No civilization without social stability. No social stability without individual stability” (Huxley, *Brave* 36). The implications of this might be grasped by drawing an analogy between the *collective* psyche of the State's society and Freud's theory of the *individual* psyche, keeping in mind Freud's claims, steeped in Victorian anthropological ideas, concerning the similarity between the development of the individual and that of civilisation (*Civilization* 98–99; cf. 44; 104). Thus, we can regard the multitude of individual psyches as parts that make up what we might call “the World State's psyche”.

Extended to the collective level, Freud's theory of the economy of mental processes—which proposes that the ultimate purpose of all psychic activity is the maintenance of stability—can provide us with a new way of looking at the means by which the World State achieves social stability. In Freud's understanding, the economy of the psyche refers to how mental processes might be conceptualised in terms of the flow, distribution (*Outline* 177; *Civilization* 51) and transformation (*Outline* 180; cf. Spengler 301) of psychic energy or libido (88; 192; 196) via processes like sublimation or repression. Freud defines these two processes as follows: “Sublimation of the drives is a particularly striking feature of cultural development, which makes it possible for the higher mental activities—scientific, artistic and ideological—to play such a significant role in civilized life” (*Civilization* 44; cf. Valls 310), while “the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious” (Freud, “Repression” 146; cf. Valls 277–79). Finally, Freud asserts that drives are “the ultimate cause of all activity” (*Outline* 178). The life drive (Eros) is aimed at creating and sustaining life (179; cf. *Principle* 47), organising entities into larger units (*Outline* 98; cf. *Principle* 37), while the death drive (Thanatos) impels the individual towards destruction (*Outline* 179) and “set[s] [itself] against” the urge to create units (98).

Henry Ford's factories were based on eliminating all “unnecessary mental activity” (Peller 65) on the part of the workers. Thus, it is in line with Fordian doctrines that, in the World State's setup, there is no room for intense emotional experiences such as love, hate or grief. As the Director tells the students, “[n]o pains have been spared to make your lives emotionally easy—to preserve you, so far as that is possible, from having emotions at all” (Huxley, *Brave* 37). This renders unnecessary the Freudian idea that “in general the task of avoiding suffering pushes that of obtaining pleasure into the background” (*Civilization* 17; cf. 18)—the State's citizens are free to focus on the attainment of pleasure. In fact, from a psychoanalytic

perspective, we might suppose that the only psychic rule which is allowed to function in the State is what Freud called the “pleasure principle”,⁷ claiming that it is “intimately connected” with the economic factor (*Outline* 68). The pleasure principle functions as a kind of regulatory mechanism, aiming to maintain an optimal state of psychic balance (homeostasis)—what in the World State is called “stability”. It operates “in the service of a function whose business it is to free the mental apparatus entirely from excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in it constant or to keep it as low as possible” (*Principle* 57; cf. 49–50). Pain (discomfort) increases tension levels (1), while the release of tension is felt as pleasure (57; cf. Scitovsky 68). Huxley’s World State is like a collective psyche, with the pleasure principle prevailing at the highest level of economic organisation.

Viewed in Freudian terms, the World State might be seen as functioning based on the hypothesis that “[u]nrestricted satisfaction of all our needs presents itself as the most enticing way to conduct one’s life” (*Civilization* 18), since in the State the unlimited and unchallenged rule of the pleasure principle invalidates and renders redundant processes like sublimation and repression. As Freud writes, the pleasure principle “is more especially on guard against increases of stimulation from within [the psyche, for example unmet desires or unprocessed trauma], which would make the task of living more difficult” (*Principle* 57). On the whole, the State’s project appears to be successful: except in the case of “deviant” individuals like John the Savage, Bernard Marx and Helmholtz Watson, the reign of the pleasure principle on both the individual and the collective level does ensure that citizens avoid overwhelming internal or external stimulation that could disrupt psychic balance, at the same time rendering sublimation or repression pointless.

An analysis of the economy of the World State’s collective psyche through the framework outlined by Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) might help us identify the effect of the State’s preoccupation with satisfying the pleasure principle on the other mental processes mentioned above. For Freud, the main tension between civilisation (*Kultur* in the German original) and the individual is rooted in the individual’s wish to live according to their drives (instincts) and desires (“the satisfaction of the drives spells happiness” [*Civilization* 20]), while civilisation demands conformity and the subjugation of the drives (44; cf. 42; *Illusion* 10). Essentially, civilisation is always at conflict with the pleasure principle (*Civilization* 18)

⁷ Freud’s theory of the pleasure principle and the life drive was preceded by what he called the “constancy principle” in *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895), which was thought to be in charge of making sure that a “given energy ... remains constant” (Valls 245). The World State might be seen as also operating based on this principle.

and is built on the sublimation of drives (44). The State, however, has brought about a highly organised society without relying on sublimation, having ruled it out in general, but allowing it when necessary. For instance, scientific research is “most carefully chained and muzzled” (Huxley, *Brave* 198), but artistic endeavours or intellectual pursuits—what for Freud are typical products of sublimation (*Civilization* 44; *Illusion* 14; cf. Valls 310)—are impossible. In the State, the destructive instinct has also been eliminated (Diken 156), conforming to what Freud (based on contemporary German anthropology, for example that of Norbert Elias) saw as the primary aim of civilisation (see *Civilization* 77; 61), but to a much more extreme extent. The State achieves its stability by redirecting instinctual energies in highly structured ways, not through sublimation but through rechannelling the libido under the reign of the pleasure principle, although it should be noted that, in the World State, the pleasure principle, far from manifesting itself in its “natural” way, is given free rein within a strictly regulated framework imposed by the state.

Only those ways of gaining pleasure are allowed which have been sanctioned by the State, some of which are newly invented, like “[s]oma-holidays”, through which the State might be seen as employing techniques which Freud only tentatively ventured to describe in 1938: “The future may tell us how we can use particular chemicals to directly influence the amounts of energy and their distribution in the psychical apparatus” (*Outline* 210–11; cf. *Civilization* 27; 19). “Older pleasures” are also given free rein: the State encourages promiscuity, which, however, seems to run counter to Freud’s claim that the sexual instinct is one of the instincts that are undergoing regulation in Western civilisation, where sexual life’s “importance as a source of happiness—and therefore as a means to fulfill our purpose in life—has imperceptibly diminished” (*Civilization* 53). We might say that it is in the realm of sexuality where the World State most diverges from commonly held notions of civilisation, having elevated it into what is perhaps the main source of pleasure. As Huxley points out, “legalizing a degree of sexual freedom ... practically guarantees the Brave New Worlders against any form of destructive (or creative) emotional tension” (*Revisited* 259). Thus, the State can be seen as an answer to the dilemma or contradiction identified by Freud, the discontents of civilisation: the fact that the very idea of civilisation, contradicting fundamental desires, entails the unhappiness of the population (*Civilization* 31–32; 91). In Huxley’s novel, the unsatisfied viewpoint is held only by the misfit characters, while the rest of the population experiences pleasure.

