

Are there any truth conditions of the identity of meaning?

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Ecsenyi Áron

BA Szabad bölcsészet

Témavezető: Pöntör Jenő

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Abstract

A certain philosophical school of thought which is known as externalism has recently received a lot of attention. Representatives of the theory emphasize that the knowledge about the properties of environment depends on what the factual conditions of the mind's cognizable environment are. Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts, meaning, beliefs, and desires – which are called 'intentional states' – are related to the environment. Inasmuch as our metaphysics describes the environment, each factual statement about environment is related to the metaphysical identification of intentional states. One should always take into account what the factual conditions are. On the contrary the individualism denies that this is true, and it argues that the intentional states depend solely on our mental properties. This debate has important consequences with regard to philosophical and empirical theories of the mind.

In this article, my intention is to point out some additional thoughts on the semantic externalist idea, which is based on the contradiction of view on methodological solipsism, because its representatives interpret the methodological solipsistic assumption on range of truth conditions. The methodological solipsistic assumptions do not claim that some other creature other than the human being has a rational character. In this respect I am attempting to prove that if we want to identify the intentional states, we cannot say without contradiction that our mental contents are derived from such assumptions. In this way I will try to prove that we either define the meanings consistently with methodological solipsistic assumptions or we determine their truth conditions, both of which are not possible simultaneously.

Let us call attention to the fact that it is possible that there is mutual understanding of a particular expression without anyone participating in it and would have truth conditions in the matter of understanding of the expression. For this reason, I would like to introduce that the choice between methodological solipsistic assumptions and truth conditions is possible. Although Fodor attempted to constitute a kind of individualist theory in *Psychosemantics*, Stalnaker argued that his theories could have identified the intentional states. I am going to demonstrate that in fact the fault of Fodor's theory arises from the dilemma of choice between truth conditions and methodological solipsism. However, it could have been spared, and thus Stalnaker's attack would not have not have a leg to stand on. Nevertheless, this implies that it cannot be proven that there are any rational creatures by truth-conditional statements at all.

Can we define the reference with methodological solipsistic assumption?

The reference-determining statements of natural variety terms rely on that everyone who acquired the natural variety terms and possessed their truth conditions of these statements. The truth conditions provide that the reference will be intersubjectively accessible. At the same time we have just certain subjective assumption with our mental contents which are necessary in order to have any idea about the reference. Thus, it is not dispensable the mental contents if we clarify the truth conditions of a reference-determining statement. If, however, we are able to identify the reference as an intersubjectively accessible thing, the question arises that how we can reconcile it with the mental content?

According to semantic externalism, the solution is that the meaning is a certain intentional state, which determines the reference. Intentional states not only depend on mental content but they are also in causal relationship with the outside world (for example: Burge 1986a). The roots of this theory go back to Kripke and Putnam, and although it was a matter of serious debates, most philosophers have accepted the outcome. However I am going to argue that the semantic externalism draws erroneous conclusions about the intentional states, because its premises on the mental contents and on truth conditions are incompatible with each other.

The reinterpretation of mental content was started by Putnam. Putnam (1975) in the „*Meaning*” of *meaning* presented a certain thought experiment during which he concluded that the mental contents do not identify the meaning of natural variety terms. ‘Meaning ain’t in the head’ (Putnam 1975: 227). Intentional states are not determined by mental contents. According to Putnam, the mental contents, which are obtained from surface properties of water, for example can replace such kind of cognizable things which aren’t H₂O, but their surface properties is similar to water (Putnam 1975: 223-226). For this reason, any mental content isn’t used to identify the meaning of water. The thought experiment is as follows: There is an imaginable planet which is an exact duplicate of the Earth, including duplicate versions of everyone. The Twin-Earth is identical except for its water which, instead of being made of H₂O is made from XYZ, which is completely different from water but looks identical with it under normal temperature and pressure. When any normal earthling, say *water*, Putnam says they are referring to H₂O. When a Twin-Earthling says ‘water’ they are referring to XYZ. Notwithstanding the mental contents of the two twins are identical, from which Putnam draws the conclusion that what our mental contents refer to must be partially defined

by things outside our heads. If it happens to someone who does not know the micro-structure of water and he gets to Twin-Earth, probably he would adopt the Twin-Earth's language and consider XYZ to be water. Later, if he admits his mistake, after which he would know that water is H₂O and not any different matter, then he would say that 'on Twin-Earth *water* means XYZ'. We could say, provided we previously assumed, that the meaning determines the reference (Frege's principle), while the mental content does not. Therefore the mental contents don't identify the meanings.

