


The Evolution of Peacekeeping

The question of success in peace operations

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Abstract

In this paper I attempt to answer the question of success in peace operations. Peacekeeping's comprehensive goal is to impose Johan Galtung's positive peace, namely the permanent absence of structural violence. My main argument is that both quantitative and qualitative factors matter in managing a successful mission. Besides, I collected some critical issues about peace operation's performance that also can influence the outcome. I come to the conclusion that the United Nations was reflective to the vehement criticism and tried to build new elements into its peacekeeping framework.

Keywords: *peace, peacekeeping, peace building, success, United Nations*

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Introduction

Peacekeeping is one of the most known activities of the United Nations. After ten thousand years of bloodshed in the history of humanity peacekeeping is the manifestation of a sharp change of focus on the protection of human life. During more than sixty years many conflicts were resolved by UN peacekeepers across the five continents. There were some failures and renewed conflicts, as well, that shadow this supposed-to-be successful initiative of the international community. It seems to be a more difficult exercise to manage the creation of peace than just following a guideline. Therefore, my research question in this paper is what success means in peacekeeping.

In the first section I present peacekeeping per se, its brief historical development and the types of missions. Before mentioning success in peacekeeping it is necessary to understand the concept of peace we want to keep, enforce or build. Thus, in the second part I present different conceptions about peace, mostly based on Johan Galtung's work. A peace operation has quantitative and qualitative elements that both can influence the outcome of the mission. Therefore, in the third part I collected quantitative and qualitative approaches about evaluating success of peace operations. Due to a vehement criticism many aspects of peacekeeping were questioned and formed a negative current public opinion on itself. In section four I present some of these critical issues related to peacekeeping activities. In the last part I mention how the UN system attempted to reflect these above appeared problems and fill gaps in its reform process in the 2000s.

I. What is peacekeeping?

Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the UN to maintain international peace and security. It means the deployment of personnel in order to limit and prevent armed conflicts and violence and maintain peace. As time goes on, the definition of peacekeeping changes. Originally, peacekeeping operations were deployed only in interstate conflicts but after the end of the Cold War the international community tended to intervene in intrastate conflicts and civil wars, as well. (Fortna and Howard, 2008)

Technically, the UN Charter nowhere refers to the practice of peacekeeping. Today it is one of

the central activities of the UN but it was a practice improvised after the Charter was published. It includes activities discussed in Chapter VI and Chapter VII. The former refers to „pacific settlement of disputes” therefore provides basis for „traditional” peacekeeping missions, the latter refers to „action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression” therefore provides broader possibility for using armed forces and establishing peace enforcement mission to comply “the action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security”. (UN, 1945) As peacekeeping contains the both, former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld described peacekeeping as „chapter six and a half”. This phrase is still used in UN circles. (Fortna-Howard, 2008:3)

I.1. Three waves in Peacekeeping

There are three distinguishable parts of descriptive history of peacekeeping which are also reflected by the atmosphere in literature about peacekeeping, as Fortna and Howard (2008) point out. To understand the questions around peacekeeping we need to look through a brief summary of this development, as I do it in the followings.

As an UN-activity, of course, peacekeeping also follows the structure of world politics. First peace operations were deployed during the Cold War, primarily observer operations, later traditional peacekeeping operations with lightly-armed support and a range of successful results in the sense of success that refers to keeping peace in international disputes and conflicts. I need to emphasise that during this period the UN focused on and intervened only in conflicts between states not within them. In scientific evaluation it was typical to use rather quantitative factors related to peacekeeping missions. (Fortna and Howard, 2008)

This was followed by the newfound interest of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War. Both the Great Powers and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali were enthusiastic about a more comprehensive peacekeeping. There was an expanded set of expectations about the possibility of fulfilling the UN's original envisioned role, as the basis of a global collective security system based on a great power concert. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) The focus of peacekeeping turned to intrastate conflicts and civil wars, the missions got more non-

military tasks and there was a boom in deploying operations, too. In the first three years after the Cold War there were more new operations established than in the 30 years before. The profile of peace operations started to shift from peace keeping to peace making and, on the other part of the spectrum, peace and nation building.

But this new form turned quickly to a focus on failure, dysfunction, and unintended consequences due to the failed operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica (Bosnia) and Angola in the early 1990s. Effectiveness, legitimacy, transparency and – most embarrassing – the professionalism of the UN operations and personnel were questioned. The negative externalities of peace operations started to be a research topic in scientific and media circles. For example, Fortna (2004) cites Gilligan and Stedman who evidenced that the number of deaths increased after peacekeepers were deployed (this was dramatically the case, for example, in Rwanda where the genocide took place after UN intervention). Michael Lipson (2002) named peacekeeping “Organized hypocrisy”. Other scholars started to draw attention on the qualitative factors of peacekeeping, as I develop below. There were and are some questions still not clear, for example:

- whether peacekeeping is best conducted by the United Nations or by other organizations or regional actors;
- the effectiveness of the use of force;
- whether and when more intrusive and longer-term transitional administrations are effective;
- and the impact of peacekeeping not only on stable peace but also on other goals, such as democratization, etc.