That mental energy remains in its basic form does not mean that there is no flow of energy in the World State’s psyche, rather, it is consistently directed toward the same specific

aim (with different objects). This enables us to understand why repression cannot take place in the State either. In the first place, emotional attachment (an *investment* of energy) to objects, ideas and other people has been eliminated (*Civilization* 48). There are no life experiences which could lead to distress and would necessitate repression—this is a world from which conflict, pain, trauma, grief, sadness and anger (see Huxley, *Brave* 110; 142; 181) have all been expelled (37; cf. Serdar 365). The State might also be seen as employing what Roberto Esposito has termed “immunisation”—a biopolitical means of protective regulation by the state based on how “the immune mechanism functions precisely through the use of what it opposes. It reproduces in a controlled form exactly what it is meant to protect us from” (8). The World State integrates elements of the threat it seeks to neutralise into daily life: it “protects” its citizens from the chaos of unregulated desires by systematically controlling and limiting their emotional and biological experiences through Violent Passion Surrogates and Pregnancy Substitutes (Huxley, *Brave* 211; 32); however, this comes at the cost of sacrificing the depth, spontaneity and intensity that make life meaningful (Esposito 28). The World State, under the slogan of liberating the pleasure principle, establishes control on a yet deeper, more fundamental level—the kind of social organisation that has been critiqued by the likes of Herbert Marcuse (see 11–12). In general, in this world it is only minor inconveniences that can arise (which in themselves are another satirical clue that the system is not yet perfect), in which case “there is always soma” to smooth matters over (Huxley, *Brave* 47; 210; cf. Hart 109; Horsley 259). Ultimately, through the control the State exerts over both the individual and collective psyche, it achieves social stability also in the broader economic sense that we can associate with the psyche.

3. Misfits, Hatcheries and Crematoriums: Nonproductive Expenditure in the World State

Freud speculated about a “universal attribute ... of organic life”: that life itself is a temporary interruption of an inorganic, stimulation-free state and that the death drive represents the psyche’s effort to restore this original condition (*Principle* 30). As we shall see, Bataille can serve as a complementary counterpoint not only to the State’s fixation on stability but to the psychic economy of balance formulated by Freudian psychoanalysis, to which Bataille’s thinking is indebted (Noys 112):⁸ for Bataille, life is not a temporary interruption but a continuous and necessary eruption—expenditure—of excess energy which disrupts stability, often in ways that defy the utilitarian and survival-oriented logic of the Freudian pleasure principle and drives. This combined theoretical background has important implications for a broadly economic, pleasure-focused reading of *Brave New World*, as in addition to the processes of the individual and collective psyche, life events like birth and death are also under tight control.

The World State’s stability and consumer economy might be examined from the perspective of Bataillean economy, an anthropological approach to economy based on the concepts of consumption, expenditure and loss. It is important to note that, for Bataille, “consumption”, together with the other two concepts above, denotes primarily the exhaustion of existing stocks and energies (Noys 113), rather than what in consumer economy is understood as the use of goods and services, although, anticipating Jean Baudrillard, Bataille also believed that “anything can become a consumer object” (Baudrillard 15). Bataille outlines his theory of what he calls “general economy” in the three volumes of *The Accursed Share* (1949), constructing it in opposition to the more conventional “restricted economy” of modernity (*Accursed* 1: 19–41), meaning capitalism (1: 116; cf. 1: 127; 1: 133), which is based on the notions of utility, accumulation (indefinite growth) and scarcity (Scitovsky 64). Bataille posits expenditure (of “colossal waste” [*Eroticism* 60], that is, of excess energy) as the major organising force of economy and human society as a whole (*Accursed* 1: 20), arguing that an economic theory based on expenditure rather than on production is more suitable for explaining the workings of the world. The reason behind this is that, for Bataille, energy is inherently excessive: through solar activity (1: 28), nature produces an overabundance of energy (1: 29), which humans are compelled to expend in ways that go beyond mere survival. Thus, this framework challenges not only the conventional notions of utility and productivity, but also the

⁸ For attempts to incorporate Bataillean thinking into psychotherapy, see Buse.

focus on stability and balance that is often present in theories of economic systems (as is the case, for example, in Keynesian or Hayekian economics) and which might also be detected in the Freudian conception of the psyche.

The Bataillean approach to economy emphasises that excess energy is a fundamental aspect of life and an *always already* given attribute of the world; therefore, in any economic system, there must always be some degree of nonproductive expenditure involved (1: 153; cf. *Visions* 117; 252; Caillois 101). According to Bataille, nonproductive expenditure occurs when excess energy cannot be entirely utilised in productive ways (*Accursed* 1: 31): “The general movement of exudation (of waste) of living matter impels [the individual], ... it destines him, in a privileged way, to that glorious operation, to *useless consumption*” (1: 23—italics mine).⁹ Excess energy must be expended, often in potentially destructive ways (1: 21; cf. 31; Caillois 131), through art (Bataille, *Visions* 118–20; cf. *Accursed* 1: 10), acts of gifting (1: 65), non-procreative and perverse sexuality (*Visions* 118), religious sacrifice (ritualised and symbolic destruction; *Accursed* 1: 59), or even war (*Visions* 118; cf. Caillois 177). If excess energy is reinvested in the system’s own growth, it is spent (expended, utilised) productively (Bataille, *Accursed* 1: 25).

The economic system in *Brave New World* might be seen as representing a highly controlled version not only of the Freudian economic model of the psyche, but also of what is described in Bataille’s theory. Bataille and Freud handle the concept of production differently, but the difference comes down to the labels being used: in sublimation, artistic endeavour is a *productive* way of redirecting psychic energy, and while for Bataille art is a possible result of the *nonproductive* way of expending excess energy, this is, in a literal sense, also a *productive*, creation-based process. The real conceptual difference is whether energy is being *redirected* to fuel production (that is socially acceptable, culturally valued or rewarding, and personally fulfilling) or whether it is actually *expended* during production (Bataille also uses the expression “luxurious squandering” [1: 33]). Thus, while Freud speaks of psychic energy as a finite resource that needs to be micromanaged, for Bataille, energy is always being replenished thanks to solar power, and this, too, in excess. The idea that, under the reign of the pleasure principle, the psyche aims to avoid overwhelming internal or external stimulation that could disrupt balance might be reconceptualised as the psyche’s attempt to avoid anything which might cause an *excess* in the distribution of psychic energy. For Bataille, on the contrary, life is the inevitable and often deliberate transgression of limits (boundaries, taboos), where the excess gains release

⁹ Bataille uses the expression “the accursed share” to denote the *energy* that is to become nonproductive expenditure, although in most contexts, the two expressions are interchangeable.

during moments of transgression. Thus, in this view, stability on a collective scale is less a goal than a temporary state within a dynamic process where excess energy constantly disrupts the equilibrium of the world. The reverse is also true: in Bataillean terms, the State's ultimate goal, stability might itself be seen as a way of controlling nonproductive expenditure, if we consider that unbridled wastage could imbalance the system. It seems that, paradoxically, all the excess energy present in the State is directed toward maintaining the system's stability, even that of nonproductive expenditure.