Putnam's train of thought originates from Frege's principle and Twin-Earth thought experiment is consistent with each other if and only if the following claim is false: 'If the mental contents determine the meanings, then it is true, that in every epistemically possible world in which the speakers are in identical mental contents have the same necessary and sufficient conditions for falling into the reference.' It may be explained that the criteria for truth conditions are consistent with each other while the statements are not, considering that one of falsity guarantees the consistency of other premises. However, Putnam put more than this; he thought that the inconsistency of these premises entail that the Frege's principle and Twin-Earth thought experiment cannot be sustained with 2 premises.

What is the 2nd premise? Consider the following three items!

1. The meaning determines the reference – Frege's principle.
2. Knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain mental frame. (Putnam 1975: 219).
- 2_B. One in every metaphysically possible world in which it is in identical mental contents have same necessary and sufficient conditions for falling into the reference. (Putnam 1975: 221-222)

It is clear, that Putnam thinks 2 to be false, because he assumed 2_B implies 2. Nevertheless 2_B is inconsistent with 1 and Twin-Earth thought experiment, which are true for natural variety terms. The reason for the inconsistency is that so far as our mental contents individual our meanings, when we would be compelled to say, that the meaning of XYZ and that of H₂O are equal, because there are same mental contents in both cases. By contrast, the truth conditions of their reference determining claims are different. Therefore the meaning cannot be determined by the reference, or we would get a contradiction with Frege's principle. However, Putnam mentioned that imperative arguments are for engagement with 1. In the literature of early analytic philosophy on Frege's principle it is accompanied by the well-worn

example of ‘creature with heart’ and ‘creature with kidney’, which expressions are intended to illustrate that while they refer to the same subjects, they have different meanings. According to Putnam the meaning of natural variety terms also determines their reference, as we can say, that natural variety terms designate a certain type of thing in metaphysically possible worlds. From all this it follows that we are forced to expand our semantic theory in favor of Frege’s principle.

Since Twin-Earth thought experiment is a suitable explanation of meaning it is necessary to reject 2_B. Frege’s principle and Twin-Earth thought experiment together are sufficient. And, if 2_B implies 2, then the mental content of an agent doesn’t identify its meanings.

However does 2_B really imply 2? Let us suppose, that the conclusion is invalid, because the definition of mental content which is offered by Putnam is not aligned with the truth of 2_B; simply 2_B relies on such presuppositions which exclude this interpretation. In this case 1 and 2 would be consistent with each other because there will no longer be sufficient basis to the faith in their contradiction. However, in this way, it is also required by the logic that somehow we point out that the Twin-Earth thought experiment is false and relies on wrong presuppositions. In other words, it is not true that: ‘If I know that my Twins refer to other object than me with same expression then I know his meaning of the term is different from mine. Although, of course, this claim is true if and only if 1 and Twin-Earth thought experiment are inconsistent with 2, because otherwise we can accept that 2_B doesn’t imply 2, whilst 1 and Twin-Earth thought experiment are consistent with 2.

Putnam avoids taking a position on the ontological question by a kind of methodological solipsistic assumption; they are formulated as there is no mental contents, properly so called, presupposing the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that content is ascribed (Putnam 1975: 220).³

“Making this assumption is, of course, adopting a restrictive program – a program which deliberately limits the scope and nature of psychology to fit certain mentalistic preconception or, in some cases to fit an idealistic reconstruction of knowledge and the world.” (Putnam 1975: 220)

Putnam thinks that mental content derives from methodological solipsistic assumption and he attaches the identification of mental contents to the range of truth conditions. He calls the

³ See also other definition of methodological solipsism: Burge (1986b: 112-114), Butterfield (1986a: 99-100)

mental content for narrow content the basis of the interpretation (Putnam 1975: 221). One has a narrow content if she knows a meaning and she also knows that the meaning that one has grasped is the meaning of an intersubjective symbol. Namely, it doesn't matter what assumptions the particular agent have, because it is necessary to satisfy the metaphysical condition of knowledge of the agent that the meaning has grasped like the meaning of an expression (which is an intersubjective symbol). If the condition is satisfied, then we can identify the mental contents. Since the condition provides the truth of the identification, therefore it follows from Putnam's theory that the methodological solipsistic assumptions have truth values.

2_B is consistent with these assumptions to the effect that they have truth values; and it is strengthening our commitment that no one could think about 2_B , that it is true, without being the definition of the narrow content. 2_B is a statement which says that in every metaphysical possibility world where the speaker is in identical mental content have the same necessary and sufficient conditions for falling into the reference (Putnam 1975: 221, 222). Inasmuch as, according to Putnam the notion of reference is made quite precise, relative to the fundamental logical notion of truth (Putnam 1975: 218), therefore when Putnam derives 2_B from definition of narrow content, he made it explicit that we are forced to set up the identification of mental content with possible truth-value. Namely, I will be sure to possess a specific narrow content, if I know that a meaning which refers to an expression's meaning. However, it hasn't guaranteed that either definition of narrow content or adoption of 2_B would be consistent with my methodological solipsistic assumptions about my mental content. What do things ensures that our methodological solipsistic assumptions have truth conditions at all? If we don't start in this way, then the definition of narrow content is a needless accessory. Notwithstanding the definition of narrow content has additional consequences. If one accepts that the methodological solipsistic assumptions have truth conditions, then she also presupposes that the meaning and reference have truth conditions.