In sum, the new-found comprehensive goal of peace operations did not overlap the capacities and competences of peacekeepers. Due to this, the respect of the United Nations dropped drastically within the international community.

As a consequence of these failures it became clear that it is not enough to impose peace but it also should be kept, if possible by the internal population and not by peacekeepers. To contrast the above mentioned failed cases there were numerous rarely-mentioned successes where UN could establish self-sustaining peace that lasts after the mission

departs. Examples are found in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Croatia, and the West African peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau. (Fortna-Howard, 2008)

After this unsuccessful period in peacekeeping came a radical change. The whole system in relation with peace operations were revised, both structurally and in approach. High emphasis was put on quantitative and qualitative factors, as well.

Today's peacekeeping missions are under high pressure by governments, international and non-governmental organisation, the media and the global publicity not to run into another failure again. "Peace operations are therefore expected to produce positive outcomes such as promoting stability and durable peace; they are expected to rebuild and develop and they are expected to generate respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy." (Aoi et al., 2007:5). Therefore, current peace operations rather focus on peace or state building.

I.2. Types of mission

According to Fortna (2004) we can distinguish four different types of peacekeeping operations: Observer mission, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In accordance with the above mentioned, the former three are based on the consent of the parties and authorized under Chapter VI, the latter under Chapter VII and do not necessarily require the consent of the belligerents.

Observer missions are mostly small sized and apply unarmed monitors. **Traditional peacekeeping missions** are somewhat larger and involve lightly armed military units, in most cases in addition to observers. They are usually authorized not to use force but only in case of self-defence or defence of the mandate.

The so-called **multidimensional** peacekeeping missions were firstly deployed in the 1990s, in line with a new world order, a new humanitarian focus on peacekeeping and new purposes of building sustainable (positive) peace. They supplement traditional peacekeeping forces with large civilian components: election officers, human rights and police trainers and monitors, demining and reconstruction personnel, refugee repatriation experts, gender experts and even civil administrators. (Druckman, 1997:158; UN, 2003:10) In their tasks are

usually providing humanitarian assistance, and assisting with the rebuilding of judicial institutions. In relations to military tasks, peacekeepers moved from merely observing troop movements after interstate wars to actively assisting with troop demobilization, reintegration, retraining, and the construction of national military forces after civil wars. Multidimensional missions are usually called “integrated missions” or simply “peace operations”, as well, referring to the mixture style of it. (Fortna-Howard, 2008) Missions with the goal to build new institutional framework, functioning state administrations, etc. are called peace building operations or state building operations. About transitional administrations – a special form of multidimensional missions – I explain more below, among the critical questions.

According to the United Nations’ Handbook (UN, 2003), multidimensional peacekeeping operations may be required to:

- Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement;
- Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes;

Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal civilian life;

- Prevent the outbreak or spill-over of conflict across borders;
- Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development; and
- Administer a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government.

Civilians have taken on a growing number of responsibilities, which can include:


- Helping former opponents implement complex peace agreements by liaising with a range of political and civil society actors;
- Supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- Assisting with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants;
- Supervising and conducting elections;
- Strengthening the rule of law, including assistance with judicial reform and training of civilian police;

- Promoting respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations;
- Assisting with post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation; and
- Setting up a transitional administration of a territory as it moves towards independence.

While peacekeeping is primarily supposed to implement long-negotiated peace agreements, **peace enforcement** generally concerns the use of force in case of lacking “peace to keep”. Until the non-cooperative party is defeated or agrees to a peace agreement, peace enforcement missions are allowed to use force in order to impose peace — as occurred, for example, in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ivory Coast. (Fortna-Howard, 2008) Therefore their forces are better armed and larger. As Fortna (2004) argues, peace enforcement seems generally more likely when there are three or more factions in the fight than in simpler two-way conflicts. In every enforcement case there were at least three parties to the conflict, according to her analysis.

To sum up, I show these four types of mission in Figure 1, differentiated on two dimensions: duration of the mission and type of force allowed to be used. Observer and peace enforcement are usually short term deployments, while traditional peacekeeping and multidimensional peace building need longer time. Observer and traditional missions can use lightly-armed forces, whereas peace enforcement and peace building deployments are allowed to use any coercive force to fulfil their mandate.

Figure 1. Types of mission, Source: Author



II. Different approaches about peace

Most scholars accept the fundamental statement that peace should be seen as the absence of violence or conflict. From a traditional realist or – more broadly – rational choice point of view conflict is an objective phenomenon that originates in the anarchic competition for resources between states. Therefore, as conflict is an intrinsic quality of both human beings and the modern state system, it can only be managed, rather than permanently resolved, through zero-sum settlements that compromise fundamental interests. (Young, 2011) Consequently, these approaches mostly focus on the quantifiable aspects of peace and peacekeeping, as I explain later. In professional circles this type of absence of violence called “**negative peace**”.