In Huxley's novel, the characters John, Bernard, and Helmholtz (and John's mother Linda) all contain some form of excess which prevents them from fitting in and from being "wheel tenders" in the machine of civilisation (Huxley, *Brave* 36),¹⁰ unlike Lenina Crowne, Fanny and most of the State's subjects, who appear to feel more at home in the State. For instance, Helmholtz feels in himself an excess that he struggles to articulate (59–60)—in Freudian terms, sublimate—into actual artistic production. Bernard talks to Lenina about the excess he feels within himself while flying over the sea (78). His attempt at experiencing genuine emotions might also be understood as excess—as he puts it after having slept with Lenina on the first night of going out, "I want to know what passion is. ... I want to feel something strongly" (81; cf. Diken 155). Bernard's strong feeling *for* a strong feeling is a second-degree articulation of his excess. When telling Lenina that "[I wanted] to try the effect of arresting my impulses" (Huxley, *Brave* 81), he reveals that he has been defying the requirement of consumerist consumption and sexual indulgence—he attempts a kind of repression of his conditioning. As we shall see, John voices similar abstinent and ascetic sentiments in connection with emotions and bodily urges (186). The distress of the misfits is rooted in how they are unable to attain any kind of happiness (by their own or by the regime's standards)—that is, consciously or unconsciously, they defy the World State's equation of happiness with pleasurable physical sensations and consumerism. The preliminary economic significance of the misfits lies in that they enable us to question the stability of the system: although Mond appears to be convinced of its stability, this is a stability that has already been disrupted. The presence of the misfits also reinforces the satirical dimension of the novel: despite all its eugenics and conditioning (see Congdon 84), the World State does not succeed at achieving all-encompassing conformity. Viewed in the context of Bataillean economy, happiness (the two kinds of pleasure identified in the first chapter) is presented and promoted by the State as a productive form of expenditure: "Our Ford himself did a great deal to shift the

¹⁰ A similar metaphor, with biopolitical implications, that of being "a cell in the social body", is mentioned by both Bernard (Huxley, *Brave* 78) and the Director (84; cf. *Revisited* 259).

emphasis from truth and beauty to comfort and happiness. Mass production demanded the shift. Universal happiness keeps the wheels [of civilisation] steadily turning; truth and beauty can't" (Huxley, *Brave* 201), explains Mond. As Bataille also points out, "if we do not have the force to destroy the surplus energy ourselves, it cannot be used, and, like an unbroken animal that cannot be trained, it is this energy that destroys us; it is we who pay the price of the inevitable explosion" (*Accursed* 1: 24; cf. Caillois 100). If the unhappy misfits are not partaking in productive expenditure, they might be viewed as standing for its nonproductive, uncontrolled, potentially violent variant in the Bataillean sense, with John as the one who, during his disturbance of the hospital's soma distribution, his flogging of both himself and Lenina, and finally, via his suicide, resorts to violence also in a literal sense. The conflict also leads to Linda's death and Bernard's and Helmholtz's deportation—their fate suggests that individuals who do not fit into the system will sooner or later be eliminated, thus nonproductive expenditure is reinforcing the State's stability.

The presence of the misfits can be traced back to the State's handling of reproduction, which includes "some of the best-known satiric images of future-world biological intervention" (Horsley 256). In one of his essays, Huxley considered the idea of an economic use of eugenics, which could be used to "train up a race not of perfect human beings, but of perfect mass-producers and mass-consumers" ("Science and Civilization" 97). The first chapter of *Brave New World* gives insight into how reproduction has become like all other forms of production. Bokanovsky's Process is "[t]he principle of mass production applied to biology" (*Brave* 5), an example of "conquer[ing] human nature by eugenics", not unlike the system proposed by Plato in *Republic* (Franck 75). Humans (on occasion literally referred to as "products" [Huxley, *Brave* 5]) are produced on assembly lines, in groups of identical twins—this is what John finds most distressing about the "brave new world" (140; 177; 184; 195; 218)—, many of whom are conditioned to work at hatcheries in accordance with their caste.¹¹ From a structural point of view, hatchery workers are contributing to the upkeep of the system in a manner not unlike the hypothetical perpetual motion machine, as the product of the system is directly used in the creation of even more products—for Bataille, this is the kind of expenditure that is productive because it is reinvested in its own growth (see *Accursed* 1: 159; cf. 1: 25). Thus, in the World State, ordinary reproduction (resulting from the union of male and female reproductive cells) is relegated to the status of what Bataille regards as a nonproductive process (1: 35). As sexuality is removed from the context of social reproduction, all its energy can be conserved for pleasure,

¹¹ This is precisely Huxley contemporary author Ernst Jünger's prediction for the future of education: "the training of man as a type rather than as an individual takes precedence" (13).

leading to what might seem significant nonproductive expenditure. Therefore, we might suppose that promiscuous sexuality is one mode through which the system provides a way for the expenditure of excess energy, however, even this energy serves to maintain the system's stability.

In line with the absence of close emotional bonds, in the World State, through "death conditioning", people from a young age "learn to take dying as a matter of course" (Huxley, *Brave* 142; cf. 181; 194). Mourning is frowned upon (cf. Bataille, *Visions* 118), meaning that death is "completely stripped of its ontological sense" (Serdar 367; cf. Buchanan 33). In Bataillean economy, death is the ultimate form of expenditure, while in Bataille's conception of eroticism it is the ultimate transgression. For Bataille, not only conventional procreation, but death, too, is a waste of energy, in the sense that after death the individual can no longer be of any use to the economy: "Of all conceivable luxuries, death, in its fatal and inexorable form, is undoubtedly the most costly" (*Accursed* 1: 34—italics removed). As Linda's fate shows, the dying are provided soma and entertainment rather than real care—from a purely economic point of view, it is not productive for the still healthy members of society to concern themselves with the waste of consumers that death means. What *is* productive, however, is the routine recycling of the bodies after cremation: "Fine to think we go on being socially useful even after we're dead. Making plants grow" (Huxley, *Brave* 63). By abolishing the aura and transgressive power of death and treating it as a banal event, the World State prevents a meaningful encounter with death. As we shall see, the best example of this is the State's handling of sacrifice, which preempts any form of genuine eroticism, metaphysical transgression or connection with the sacred in general.

4. (The Absence of) Spirituality in the World State

The absence of spiritual sentiments in the World State might be viewed as a direct consequence of its economic setup if we consider Neil Postman's assertion that, during the 19th century, it came to be believed that "the engine of technological progress worked most efficiently when people are conceived of not as children of God or even as citizens but as consumers" (42; cf. McDonough; Miller). It is not simply that, in the World State, spiritual sentiments are forbidden: they are disabled, as people are already incapable of experiencing them due to their conditioning and because of the lack of the social context that could function as a framework for, among other things, religion (festivals or rites). Yet, the novel's handling of spirituality is ambiguous. Mond explicitly states that religious sentiment is to be avoided if one wants to maintain such a civilisation as the State's:

We can be independent of God. ... [R]eligious sentiment is superfluous. ... [God] manifests himself as an absence, as though he weren't there at all. ... Call [this] the fault of civilization. God isn't compatible with machinery and scientific medicine and universal happiness. You must make your choice. Our civilization has chosen machinery and medicine and happiness. (Huxley, *Brave* 206–207)

As Miller puts it, in this world, "God is not merely second to technology ... but God has completely been stamped out and forgotten, replaced by paradigms of God being progress" ("Threat"). Fordism functions as a kind of pseudo-religion, filling the void left by the lack of organised religion (see Vignone 26), but, as Mond explains, "[p]eople believe in God because they've been conditioned to believe in God" (Huxley, *Brave* 207). The State might be seen as both an implementation and an inversion of Mond's statement, while its pseudo-religion and conditioning itself are not unlike how, for Freud, the instillation of religious beliefs in children is a form of abuse of education (*Illusion* 47–48; cf. 51–52; 54).