In the first instance the definition of narrow content provides for Putnam that 2_B (which is inconsistent with the truth of 1 and Twin-Earth thought experiment) will be stronger, or equivalent than 2. It is foreseeable: Putnam derives from definition of narrow content that the narrow content determines the meaning (Putnam: 1975: 222), and given that the narrow content provides the truth condition of the speaker's claims about what's necessary and sufficient for falling into the reference, and it is adopted that the meaning determines the reference (1), and since the reference presupposes truth conditionals, hence there should be truth conditions of those claims which determine the meanings by the narrow

content (2).

If the narrow content would be the sole definition of the mental content then 2_B implies 2, because 2 would mean that the speaker's mental content – in contradiction with Twin-Earth thought experiment – determines the reference of the speaker's particular expression. Since 2_B is a false premise if and only if 1 and Twin-Earth thought experiment together are true, therefore 2 is also a false statement if and only if they are true. In this case we cannot avoid imagining a logical relationship between definition of narrow content, meaning, and reference which provide that we interpret the meaning basis of the reference rather than narrow content. And whereas all of them are interpreted on range of truth conditions, therefore truth conditions of identity of meaning are certain preconditions of consistency of 1 and Twin-Earth thought experiment. As far as that goes, although Putnam mentions that the reference is made relative to the truth, same time he doesn't point out that why same would be the meaning in the sense that the truth conditions are hidden in the meanings. Simply he presupposes if one will discover that 'water' on Twin-Earth is XYZ then Earthian spaceship will report that:

“On Twin-Earth the word 'water' means XYZ.” (Putnam 1975: 223)

If the report and 1 are true, then the identification of meanings take into the metaphysically possible properties of the environment – unlike 2. Thus 1 is a necessity epistemological truth. However, the truth of Earthian report is derived from definition of narrow content, (at least it is able to determine that the XYZ is water due to the narrow content) therefore there is just a presupposition according to which the definition of narrow content is consistent. Inasmuch as one has a narrow content and know a meaning and also know that the meaning that oneself has grasped is the meaning of *water* on Twin-Earth, then the speaker of Earthian spaceship know how the reference of the *water* should determine, but he also know what meaning of a Twin-Earthian speaker's expression is, because his knowledge that the 'reference of water is satisfied by XYZ' is necessarily determined by the meaning of water. If the speaker correctly refers to something, then he grasps its meaning.

It seems, that the definition of narrow content provide that the 1 and 2_B have same conditions, and simultaneously couldn't be consistent with each other. This definition only enable to 2_B implies 2, and 1 will be consistent in own criteria with Twin-Earth thought experiment. However, it is not necessary to accept this idea. Far-reaching conclusions can be drawn only from the fact that the definition gives a consistent view of our methodological

solipsistic assumptions. Notwithstanding, if we want to prove that 2 doesn't follow from 2_B, or either 1 is inconsistent with Twin-Earth thought experiment, then it is necessary to demonstrate that the definition of the narrow contents is inconsistent. This can be solved if we point out that our methodological solipsistic assumptions excluded the truth-evaluation.

So, I will argue that it is not known from the methodological solipsistic assumptions what the truth condition of a statement is.

Consider the following items:

MS₀ If one knows a meaning then she also knows that what she has grasped is the meaning of an expression. (Putnam 1975

MS₁ Mental contents are made from methodological solipsistic assumption.

Acceptance of 1 and the consistency of these two items are required to ensure that we admit the truth of Twin-Earth thought experiment. To avoid this, it is enough to prove that they are inconsistent with each other. To do this, it should be pointed out that one of them implies the negation of the other.

MS₂ None of us can define by our methodological solipsistic assumptions what the reference of an expression is, because these assumptions cannot be interpreted on range of truth condition.

If MS₂ is true, then MS₁ and MS₀ are inconsistent with each other. However, the proof of MS₂ is not simple, because it should be consistent with 1 and with 2. Primarily, if it is consistent with 2, then 2_B doesn't imply 2. And, if they (MS₂ and 2) are also consistent with 1, then 1 is inconsistent with Twin-Earth thought experiment, because, in this case, the meaning of water would not hide any truth conditional statements. In other words, MS₂ and the definition of narrow content exclude each other.