Other scholars with sociological or constructivist background emphasise the qualitative, less visible elements of peace. Johan Galtung (1969, 1990) also accepts the definition of peace as absence of violence. But at this point he develops a detailed sophistication and diversification of violence.¹ He distinguishes **direct** (personal), **structural** (indirect) and **cultural violence**, forming together a complex triangle. Direct violence is the ‘traditional’ type of violence, when a considerable subject that violates a considerable object through a considerable action.² Structural violence is more indirect, mostly embedded in institutions, which is manifested in the unequal distribution of common resources: let it be material or immaterial, money or rights, etc. Through structural violence one group of the society is count as unequal according to their gender, race, religion, ideology, etc. therefore upholding a high potential of direct violence. Thus, Galtung uses the term social injustice for structural violence. In other words, the violence is less visible. These subaltern groups are violated by – for example - not having rights to vote, not getting good education, etc. Doing so, they will be permanently interested in changing the – therefore fragile – situation. This is an unstable

¹ He defines other distinguishes between the forms of violence, as well: physical (not just biological) and psychological, negative and positive, truncated and obvious, intended and unintended, manifest and latent violence.

² In the context of influence – as an abstract synonym of violence – there is a considerable triangle of influencer, influencee and a type of influence.

equilibrium.

Cultural violence is the legitimizer for these above mentioned two. Through norms, traditions, values that put someone to the place of evil or unequal, stoning and beatings or building up wall around people – on the direct level - and excluding someone from elections or education – on the structural one - can be seen legitimate. Galtung (1990) distinguishes six fields for cultural violence: religion, ideology, language, art, empirical science and formalised science. In the triangle direct violence can be seen as an event, structural violence as a process with ups and downs, cultural violence as an invariant, e.g. a permanence that remains in essence the same and makes only a slow transformation of basic culture possible.

These are fundamentally important findings in thinking about re-building a society, namely a culture. Galtung defines the absence of only direct violence as negative peace, which practically conserves the original incentives for conflict that was mentioned above, and the absence of structural violence as **positive peace**, which makes peace to be sustainably kept. Young (2011:6) explains the concept of Galtung's positive peace as follows: "... a society cannot be truly at peace until all forms of social, political and economic inequality and exclusion have been removed from the structures that exercise power within it. Peace, therefore, does not merely mean the absence of war as proponents of conflict management contend; rather, it can be equated with a form of justice in which groups and individuals are free to do, be or become what they desire unless this infringes upon the ability of any others to do the same."

In the late-1990s Galtung's positive peace became the desired goal of most peace operations. A considerable shift moved on the spectrum from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. As this framework put emphasis on organisation of democratic elections, creation of market economy, human rights and rule of law – which are related to Western civilization – it was called "**liberal peace**". This concept has been criticized by other constructivist and critical scholars, arguing that it is hegemonic and unsuited to the realities of post-conflict environment. These different conceptions about peace result in different conceptions about the success in peacekeeping, as well, that I show in the following section.

III. Different approaches of success of peacekeeping

As a consequence of different approaches about peace there are different views about success of peacekeeping and peace building. Due changes in peacekeeping's performance in the 1990s there started an active scientific debate about the understanding of the question of success. A new place opened for clashing the realist, rational choice – sometimes called positivist - views and social constructivist and critical views. Due to the social constructivist turn in social sciences more qualitative factors were drawn into consideration, beside the remaining quantitative data. In this chapter I attempt to show a brief introduction into the quantitative and qualitative approaches.

III.1. Qualitative approach

Peace operations have several well-quantifiable data: the number of death, the aids implemented correctly, whether the mandate was fulfilled, the duration of peace after the departure of the mission, or more simply, whether the conflict stopped or not. These prove obvious basis for positivist scholars to evaluate success.

Paul Diehl points (1993 in Johansen, 1994) two clear criteria for success for peacekeeping missions: 1. whether they were able to limit armed conflict and 2. whether they were able to promote conflict resolution³. On a concrete level, his analysis of specific cases is clear and convincing. His conclusion is that peacekeeping operations are mostly successful under the following conditions:

- the host states and third parties give their consent to peacekeeping operations;
- peacekeepers are lightly armed and do not fire except in self-defence;
- peacekeeping forces maintain a neutrality in which they neither favour nor are perceived to favour any side in the dispute;
- peacekeeping addresses interstate rather than intrastate conflicts;

³ In this sense, during the Cold War area, the only successful operation was UNEFII between 1973 and 1979 that ordered the situation between Israel and Egypt and therefore contributed to the Camp David Agreement.

- and the geographic context enables peacekeepers to be deployed in relatively invulnerable settings in which they can easily detect violations and completely separate the combatants. (Johansen, 1994:308)

Druckman et al. (1997) point out the following three as a guiding list for successful mission:

1. They also examine whether the purpose/mandate was fulfilled? They argue that a clear mandate per se is also a kind of success.
2. They consider specific accomplishments of the operation, these may include the number of people who fed the area, cease-fires achieved, and so on. This type of evaluation allows an analyst to look at tangible items, but it still leaves open the question of what standard one uses to compare or evaluate the operation. Steven Ratner, for example, compares the data to other peacekeeping operations. Others compare operations' achievements with an imaginary state if there had been no intervention that usually leads to a too easy and naive "better than nothing" answer.
3. They also put emphasis on the manner in which it has been achieved: efficiency, neutrality, impartiality, avoiding the use of violence. Success may even be defined in terms of the ability of the peacekeeping force to avoid casualties. In short, whether the mission was in accordance with the written goals.