While thoroughly sceptic of all forms of religion, particularly organised religion, Freud does recognise its allure: "I [religion] can't give you what people commonly call 'truth'; you have to stick to science if this is what you want. But what I can give you is something incomparably more beautiful, more comforting, and more ennobling than anything science might have to offer" (*Outline* 160; cf. Huxley, *Brave* 206). The way that Freud formulates religion here might be seen as one aspect of what the World State's subjects are missing out on, however, ultimately, Freud is critical of the idea that religion is a viable way of attaining happiness (see *Civilization* 28). What is more important for the purposes of the present analysis

is that Freud addresses spirituality primarily through the lens of psychoanalysis, viewing it as a product of psychological mechanisms rather than a metaphysical reality. His approach is more rational than Bataille's, who critiques contemporary society for its lack of spirituality: "In past worlds, it was possible to lose oneself in ecstasy, which is impossible in our world of educated vulgarity" (*Visions* 179). Freud readily admits that he is not susceptible to any sense of the transcendental, spiritual, or numinous, however, in order to understand the World State's economy of pleasure, we must consider these elements. As it is the metaphysical side of spiritual experience that is more relevant for the economic stakes of the novel, I would like to suggest that Bataille's take on spirituality complements Freud's approach by identifying those characteristics that Freud does not account for. So far, in line with Freudian discourse, I have used the word "religion" to refer to the Western idea of organised religion. To accommodate Bataillean thinking, from now on I shall use the word "spirituality" to denote the idea of individuals coming into contact with metaphysical powers larger than themselves.

In general terms, while the rational Freud emphasises the mind's attempt to minimise overwhelming stimulation, Bataille celebrates the human tendency to amplify stimulation through acts of transgression and excess, even at the cost of destruction or death. Bataille sees human behaviour as driven by a desire to exceed boundaries (to transgress taboos; see *Eroticism* 86; cf. 256; Kripal 159), including those of the self, society, and life itself. For Bataille, this is a drive toward excess, which often manifests itself in acts that confront death, such as eroticism and sacrifice (and the violence that is part of both [*Eroticism* 16; 81]). According to Alexander C. Irwin, "theories of religion, inner experience, and the sacred are central to the vision of human life Bataille proposes" (105). Irwin identifies two dimensions of Bataille's view of spirituality: that of "inner experience" ("the territory of an intensely private, inward-turning, and essentially ahistorical venture into the hidden regions of the psyche" [106]) and "the domain of religion as social phenomenon" ("the public, historically evolving dimension of religious life expressed in collective religious rite" [106]). Bataille's theory is relevant in exploring the *absence* of spirituality in the World State since it focuses on precisely those spiritual elements which are absent from the State's perspective on life—spirituality (religion, mysticism, the transcendent and the metaphysical dimensions) both as a personally felt and social experience, as the working of the State is predicated on the exclusion of any sense of the transcendental.

4.1. Solidarity Service: Bataillean Eroticism in the World State

Some of the collective events, like the Solidarity Service or the fight-turned-orgy episode preceding John's suicide, are clearly ritually choreographed. Like actual religions, they aim to

rechannel potentially dangerous (violent) energies into a controlled, sanctioned activity. It is crucial, however, that for the participants the Service is not a “real”, deeply felt, transformative and transgressive spiritual experience. Rather, it is the secularised perversion of the same idea and one placebo among many that exist to create social cohesion as well as to maintain the status quo of constant pleasure and steady production (other examples include Violent Passion Surrogates and the Pregnancy Substitutes). What Mond implies when he says that “God isn’t compatible with machinery and scientific medicine and universal happiness” (Huxley, *Brave* 207) is that religious (spiritual, transcendental) sentiments are impossible, because they would make individuals aware of a dimension that is entirely outside (155), and potentially make them desire something that is unfulfillable: this is a world where the only desires are those that can be fulfilled. Therefore, Mond’s claim that “they never want what they can’t get” (193–94) rings true not only for consumerism but, in an ironic way, for spiritual experience as well.

It has been noted that “all dystopian fiction emphasizes the importance of social rituals” (Foust 84). In *Brave New World*, the “state-mandated, consequence-free sexual promiscuity intended to ... provide an unlimited source of carnal pleasure” (Hart 109; cf. Diken 164) culminates in the quasi-religious, drug-fuelled, ecstasy-inducing social event called “Solidarity Service”. The fact that Solidarity Services are state-mandated might be seen as an extreme realisation of what Freud writes in connection with civilisation’s handling of sexuality: because sexuality can function as “the model for all happiness” (*Civilization* 48), people have “place[d] genital eroticism at the center of [their lives]” (48), creating a “demand for a uniform sexual life for all” (52). These gatherings can be seen as travesties of religious rituals, replacing spiritual ecstasy and traditional sacred meaning with mechanical, state-sanctioned, “[c]hemically induced euphoria” (Horsley 259): the blending of soma, Solidarity Hymns and group chanting creates a collective experience designed to reinforce societal cohesion and the State’s power over its subjects. Congdon suggests that Huxley’s novel is “not a cautionary tale of technology, or even eugenics, but a preemptive critique of the type of belief systems which might be mobilized to make the society of the future possible” (85). While the novel, in particular the Solidarity Service scene, can be read as a critique of organised religion, the more revealing perspective for the State’s economy is that, in the context of Bataille’s theory of eroticism, it becomes clearer why the State’s population is incapable of spiritual sentiments. For Bataille and other anthropologists of religion, “[t]he aim of religious practices is by various means to reintroduce human beings into the sacred domain” (Irwin 116). Eroticism, in Bataille’s definition, is *not* aimed at “the accumulation of [physical] pleasure, but is also an experience which entails the dissolution of the boundaries of the self and a confrontation with mortality”

(Pawlett 78; see also 82; 90). For Bataille, eroticism is sexual experience in the broadest possible sense, including the spiritual: as he writes, “all eroticism has a sacramental character” (*Eroticism* 15–16). The closing scene of *Brave New World*, when “the members of the crowd begin to ‘mime’ John’s passionate gestures, everybody striking at one another in a mass orgy of soma, sex and violence” (Diken 161; cf. 163), might be viewed as literalising the violence that accompanies the disruption of societal, moral, and personal boundaries according to Bataillean eroticism (see *Eroticism* 192; 16).

The scene in which the Alpha Bernard participates in a biweekly Solidarity Service is central to the novel’s portrayal of the confluence of sexuality and spirituality. The Service is described as having a ritual function: “Twelve of them [were] ready to be made one, waiting to come together, to be fused, to lose their twelve separate identifies in a larger being” (Huxley, *Brave* 69). At the heart of the Solidarity Service stands the experience of fusion—what for Bataille accompanies erotic moments (Bataille, *Eroticism* 19; cf. 275; 20; *Accursed* 2: 113; 115–16). Throughout this scene, we can also identify motifs with religious connotations. The twelve participants recall the Twelve Disciples, while, in a distorted replica of the Christian sign of the cross (Huxley, *Brave* 45), the president of the gathering stands up and makes “the sign of the T” (69). The singing of the Solidarity Hymns is followed by the consumption of soma, not unlike the use of hallucinatory agents during religious tribal ceremonies,¹² accompanied by a “formula” consisting of the phrase “I drink to my annihilation” (70). This might once again recall Bataillean eroticism, which conceives of the sexual act as making one conscious of one’s own annihilation: “We can only reach a state of ecstasy when we are conscious of death or annihilation, even if remotely” (Bataille, *Eroticism* 267; cf. *Accursed* 2: 82; 84). The first word of the first Hymn identifies Ford as the recipient of the prayer asking for the arrival of “the Greater Being” (Huxley, *Brave* 70) in whom the twelve participants are to be merged, and the Hymns themselves also describe fusion, annihilation, rejoicing and a “larger life” that is to begin after the death of the participants (70). Another chanted formula, “I drink to the imminence of His Coming” (71), might bring to mind the second coming of key religious figures, for example that of Jesus in Christian eschatologies.

The choice of words after the three Hymns reinforces the sexual aspect of the encounter: “The sense of the Coming’s imminence [is] like an electric tension in the air” (71), there is

¹² Soma connects the themes of sexuality and spirituality by providing “an ersatz religious experience” (Diken 154): “Christianity without tears—that’s what soma is”, Mond explains to John (Huxley, *Brave* 210—italics removed; 46). Soma’s connection with spirituality should be seen in the context of how Huxley was inspired by real-world religious rituals of the Vedic people (McDonough).

“silence of stretched expectancy, quivering and creeping with a galvanic life” (71). This is broken by “a wonderful, mysterious, supernatural Voice from above their heads” (71), making those present “melt” and “dissolve” by its “penetrating” whisper (72), and then “suddenly the tearing point [is] reached” (72). A ritualistic incantation is the cue for the participants to become “dancers” going around in a circle “beating [the rhythm] out with hands on the buttocks in front” (73). Finally, the saying “twelve as one” (73) (as well as the dictum “everyone belongs to everyone else” [34; 37; 40; 104; 110; 180]) is literalised during the “[o]rgy-porgy” (73) that ensues: these words “announce the approaching *atonement* and final *consummation* of solidarity, the coming of the Twelve-in-One, the *incarnation* of the Greater Being” (73—italics mine). The “[o]rgy porgy gives release” (73), and all members except Bernard appear to enjoy “the calm *ecstasy* of achieved consummation, the peace ... of balanced life, of energies at rest and in *equilibrium*. ... For the Solidarity Service had given as well as taken, drawn off only to replenish” (74—italics mine). It is in this way, through the exchange of energy, that the Service feeds into the State’s stability-based economy of pleasure.

Sexual connotations are also suggested when the narrator remarks that Bernard repeats the phrase “‘I drink to the imminence of His Coming’ ... with a sincere attempt to feel that the coming was imminent; but the eyebrow [of Morgana, one of the participants] continued to haunt him, and the Coming, so far as he was concerned, was horribly remote” (71). The word “coming” foreshadows the sexual gratification of the participants, but the focaliser Bernard has a different experience already at the beginning, when he notes the attractiveness or lack thereof of his female companions. Having “blindly planted himself next to Morgana” and having endured a failed attempt at conversation, he “foresaw for himself yet another failure to achieve atonement”, because he wishes he were sat next to someone else (69). Later, Morgana passes the soma-cup to Bernard, who drinks from it: “‘It’ll be a failure again,’ he said to himself. ‘I know it will.’ But he went on doing his best to beam” (71). Thus, a lack of sexual attraction is highlighted as the source of Bernard’s struggle with finding the situation pleasurable (a motif which occurs at a later point as well, during Lenina’s failed attempt at seducing John, see 168–71). Although “[f]or someone fully imbricated into Fordism, the Solidarity Service is a perfect religious experience satisfying the religious emotion” (Congdon 97) and only Bernard’s dissatisfaction is mentioned, what the other characters feel is not genuine ecstasy, due to the travesty-like framework of the Service. Bernard sees the inauthenticity of the ritual (but he only does so because he cannot have sex with whoever he wants): by the end of the Service, he “was as miserably isolated now as he had been when the service began ... [s]eparate and unatoned” (Huxley, *Brave* 74; cf. 65; Bataille, *Accursed* 1: 58n15). His religious emotion seems to be more

engaged in the scene when he and Lenina fly over the sea (Huxley, *Brave* 78; cf. Congdon 99), but even then he is unable to find someone who would understand him. Although eroticism and sacrifice could, in theory, provide a way of momentarily overcoming the State's regulation, for Huxley's characters, eroticism and sacrifice in the Bataillean sense are not conceivable, due to how spiritual experience is always out of reach in the World State.

Solidarity Services mimic the general logic (purpose) of spiritual rites: they offer a carefully constructed, regulated and repeatable process that ensures stability (Caillois 128). What is missing, however, is the potential within spiritual experience to push individuals beyond ordinary experience (in a sacrificial sense, from the profane into the realm of the sacred, as explained later). While Bataille mentions "orgiastic dances" as an example of "organizations that have ecstasy and frenzy as their goal" (*Visions* 102), if the only real purpose of the Solidarity Service appears to be the purveying of pleasures, by definition, it could never be the kind of erotic experience that is described by Bataille, as, instead of *physical* pleasure (Pawlett 78), Bataille refers to ecstasy (*metaphysical* pleasure) as the defining state brought about by eroticism (and as that in which "[l]ife ... finds its grandeur and its reality" [*Visions* 179]). Thus, on the surface level, the confluence of spirituality and sexuality brings about what seems like a transcendental experience, however, due to the State's inability or refusal to conceive of transcendence, this can only be a travesty of eroticism in its full Bataillean sense. Thus, despite the apparent similarities between Huxley's novel, contemporary anthropological approaches towards religion and Bataille's theory, Solidarity Services are not spiritual experiences proper: instead, they are simply a way of enacting the State's encouragement of casual sex. Through Solidarity Services, the State regulates, commodifies and institutionalises sexual pleasure into a tool of social control, to such an extent that transgression—a key aspect of Bataillean eroticism—no longer exists, because, in this dystopian world, there are no taboos left to violate. This has two implications. Firstly, the State's commodification of pleasure means that it has stripped pleasure of its transgressive, subversive, sacred, ecstasy-inducing potential. Secondly, the State's absence of spirituality might more specifically be conceptualised as the absence of the possibility of transgression. I would like to suggest that John's figure serves as an exception: in line with his generally intense (and sometimes possibly violent) psychic economy, his is the only life in the narrative that has a potential for spirituality and transgression.