Druckman et al. (1997) elsewhere develop indicators for success as the followings:

- the ability to prevent violence in the area,
- ability of the operation to facilitate the resolution of disagreements among local actors, which is called a "positive peace",
- in short term they handle signing an agreement and preparing an analyse on how peacekeepers can withdraw (if they can't, it is a failure), in long term a good indicator can be the absence of conflict 5, 10, 20 years after the peacekeepers have withdrawn.

As Fortna (2004:284) argues, the true success for the UN is not just preventing another war but the ability to go home and still have peace hold, to create a self sustaining peace. She examines the effect of peacekeeping operations on risk of wars and duration of peace. She evidenced that over the 1947-1999 time period, the presence of peacekeepers reduces the

risk of another war by more than 55%. As she argues: “Looking just at the post-Cold War period in which most peacekeeping in civil wars has taken place, we see that the presence of international personnel reduces the risk of another war dramatically, by 84%, and we can be quite confident that this result is not an artifact of chance ($p = 0.008$). In the post-Cold War period, all forms of peacekeeping reduce the risk of another war, but again, the smaller hazard ratios for consent-based peacekeeping indicate that it is more effective than are enforcement missions.” (Fortna, 2004:285)

Steven Ratner in Duckman et al. (1997) opens the field of research for other indicators which leads to a view on a broader context. He derived four different and relative ways of making such appraisals: (1) comparison with the mission's mandate, (2) comparison with the results of other peacekeeping operations, (3) impact on the states concerned, and (4) impact on the United Nations or other implementing organization. (Druckman et al., 1997:154)

III.2. Qualitative approaches

Social constructivist scholars put peacekeeping into a broader context, putting higher emphasis on qualitative elements. In comparison with positivist viewpoint they widen the focus of analysis with additional factors. Of, course it doesn't mean that they find quantitative data less important. They emphasize the importance of qualitative criteria and question the peacekeeping missions' contribution to larger values such as world peace, justice and reduction of human suffering. They highlight the question about the impacts on population, society, norms and institutions etc. Autesserre (2012:2) explains that “only analyses that combine top-down and bottom-up approaches, and those built on both political science and anthropological questions and methods, can provide a full and nuanced picture of the influence of collective understandings on peace interventions.”

In brief, qualitative factors are important because they can heavily undermine the success of a mission, even if all quantitative factors fit to our guideline.

As Druckman et al. (1997) argue, the real point of conceptualizing criteria for evaluating peacekeeping is to think about peacekeeping within the much bigger context of

peacebuilding and conflict transformation. In another way to consider this issue they use the phrase "peopling" of understandings. They require the discussion how current thinking is "unpeopled" and what are the consequences of such conceptualizations for scholarship and practice. They hold the main goal of peacekeeping in the elimination of conflict's underlying causes. Therefore, peace operations are supposed to create Galtung's positive peace.

Robert Johansen argues in Druckman et al. (1997) that peacekeepers affect many aspects of life that go far beyond a narrow understanding of military or physical security, which is the usual focus of peacekeeping evaluations. These other aspects receive insufficient attention in evaluating success despite they are important. As illustration he gives some areas needing further study: the social consequences of peacekeeping (for example, on refugee flows, amount of local corruption, prostitution), the economic consequences of peacekeeping on the target countries (for example, UN operations have apparently accounted for 6 to 7 percent of gross domestic product in Croatia), and the ethics of peacekeeping (whether ethical considerations influence the selection of means or ends).(Druckman, 1997:157)

Elsewhere, Johansen (1994) writes that to find the utility of peacekeeping, we should 1. assess the effect of peacekeeping forces on local people affected by their work – similar to the "peopling" approach - and 2. compare the degree of misunderstanding, tension, or violence that occurs in the presence of UN peacekeepers to the estimated results of balance-of-power activity without peacekeeping. It is also a questionable factor whether peacekeeping operations reduce the likelihood of violence even by a modest degree, discourage incidents from escalating, make violence less bloody when it does occur, or postpone the inevitable return of conflict long enough to give diplomacy a further opportunity to succeed.

Other critical views related to peacekeeping also draw attention on the question of **"success for whom"**. According to the peace operations' form as political enterprises the perspectives vary as widely as politics does. Thinking about success is different from national, international, UN-viewpoint or from military, administrative or sociological point of view. For example, UN practitioners will think of success in terms of meeting the mandate and of achieving stability in the area of operations because a stable situation is easier to cope with

and helps minimize political strife among member states. In military terms, just being in the field may be a plus given that few states' forces get much chance to deploy outside their national boundaries. They may define success as just staying alive and unhurt and meeting the operational objectives they have been assigned. For poorer countries it can be considered as success to have their troops selected as part of a peacekeeping operation because they receive payments from the United Nations that often exceed their costs. For the local belligerents, success may be defined in terms of keeping the international force in place for a sustained period of time, allowing them to avoid fighting but also to put off the hard choices and political risks entailed in direct bargaining for a peace settlement. Alternatively, success can be seen locally in terms of driving the international force out of the country as it was in the case of some factions in Somalia. (Druckman, 1997:159)

Druckman et al. (1997:159) also emphasize that, although general standards of success - based on the operation's impact on the affected country or the UN - are useful, other standards that consider the effect of peacekeeping missions on the various actors and issues would permit a more differentiated and sophisticated analysis. Different standards could be developed for the impact of the mission, for instance,:

1. on the *human rights situation* in the country (for example, number of prisoners released, reduction in the arbitrary killings and other violence, improved functioning of the judiciary),
2. on the military (for example, removal of discredited members, institutional reform, willingness to follow civilian command),
3. on humanitarian conditions (for example, resettlement of refugees and other displaced persons, reduction in mined areas, improvement in food distribution).
4. on the United Nations, e.g. on the organization's ability to conduct other missions, as well as on its personnel and budgetary capacity.

Howard (2008) in her research uses qualitative methods to compare the set of most similar, completed UN peacekeeping missions, and defines success in terms of both ***mandate implementation*** and the ability of ***domestic institutions*** to function after the departure of the peacekeeping mission. Her central finding is that "*organizational learning*"—that is,

increasing ability to gather and disseminate information, engage with the local population, coordinate among units, and provide strong leadership— while a peacekeeping mission is deployed in the field, is one of three necessary sources of success.

Brian Urquhart (1990) gives nine qualitative criteria for achieving and explaining success per se:

1. a viable political context,
2. broad support (political, financial, diplomatic and military) for operations,
3. representativeness in the force,
4. feasibility built into the mandate,
5. cooperation from the parties to the dispute,
6. skill and sensitivity in directing the force,
7. quality in the command process,
8. military discipline in the troop,
9. no imposition of an external will or solution.

Gareth Evans (1993) gives a different set of seven criteria:

1. clear and achievable goals,
2. adequate resources,
3. close coordination between peacekeeping and peacemaking,
4. impartiality,
5. local support,
6. external support,
7. clearly signposted exit.

IV. Critical questions about the impact and performance of peace operations

Due to the parallel development of multidimensional operations' pool of tasks and the public's awareness and attention related to peace operations there appeared some topics

where the legitimacy, mortality, credibility and professional preparation of UN employees were questioned. In this chapter I present some of these questions about transitional administration, democratization process, the “peacekept”, unintended consequences, the lack of accountability and self-destructive logic of peace operations.

Transitional administrations are those of typical multidimensional peacekeeping operations which are required to hold executive authority over state administration in addition to their tasks. Sometimes this means that the UN mission has veto power over the decisions of a transitional government, for example in Namibia. At the other end of the spectrum, the UN takes over the very governing of the state, like in East Timor, and puts members of the international civil service in executive, legislative, and judicial positions (Fortna-Howard, 2008). But this radical way of peace operations happened only in 5 case. In all these cases, the UN was supposed to play the role of the so-called “benevolent autocrat” (Chesterman, 2004 in Fortna-Howard, 2008). Therefore it violated the norms of sovereignty and democracy with the goals of establishing sovereignty and democracy. This raises a range of contradictions and bitter thoughts. One question is to what extent is it possible to build a country for others and is it actually possible to create the necessary norms, institutions and routines within the society in such a positivist (checklist) way of thinking. It remind some people to the colonial past, when coloniser powers used their colonies as laboratory of mankind with the goal of creating ideal states, like the Brits had done in Ghana or the Germans in Jiaozuo-Bay. (Meredith, 2011)

A similar question refers to **democratisation** as a core goal of peace building. Is it possible to build democracy without any “demos”? Doyle & Sambanis (2006) argue that peacekeeping helps to foster at least a minimal level of democracy as a condition of a negotiated settlement in which factions agree to disarm in return for political participation. If we can trust the democratic peace theory that suggests – in a very simply way - that liberal democracies do not fight against each other, it seems to be a good way of solution. (Doyle, 1986) But does this form of democracy fit to all cultures, where respect, religion and family play a different role from the Western one?

Back to Galtung (1969) approach about structural violence, he argues that social injustice is embedded violence. Therefore creating an equalitarian society – in Western terms,

democracy – is an adequate way to liquidate violence, namely creating positive peace. But according to his different forms of violence, a democracy, practically an equalitarian and just social order, made by foreign powers can be the result of violence, too. The acceptance of foreign norms and views can be evidence for cultural violence or another, what he calls truncated violence, when violated object acts in order to avoid physical violence. This latter is similar that is known in political science jargon as Realpolitik, when purely power matters.