4.2. A Case Study of John the Savage: Asceticism and Sacrifice

While John felt alienated already in the Savage Reservation, his birthplace, it is only after Bernard and Lenina bring him to London that his outsider status becomes explicit (see Huxley,

Brave 207). Having grown up among the “savage” Native Americans, he is neither genetically engineered, nor conditioned. Instead, John has been raised with traditions which, in many ways, mirror those of Huxley’s contemporary Western civilisation: he finds it hard to accept the State’s eradication of what he believes are fundamental life experiences, such as love between family members, grief, heroism, enjoyment of the arts and enduring suffering as part of life. Throughout the narrative, John challenges the State’s norms by refusing soma (see Serdar 366), advocating for the right—the “liberty” (Huxley, *Brave* 194; 187; see Freud, *Civilization* 42)—to suffer and to feel deeply, and via seeking authenticity through isolation by an abandoned lighthouse, even if this means instability or pain. John’s association with two spiritual motifs, asceticism and sacrifice, can help pinpoint specific aspects of the World State’s attitude towards spirituality and the latter’s relationship to the State’s broader economic structure.

While John is crafting a bow near the lighthouse, he is reminded of the swarming twins around Linda’s deathbed, who were “insulting with their presence, not merely his own grief and repentance, but the very gods themselves” (Huxley, *Brave* 218). It is moments like this which make it possible to see John, who has a spiritual connection with both his tribe’s divinities and Jesus, as the character whose religious emotion within the novel is most fully engaged. John’s standpoint is best visible in his and Mond’s theoretical debate on religion. Throughout the scene, John argues for the possible existence of a god: “isn’t it *natural* to feel there’s a God?” (207) and “God’s the reason for everything noble and fine and heroic” (209). John’s remark highlights the State’s fundamental lack of genuine belief in the transcendental—which is also the condition for the existence of the sacred sphere. John’s beliefs can be traced back to the scene on the Reservation, in which his contemplation of suicide impelled him to “discover Time and Death and God” (118; cf. 207; 203). He believes that if the State’s people believed in God, similarly to the Indians, they “wouldn’t allow [themselves] to be degraded by pleasant vices” (208) and would “have a reason for self-denial” (209). His self-flagellation is his way of demonstrating his belief: “If you allowed yourselves to think of God, ... [y]ou’d have a reason for bearing things patiently, for doing things with courage” (208). It is also in the bow-scene that John formulates the principle behind asceticism: “it was not to sing and enjoy himself that he had come here. It was to escape further contamination by the filth of civilized life; it was to be purified and made good; it was actively to make amends” (218; cf. 213). John turns to isolation, self-harm and self-induced vomiting as ways of ascetic purification, hoping that this would make him abstain from temptations, primarily from his sexual thoughts about Lenina (see 222; cf. Bataille, *Eroticism* 7), as well as prevent him from forgetting the horrific circumstances of Linda’s death (Huxley, *Brave* 218; cf. Saracino 14).

Mond counters John's declaration of his belief in self-denial by saying that "industrial civilization is only possible when there's no self-denial. Self-indulgence up to the very limits imposed by hygiene and economics. Otherwise the wheels stop turning" (Huxley, *Brave* 209). Mond points out how, for the World State, self-denial is not only illogical (going against an economy based on perpetual consumption), but also unnecessary: "what you ought to do is on the whole so pleasant, so many of the natural impulses are allowed free play, that there aren't any temptations to resist" (209). John's asceticism, thus, sets him apart as the character whose sheer presence questions the unchallenged primacy of the pleasure principle in the World State. He is the one who is capable of feeling pleasure in a way that is closer to our definition of the word than to the State's limited one: similarly to when he was learning to work clay on the Reservation as a teenager (116), the creation of the bow "gave [John] an intense pleasure" (218), which clearly contrasts the mass production and meaningless pleasures preferred by the State. Finally, the lack of self-denial encouraged by the State also ties in with the wider theme of the absence of the possibility of transgression in the novel: John's asceticism is not only the resumption of his Reservation lifestyle and a logical means of rebellion against the State, but also the only moment of transgression that is fully realised in the narrative.

John's self-flagellation recalls the scene in which he participates in a ritual on the Reservation, witnessed also by Bernard and Lenina (97–99). This is when the idea of sacrifice appears in explicit terms in the novel: John's conversation with Lenina reveals that he wanted to be whipped (100–101). On the most basic level, it appears that John's death cannot be conceptualised in sacrificial terms because the narrative ends before his death could become meaningful for the other characters (we never learn how any of them react to it) and also because, having lost its numinous character, in this world, death carries in itself none of the qualities (continuity, intimacy with the world; see Irwin 117) that spirituality associates with it. Bataille writes that, in premodern societies, "[t]he reality of a profane world, of a world of things and bodies, is established opposite a holy and mythical world" (*Religion* 37; cf. *Eroticism* 67; Caillois 132), and, for him, sacrifice—a key moment of eroticism, and one of the ways in which nonproductive expenditure is carried out—is "the religious act above all others" (*Eroticism* 81). Classical anthropological sociology has viewed sacrifice as "simultaneously violent and regulatory" (Kristeva 75). For Bataille, too, through violence, the sacrificial victim might be restored to the realm of the sacred and the intimate (that is, the realm of eroticism; *Religion* 58), in this way bringing about the restoration of continuity (Irwin 117). Similarly, René Girard notes that sacrifice, "[b]ecause the violence is unanimously ordained, ... effectively restores peace and order" (88; cf. 90; 92). John's death indeed restores continuity,

peace and order, but it does so in a literal, profane way: from the perspective of the State's society, he is not reintroduced into the sacred realm—as no such realm is collectively imagined or is indeed imaginable in the World State. Historically, the function of sacrifice has been to ensure the renewal of the world (Caillois 101; 131; cf. Bataille, *Accursed* 2: 55), however, the State's community is built upon pragmatic economic principles that deny and exclude anything capable of maintaining spiritual or metaphysical values. As Haeryung Yoon points out, John could potentially take on the role of Christ as the sacrificial lamb (893) for the State, but this would presuppose that, through his death, he is purifying his community of evil or pollution. Community *is* one of the key principles of the World State (as is clear from its motto, “community, identity, stability” [Huxley, *Brave* 1; 5]), but perfect happiness (in World State terms) and slight discomfort (to be soothed by soma-holidays) are the only possible states of existence it affords and allows: from the State's point of view, there is no evil or pollution which would necessitate ritual purification. Given the total absence of spiritual sentiment, the impossibility of sacrifice outside the Reservations does not come as a surprise. The conditions which would allow sacrifice—the willed death of animals or human beings and the symbolic, transcendental significance that could be attributed to such an act by the community performing the sacrifice—are simply non-existent in the State. Conversely, John's participation in the Reservation ritual might be regarded as sacrifice from the perspective of the community, as it occurs against the background of a genuine shared belief in a transcendental sphere, which seems to be the condition of attributing significance to such symbolic suffering and death.