Some other scholars go on with drawing attention on **cultural difference** as a factor of failed concept of liberal peace, as a universalized solution for sustainable peace. Young (2011) refers Paris (2004) in arguing that democratization and marketization processes have led to an escalation of violence in Rwanda and Angola, the reinforcement and institutionalization of ethnic divisions in Croatia and Bosnia, and the recreation of the structural violence that originally led to conflict in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. According to Cox (2002 in Young, 2011) each society has its own conceptions of justice, freedom and the relationship between individual and communal rights, therefore structural violence must be redefined as any institutionalized practices that prevent a society from realizing these conceptions from its own frame of reference. Doing so, “conflict transformation frameworks based on preconceived notions of peace and development, regardless of the principles around which they are structured, will be unable to establish this type of positive peace.” (Young, 2011:289) To summarize this message, the conceptions of good (individual, communal, social or political) cannot be universalized but they must be in accordance with varying contextually-derived realities. Liberalism is not a wrong framework, but there should be any single framework in each case.

Another criticized element of liberal peace is its “checklist approach”, which means a too practical way of thinking of peacekeepers. This critique emphasizes that most peacekeepers, even if they are good professionals, often are not competent in intercultural communication but work according to a checklist, alienated from the field. (Autesserre, 2011)

Béatrice Pouligny (2010) emphasizes the importance of “intangible” dimensions of state resilience and state building, such as local norms, traditions and culture. She argues without including informal and traditional mechanisms in reform and reconstruction processes it is not possible to build sustainably functioning society and positive peace. Referring to the

interveners she says that “the challenge for outsiders is to capture the multiplicity and diversity of political institutions, cultures and logics – in other words, of ‘modalities of governance’ – through which state resilience and state building processes may be supported.” (Pouligny, 2010:1)

Some scholars with rather **critical theory** background examine how western liberal values are projected by peacekeeping: as during the cold war period against communist ideology according to great power politics, now against other civilisations, also reflecting world political issues. (Martín, 2005) Roland Paris (1997 in Young 2011:286) presents peacebuilding as an enormous experiment in social engineering - an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict.

In this sense peacekeeping gets to the field of Huntingtonian clash of civilisations (1993) or - in a more critical way of thinking - to the agent of Foucauldian repression. Another relevant term of Foucault (1979) in the case of peace operation – mostly peace building – is biopolitics. The world governance – in this sense, the UN – operates to control over human (agent) lives, taking responsibility for its society, the whole population of the world. The questionable point is why peace and state building operations promote mostly Western liberal values. In this sense the UN becomes the agent of governing Western liberalism that governs its Empire and protects/control its human agents, namely the western ideal type of the Civilized, therefore ignores the Other. To refer Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), democratization became a tool of the ‘People’ to keep out the ‘Multitude’.

The notion “**peacekept**” refers to the parties to the conflict: government officials, rebels, decision makers and the greater population, among whom peacekeeping are supposed to keep and build peace. This perspective reminds to Johansen’s (in Druckman, 1997) “peopling” point of view and to the “peace for whom” approach. Clapham (1998 in Fortna-Howard, 2008) argues that peacekeepers and the “peacekept” often have very different perspectives. Whereas peacekeepers prioritize a nonviolent conflict resolution process, the “peacekept” tend to care more about the substance of who wins what. Peacekeepers see themselves as providing solutions to conflicts, while the “peacekept” find them as bringing

resources, including resources that can be manipulated by the “peacekept”. Peacekeepers mostly think in the short term, the “peacekept” think about the long term. (Fortna-Howard, 2008) This contradiction turns clear when Aoi et al. (2007:15) argues: “In a post-conflict context, which is the condition in which most peace missions operate, most of the official institutional positions and mechanisms will be undergoing considerable change under contested circumstances, and the peace operation would thus have to be resourceful in ensuring that the mechanisms with which it interacts, or facilitates, reflects the broadest possible representation of popular will and opinion.” Autesserre (2011) also emphasis that different conceptions about peace, peacekeeping and peace building between implementers on the ground and local population can lead to unproductive approaches, decreasing popularity of the peacekeepers and open conflicts between interveners and locals. In addition, he also argues that collective understandings prevalent in the field are often different from understandings in headquarters and national capitals.

All peace operations are a kind of intervention into a society’s dynamic life. As a non-linear, complex reaction to this intervention there can appear some **unintended consequences** that can weaken the ability of the operation to achieve its intended objectives. Some of these economic, political and social side-effects are morally and ethically unacceptable, are extremely damaging for individuals and society and have harmful impacts, therefore they lower legitimacy, effectiveness and respect of the whole system of the United Nations. According to Aoi et al. (2007) I present four categories of these unintended consequences in the followings.

1. **Permissive environment:** In a post-conflict society after the breakdown of law and order, socio-economic infrastructure and social-cultural norms, the prevailing condition creates a fertile ground for unintended consequences to occur. For example, it has been considered that sexual and gender based violence is often part of a conscious strategy to demoralise the opposing side in a conflict. Extreme poverty, the lack of economical opportunity, unemployment, the loss of family and community networks lead to moral and ethical chaos. With the presence of peacekeepers the power structure also can became anarchic.