John, the outsider, is the only figure who actively tries to take control of his own fate: he rejects the pleasure principle, searches for spiritual meaning, achieves transgression through asceticism, and we might suppose that he regards his own death as (meaningful) sacrifice (Buchanan 33). Yet, ultimately, his attempt at spirituality and his refusal to participate in the everyday economy of pleasure of the World State are pointless. Perhaps this awareness is what prompts the narrator to note the “impotence of asceticism” even before John is introduced (Huxley, *Brave* 59). Although for Bataille sacrifice “represents [the] compromise between the sacred and profane orders” (Kripal 160; cf. Bataille, *Religion* 47; Irwin 116–17) by “restor[ing] to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane” (*Accursed* 1: 55; cf. *Religion* 68), John's tragic end underscores the incompatibility of the idea of the sacred—both in its conventional and Bataillean sense—with the profane, consumerism-driven economy of the World State. In line with its lack of any sense of the transcendental, the State has eradicated traditional notions of the sacred and profane, replacing them with a new hierarchy of values that reflects the priorities of a consumer-driven, technocratic society. John's situation might

also be seen as an example of how, as Freud writes, the conflict between “the claims of the individual and the mass claims of civilization” might be irreconcilable (*Civilization* 42), although here the Freudian setup is reversed: society encourages its members to find pleasure, but John seeks to endure suffering. Rather than live what he calls a life of slavery (Huxley, *Brave* 186)—fuelled by soma and unrestrained sexual indulgence—he professes: “I don’t want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want sin. ... I’m claiming the right to be unhappy” (211–12).

Conclusion

Pleasure is perhaps the most important keyword of the World State's ethos, as it fundamentally defines the State's economy in various ways and on various levels. In this essay, I have examined how pleasure is present in Huxley's World State by identifying three different areas of its economy where pleasure plays a key role, arguing that, ultimately, it is this economy of pleasure that is responsible for the absence of a spiritual dimension in the State. Here, the traditional realm of the sacred—religion and spirituality—and the conventional profane world—individuality and freedom—have been systematically replaced by a new set of values tied to achieving stability through consumerism and biotechnological control. Consequently, with the exception of the “misanthropic trio” (Vignone 27), for the State's subjects life is devoid of personal struggle or existential meaning, replaced by hedonistic consumerist pleasures and conformity engineered and conditioned from birth. In Freudian terms, most of the psyche's economic processes are, as it were, disabled, including sublimation and repression: it is the pleasure principle that is in sole charge of regulating psychic life, both on the individual and collective level. Thus, it can be ensured that the individual's experience is always one of contentment—what the State calls “happiness”, but what actually means only pleasurable physical sensations, the satisfaction of consumer desires, and hollow imitations of genuine spiritual experiences through the “orgy-porgies” of Solidarity Services.

The State conceives itself and human existence as immanent: everything that is transcendent, that is, “external”, disappears, including the idea of the unattainable, and thus the idea of unfulfilled desire as such. Reading the State in the context of Bataille's theories enables us to grasp the spiritual implications of its economic conditions: by disabling the kind of transgression that would enable connection with the sacred realm, the State creates a sterile, characteristically dystopian travesty of utilitarianism. In a world characterised by general promiscuity, continuous production and consumption, and the absence of spirituality, John's desire, determination even, to be allowed the choice of maintaining a potentially (by the World State's standards) unhappy and solitary existence based on abstinence and spirituality is a rebellion also in economic terms, violating the principles of the State's restrictive economy. An “emblem of unorthodoxy” (Serdar 366), he embodies more profound human needs, such as the need for a life lived with intensity, even if this life entails suffering, and the inherent urge to breach the limits of profane human experience via attuning oneself to the spiritual. John comes closest to standing for the possibility of real spiritual experience in the novel, and we might suppose that before his death, for a short time, he circumvents the State's eradication of

transgression. On the plot level, however, John's suicide ultimately signifies a failure not only because it is a tragic and premature end to his life, but also because this death fails to be transmuted into a sacrifice. While John's rejection of the State is also in line with Bataille's belief in the necessity and defining role of transgression and the sacred, his tragic fate highlights how, in this world, nonproductive expenditure and sacrifice cannot function as outlets for escapism—ultimately, all forms of escape are rendered impossible by the structure of the system itself. Resistance is futile against this regime which physically, socially and psychologically suppresses individuality so as to maintain its own stability. In economic terms, the rigidity of the World State's system could not accommodate a broader, less traditional definition of economy without destabilising its equilibrium.

While Freud emphasises the regulation of psychic energy through the pleasure principle, Bataille focuses on the active and often ecstatic confrontation with death and the limits of life experienced through transgression. Both theoreticians frame these dynamics in terms of what we might call an economy of pleasure. But whereas Freud sees creation through sublimation as a solution to unproductive energy, Bataille sees the nonproductive expenditure of excess energy, including eroticism and sacrifice, as opportunities for transgression and connection with the sacred. *Brave New World* reveals the social consequences of the denial of both: a world of superficial pleasure and profound emptiness. Thus, ultimately, the World State's economy is characterised not by an excess but by a lack.

Works Cited

- Ağır, Barış. "Biopolitics of Body in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*." *International Journal of Filologia*, vol. 5, no. 8, 2022, pp. 152–61, <http://doi.org/10.51540/ijof.1208501>.
- Bataille, Georges. *The Accursed Share*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Zone Books, 1991. 3 vols.
- . *Death and Sensuality: A Study of Eroticism and the Taboo*. Translated by Mary Dalwood, Walker and Company, 1962.
- . *Inner Experience*. Translated by Leslie Anne Boldt, State U of New York P, 1988.
- . *Theory of Religion*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Zone Books, 1989.
- . *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*, edited by Allan Stoekl. Translated by Allan Stoekl et al, U of Minnesota P, 1986.
- Baudrillard, Jean. *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*. Translated by Chris Turner, Sage Publications, 1998.
- Biles, Jeremy, and Kent L. Brintnall, editors. *Negative Ecstasies: Georges Bataille and the Study of Religion*. Fordham UP, 2015.
- Bode, Christoph. "Aldous Huxley (1894–1963)." *Classics in Cultural Criticism*, vol 1, edited by Bernd-Peter Lange, Peter Lang, 1990, pp. 343–73.
- Buchanan, Bradley W. "Oedipus against Freud: Humanism and the Problem of Desire in *Brave New World*." Izzo and Kirkpatrick, pp. 26–45.
- Buse, William. *Psychotherapy Under the Influence of Georges Bataille: From Social Theory to Clinical Practice*. Routledge, 2021.
- Caillois, Roger. *Man and the Sacred*. Translated by Meyer Barash, Free Press, 1959.
- Chappe, Raphaële. "Pleasure, Happiness and Fulfillment: The Trouble with Utility." *Institute for New Economic Thinking*, 3 Nov. 2012, www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/pleasure-happiness-and-fulfillment-the-trouble-with-utility.
- Claeys, Gregory. "The Huxleyan Conundrum: *Brave New World* as Anti-Utopia." *Dystopia: A Natural History*. Oxford UP, 2017, pp. 357–89.
- Congdon, Brad. "'Community, Identity, Stability': The Scientific Society and the Future of Religion in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*." *English Studies in Canada*, vol. 37, no. 3–4, 2011, pp. 83–105, <http://doi.org/10.1353/esc.2011.0041>.
- Datta, Souvik, and Ankita Dutta. "Psychoanalytic Deconstruction of Dystopian Personae: A Comprehensive Study of *Brave New World*, 1984, *Fahrenheit 451* and *The Handmaid's*

- Tale.*” *International Journal of English Literature and Social Sciences*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2023, pp. 182–88, <http://doi.org/10.22161/ijels.81.21>.
- Diken, Bülent. “Huxley’s *Brave New World*—and Ours.” *Journal for Cultural Research*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2011, pp. 153–72, <http://doi.org/10.1080/14797585.2011.574056>.
- Esposito, Roberto. *Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life*. Translated by Zakiya Hanafi, Polity Press, 2011.
- Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta. *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy*. U of California P, 1997.
- Firchow, Peter. “Science and Conscience in Huxley’s *Brave New World*.” *Contemporary Literature*, vol. 16, no. 3, 1975, pp. 301–16, <http://doi.org/10.2307/1207404>.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality*. Translated by Robert Hurley, vol. 1, Pantheon Books, 1978.
- Foust, R. E. “A Limited Perfection: Dystopia as Logos Game.” *Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature*, vol. 15, no. 3, 1982, pp. 79–88, www.jstor.org/stable/24777571.
- Franck, Matthew J. “*Brave New World*, Plato’s *Republic*, and Our Scientific Regime.” *The New Atlantis*, no. 40, 2013, pp. 73–88, http://thenewatlantis.com/wp-content/uploads/legacy-pdfs/20140117_TNA40Franck.pdf.
- Freud, Sigmund. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Translated and edited by James Strachey, W.W. Norton & Company, 1961.
- . *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Translated by David McLintock, Penguin Books, 2004.
- . *The Future of an Illusion*. Translated and edited by James Strachey, W.W. Norton & Company, 1961.
- . *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Translated and edited by James Strachey, W.W. Norton & Company, 1959.
- . *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. Translated by Helena Ragg-Kirkby, Penguin Books, 2003.
- . *Project for a Scientific Psychology. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by James Strachey et al, vol. 1, Hogarth Press, 1966, pp. 281–391.
- . “Repression.” *SE of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by James Strachey et al, vol. 14, Hogarth Press, 1971, pp. 141–58.
- . “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.” *SE of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by James Strachey et al, vol. 7, Hogarth Press, 1953, pp. 123–246.

- Frost, Laura. "The Pleasures of Dystopia." Greenberg and Waddell, pp. 69–88.
- Girard, René. *Violence and the Sacred*. Translated by Patrick Gregory, Continuum, 2005.
- Greenberg, Jonathan, and Nathan Waddell, editors. *Brave New World: Contexts and Legacies*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Hart, Bradley W. "Aldous Huxley and the Twentieth-Century Eugenics Movement." *Critical Insights: Brave New World*, edited by M. Keith Booker, Salem Press, 2014, pp. 108–22.
- Horsley, Lee. "Technopower: 'Leviathan on Wheels' in Dystopian Science Fiction." *Fictions of Power in English Literature: 1900–1950*. Routledge, 2014, pp. 236–82.
- Huxley, Aldous. *Brave New World*. Vintage, 2022.
- . *Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited*. HarperCollins, 2005.
- . *Letters of Aldous Huxley*, edited by Grover Smith, Chatto & Windus, 1969.
- . "Science and Civilization." *Aldous Huxley Complete Essays*, edited by Robert S. Baker and James Sexton, vol. 3, Ivan R. Dee, 2000, pp. 148–55.
- . "The Substitutes for Religion." *Aldous Huxley Complete Essays*, edited by Robert S. Baker and James Sexton, vol. 2, Ivan R. Dee, 2000, pp. 248–58.
- Irwin, Alexander C. "Ecstasy, Sacrifice, Communication: Bataille on Religion and Inner Experience." *Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, vol. 76, no. 1, 1993, pp. 105–28, www.jstor.org/stable/41178621.
- Izzo, David Garrett, and Kim Kirkpatrick, editors. *Huxley's Brave New World: Essays*. McFarland, 2008.
- Jünger, Ernst. *On Pain*. Translated by David C. Durst, Telos Press Publishing, 2008.
- Keiper, Caitlin. "Brave New World at 75." *The New Atlantis*, no. 16, 2007, pp. 41–54, www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/brave-new-world-at-75.
- Kripal, Jeffrey J. "The Traumatic Secret: Bataille and the Comparative Erotics of Mystical Literature." Biles and Brintnall, pp. 153–68.
- Kristeva, Julia. *Revolution in Poetic Language*. Columbia UP, 1984.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. *Libidinal Economy*. Translated by Iain Hamilton Grant, Indiana UP, 1993.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Routledge, 2007.
- Matter, William W. "The Utopian Tradition and Aldous Huxley." *Science Fiction Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1975, pp. 146–51, www.jstor.org/stable/4238937.

- McDonough, Richard. "Aldous Huxley." *ODIP*, edited by Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, 2012, www.odipphilosophy.com/huxley.
- Miller, Derek D. "Brave New World and the Threat of Technological Growth." *Inquiries Journal*, vol. 3, no. 4, 2011, www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=509.
- Moosavinia, Sayyed Rahim, and Anis Hosseini Pour. "Women in a Nightmarish Utopia: The Effect of Technology in *Brave New World*." *Folia Linguistica et Litteraria*, vol. 36, 2021, pp. 57–72, <http://doi.org/10.31902/fl.36.2021.4>.
- Noys, Benjamin. *Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction*. Pluto Press, 2000.
- Pakzad, Noushin. "The Colonizer and the Colonized: A Postcolonial Approach to *Brave New World*." *Teaching English Language*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2010, pp. 141–51, <http://doi.org/10.22132/tel.2010.66110>.
- Parrinder, Patrick. "Brave New World as a Modern Utopia." Greenberg and Waddell, pp. 15–30.
- Pawlett, William. *Georges Bataille: The Sacred and Society*. Routledge, 2016.
- Peller, Scott. "Labouring for a *Brave New World*: Our Ford and the Epsilons." *Huxley's Brave New World: Essays*. Izzo and Kirkpatrick, pp. 62–72.
- Pettman, Caitlin. "Accepted Science and Rejected Sexuality: The Revealing Nature of the Uncanny in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*." *Agora*, vol. 24, 2015, <http://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/agora/vol24/iss2015/10>.
- Postman, Neil. *Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology*. Vintage Books, 1993.
- Saracino, Antonio Domenico. *Humanity Dehumanized: Fordian and Freudian Models of Huxley's Brave New World*. 2011. Göteborg University, C-essay, <http://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/26180>.
- Scitovsky, Tibor. *The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction*. 1976. Oxford UP, 1992.
- Seed, David. "Aldous Huxley: *Brave New World*." *A Companion to Science Fiction*, edited by David Seed, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 477–88.
- Serdar, Hamdi Ali. "The Instinct of Death in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*." *The Journal of Academic Social Science*, no. 51, 2017, pp. 364–69, <http://doi.org/10.16992/ASOS.12426>.
- Spengler, Oswald. *The Decline of the West*. Translated by Charles Francis Atkinson, Forgotten Books, 2015. 2 vols.
- Valls, José Luis. *Freudian Dictionary: A Comprehensive Guide to Freudian Concepts*. Translated by Susan H. Rogers, Routledge 2019.

- Vignone, Sebastian. *Remaking Divinity in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World*. 2021. SUNY College Cortland, MA thesis, <http://digitalcommons.cortland.edu/theses/148/>.
- Yoon, Haeryung. "The Two Landscapes of Desecrated Sexuality: *1984* and *Brave New World*." *English Language and Literature*, vol. 53, no. 5, 2007, pp. 879–96, www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/landing/article.kci?arti_id=ART001213908.