2. **Impact on local economy:** The presence of peace operation with more thousands can cause special economic enclaves and distortions in the economy. To satisfy the demands peace builders and the different demand of the local population it can lead to a dual economy. There are some positive effects, of course, as creating job opportunities or increasing demand for certain services and goods, which are mostly temporal, cannot be sustained and leave an empty hole after the departure of the mission. Negative effects can be rising basic commodity prices, increase in salary disparities and higher rate of unequal standard of living, etc. As Young (2011:283) argues, “liberal reforms often reinforce structural violence by increasing horizontal inequalities, reducing the capacities of local institutions, increasing foreign debt and making economic prosperity increasingly dependent on the volatile world market, thereby re-creating and intensifying many of the circumstances that originally led to the outbreak of conflict.”
3. **Impact on local civil service:** A dual public sector can occur, according to the presence of mission building administrative capacities. The combination of weak local administration and high inflows of aid can lead to rent-seeking and corruption.
4. **Change in gender roles:** Some of the peace operations have the goal “women’s empowerment”, therefore giving women jobs and new socio-political and financial positions. But in most societies where these operations are deployed women have traditional female role in communities and families: work around the house and handle the children. In such societies newly empowered women can be victims of atrocities, domestic violence and bad reputation in their close living atmosphere.

Another typical reduction of role for women during a peace operation is considerable in sex industry as sexual subjects, being used not just by local “consumers” but by peacekeepers, as well. Koyama and Myrtille evidenced (in Aoi et al., 2007) the direct link between the deployment of peacekeepers and the influx of aid workers, the growth of the local sex industry, and an increase in the number of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse in Cambodian and Timorese cases. They also note the link between a declining sex industry and the departure, or significant reduction, of a peace operation and the humanitarian aid community.

Aoi et al. (2007) also draw attention onto the question of **accountability and control** which are relevant questions in case of the above mentioned negative consequences. The most obvious case in this context is the fact that personnel that are deployed as part of a military contingent to UN peace operations remain under the legal authority of the sending state when it comes to criminal and disciplinary issues. It is not clear who holds responsibility for the mission's side-effects. Although the conduct of these personnel are also governed by international humanitarian law, international human rights and other bodies of international law, these instruments need to be applied through the national legal systems of the troop contributing country (TCC).

Trettin (2010) examines the so-called **self-destructive logic** of tasks and actions of individuals who work for peace operations. He argues that under certain conditions easy or vague goals – beside different private interests - lead to lower levels of task performance in contrast to specific and challenging goals that lead to higher performance. In other words, peacekeeping personnel in certain cases tend to obstruct the effectiveness and fulfilment of their mandate in order not to be replaced or to keep their well-paid jobs. Trettin bring the examples of Schöndorf's (2009) analysis on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, where it turned out that the international staff obstructed the administrative capacity building process. "Schöndorf describes that it is likely that the perceived precarious employment situation of the international staff was the reason behind the low performance of the capacity building program, which even delayed the whole transition process. Overall, Schöndorf's description of the obstructing behaviour by international staff is an interesting indication that the individuals are actually aware of their precarious situation and the goal conflict that arises from the inherent 'self-destructive' logic of the task they have to perform, i.e. training their own replacement." (Trettin, 2010:8)

V. Reactions of the United Nations: Reforms

Due to the above mentioned high criticism on the peace operations' performance the UN started to analyze its peacekeeping experience and launched a series of reform processes in

order to improve its capacity to manage and sustain field operations. In this last section I briefly present how the UN attempt to reflect on critical approaches.

In 2000 the Secretary-General appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to evaluate the existing system and to make recommendation for change. The panel was composed of individuals experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building. The result was the „Brahimi Report” that called for 1. renewed political commitment on the part of member states, 2. significant institutional change and 3. increased financial support. The Panel also emphasised that without clear, credible and achievable mandate and without being properly resourced and equipped any UN peace operation can be successful. Other important element of the report that it put emphasis on improving peace building capacities – a move from keeping to building the peace – and the civilian dimensions of peace operation. To support it recommends the doctrinal division of civilian and military issues. It calls for enhancing transitional civil administration capacities and for the creation of a pilot peace building unit within the Department of Political Affairs. (UN, 2000)

The Brahimi Report also calls for preventive action which is in accordance with Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and reinforce a global consensus on the importance of building the peace. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argues: “The responsibility to protect is not only the question of whether the international community should intervene militarily for human protection purposes. It is a broader responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild...” (WFM, 2012:4)

Other Reforms related to peacekeeping policy and strategy reform were launched. In 2005 a Peacebuilding Commission – an intergovernmental advisory body - was established to bring together all relevant actors and to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The General Assembly also called for the creation of a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund. (UN, 2005b)

In 2006 the Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) prepared its reform strategy, called “Peace operation 2010”. The strategy focuses on five key areas: 1. recruitment, preparation and retention of personnel, 2. doctrine, in order to set standards for all kind of

mission⁴ with assistance of Peacekeeping Best Practices Section within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 3. the establishment of frameworks for interactive partnerships, 4. securing the essential resources to improve operations and 5. the establishment of integrated organizational structures at Headquarters and in the field. (UN, 2006)

In 2008 an outline of most important principles and guidelines for peacekeepers was prepared, known as “Capstone Doctrine”. This was the first document of this kind that summarizes and outline the “to do’s” in such a detailed way, which is a quite ironic thing after 60 years peacekeeping practice. (UN, 2008)

The newest reform document is The New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping that was born in 2009. It evaluates the main policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today and in the close future. Its goal is to open a new dialogue with member states and other non-governmental partners about new challenges for adequate peacekeeping. The New Horizon addresses partnership in purpose, in action and for the future. To reflect the critiques and enhance peacekeeping performance the reforms refer to four dimensions:

1. Policy Development to clarifying the critical roles and responsibilities of peacekeepers and develop practical guidance in specific areas, including the protection of civilians, peace building roles of peacekeepers, and effective and robust response to threats.
2. Capability Development to fill critical capability gaps in peacekeeping missions in a forward-looking and sustainable manner and to ensure peacekeepers are prepared, equipped, and enabled to deliver against reasonable performance expectations.
3. Global Field Support Strategy to transform service delivery in the field through efficient and effective support arrangements and improved accountability and resource stewardship.

⁴ „Standardized practices, procedures and guidelines can facilitate the more effective and efficient interaction of personnel from diverse cultures, background, training and expertise in the mission environment.” (UN, 2006:3) This approach was highly criticized and labeled as „checklist approach” by many anthropologists, constructivist and critical scholars.

4. Planning and oversight for bolstering consultations among peacekeeping stakeholders and to ensure more effective and inclusive arrangements for planning, management, and oversight of missions. (UN Homepage, 2012b)

The major structural change by peacekeeping reform was in 2007 when the Peacekeeping Department got restructured in order to strengthen the UN's capacity to manage and sustain new peace operations. The department was split into two so that a new, separate Department of Field Support (DFS) was born. DPKO got some new activities and additional support, and both departments got augmented resources. DFS developed the Global Field Support Strategy in 2010 with the aim to transform "service delivery" to the field and adapt it to the requirements of current peacekeeping operations. Once implemented, support to the field will become more predictable, professional and flexible, while ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency. (UN Homepage, 2012a)

Another reform was made in reimbursing for troop contributing countries. Historically, the countries that provide troops for peacekeeping missions are reimbursed for their contribution by the UN. The question of the rates is therefore extremely important for a large number of countries, since some poor countries financially benefit from peacekeeping personnel. To change this situation a Senior Advisory Group was established that intends to complete its review by the summer of 2012, and its report will be submitted to the Secretary-General and then passed to the General Assembly. (UN Homepage, 2012a)

One of the mostly criticized performances of peacekeepers was their personnel impact on the "peacekept" and the problems with the lack of accountability. Therefore reforms have been introduced in the field of conduct and discipline. The Secretary-General launched a zero tolerance policy after UN peacekeepers were charged with sexual exploitation and abuse in host countries. The Zeid Report recommended a new conduct and disciplining architecture for peacekeeping. The report addresses solution for the problem of civil, personal and criminal accountability of peacekeepers on organisational, managerial and personal level. (2005a)

Conclusion

The most considerable change in peace operations' performance is the move from peacekeeping to peace building and state building on the other end of the spectrum. To keep ceasefire and guarantee the security of domestic population by interveners is called negative peace – the absence of direct violence – and not supposed to be handled as success. The overall goal of peace missions became to impose Galtung's positive peace that is a permanent absence of structural violence which facilitates a sustainable absence of any trigger to renew the conflict and contributes to a functioning society.

To evaluate success we can distinguish quantitative and qualitative factors. Former are – among others – the fulfilment of mandate, the number of deaths, the length of remaining conflict after the intervention and the most telling indicator is the absence of any conflict in a long term - after five, ten and twenty years. Scholars who examine qualitative factors of success focus on the impact of peacekeeping missions on the local population. Johansen calls this as “peopling” of understanding of conflict transformation. According to anthropologists, constructivists and critical peace researchers a peace operation can be evaluated successful if norms and institution contribute to a sustainable and independently functioning society, the state of human rights are appropriate and the causes of the original conflict were eliminated. Not considering qualitative factors can drastically undermine the success of a peace operation.

After putting this above mentioned factors for the focal point of peace operations, a vehement criticism started against the liberal peace framework, saying that most elements of peace building approach are related to the Western civilization and reject cultural differences. Some argue that Western democracy is inappropriate for most countries. Other critical questions were raised about the unintended consequences of peacekeeping, among others, the permissive environment, the impact on local economy and on gender roles. The unacceptable conduct and lacking accountability of the interveners resulted in adversary opinions on peacekeeping.

The United Nations' reforms attempt to reflect to public opinion and to enhance its capacities in order to manage an appropriate framework for imposing peace. The Brahimi report highlighted the civilian image of peace operations and called for more support from

member states and other international actors. To enhance policy implementation on the field a new Department of Field Support was established and a renewed code of conduct facilitates the accountability of peacekeepers. Therefore, a new form of intervention by the international community is under construction that seems to be a determining element of world politics in the 21st century.

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