In this article, my intention is to point out one of view of methodological solipsistic semantic theory, which offers an explanation how we can identify the meanings merely mental representation's contain without being aware of the relationship between our mental contents and the objective reality. The semantic theory draws a line of demarcation between the methodological solipsistic assumption and such explanations as those which operate with truth conditions. And, as we could see, it is not enough to define 2 like an isolated statement,

it is also important to add such proper interpretation of Frege's principle so that it remains consistent despite the definition of narrow content.

The first defender of methodological solipsism was Fodor (1980, 1987) who argued that the Twin-Earth thought experiment does not refute that the mental content – which is true that MS_1 – identify the meanings. However he did not argue that it would be because of inconsistency of MS_1 and MS_0 . Based on his theory, if we derive the mental content from the methodological solipsistic assumption, then the Twin-Earth thought experiment would not be contradictory with this because actually the mental content will help us to define the notion of Twin-Earth. Therefore Fodor refused to interpret 2 on range of truth conditions. At the same time, Stalnaker (1990) pointed out that the conception of Fodor's identification thesis is an unsuccessful attempt to the identification by the mental content. Nevertheless, I will argue that Fodor's failure can be traced back to the same, as the contradiction of definition of narrow content.

My argument will look like this: hereinafter I will point out that the semantic externalist theory presupposes that the definition of narrow content is true, while a certain individualist theory denied this, and presupposes that 2 come from methodological solipsistic assumption. And then, in the next chapter, I move on towards showing how it can be made an identification model for the meaning by the methodological solipsistic assumptions, and what difficulties may arise? In the end, I prove that 1, 2, MS_2 are consistent with each other, and the Earthian's and Twin's sentences can have different truth conditions on reference of an expression, while they cannot determine the meaning of it.

If we want to define what it is that satisfies the reference, then it has to formulate some kind of truth-conditional statement which determines the reference. There is no doubt that the reference is defined if its reference-determining statement is true. Then it is possible only if it is known the truth conditions of the statement. Putnam also mentioned that the reference is made quite precise, relative to the truth (1975: 218). However, the semantic externalism punctually is none other than the view that the meaning also depends on the reference without anyone being aware what the truth value of the reference-determining statement is. In other words, the truth conditions are hidden in the meanings. It is unnecessary to be aware when the reference-determining statement is true because not the truth values, but the truth conditions determine the meanings in a particular identity model of meaning. Thus the semantic externalism can be summarized as follows: The meaning determines the reference – Frege's principle; and the reference-determining statements can be identified by the meanings of their truth conditions – Twin Earth thought experiment.

Unfortunately the externalist identification of meaning is problematic. There is an interesting question whether we can talk about the meaning because we know the truth condition of its reference or we can talk about the truth conditions because we know that the meaning determines the reference. If we admit the previous one then the truth of a reference determining statement entails the meaning of the given expression, while if we admit the second one then the meaning of an expression entails the truth of the reference determining statement. In the following I prove that both are forced to accept if we reject MS_2 and for this reason we reject 2.

We must realize that the rejecting of MS_2 implies that the meaning and truth mutually presuppose each other. The rejecting of MS_2 rest upon the Twin-Earth thought experiment. According to this the truth conditions and that we commitment to existence of other minds are compatible with each other. Consider that the model of mutual understanding looks like this. In this case I should possess such truth-conditional statements which in each case are sufficient conditions for the ascertainment that someone's intentional state on a given expression is the same as mine. The model is not saying anything more than that the mutual understanding can be proved.

However, how would this proof look like?

It is worth examining with an example. The statement: 'Bismarck had a big playground' when we hear this then all of us think we understand what it means. In turn, lots of philosophers are convinced about the idea that there is no evidence that we understand the same thing. For example, I can refer to a certain habit of dog walking, but I can also refer to a political event which is linked to a German statesman. Although, usually through everyday situation these types of cases are pretty obvious, but we need to limit the inquiry to cover cases which comes into question for its clarity. According to this abstract situation my partner has infinitely many assumptions about the meaning of my sentence. However, if the truth-conditional statements are sufficient for the proving of someone's intentional state on a given expression is same with mine then I should also be made to understand myself with my partner. So the scenario is accompanied by an additional statement which properly speaking defines the words of a previous sentence. The new sentence will be true, in case we know that we properly interpreted the terms of object-language by meta-language. The problem is that the rule of proof is recursive, and there is not something which makes it necessity to use. Although the defining phrases will be required new defining phrases which have also factual criteria, yet if I add new defining phrases to the proof I cannot make sure that what we understand. The process would be stopped if I build into the proof such phrases which

meaning is clear to us. In other words I should presuppose what I am trying to find out. So the truth-conditional statements cannot be universally sufficient to grasp the identification of meaning. Of course, I must mention that the second solution would be to admit my proof with truth-conditional statement is based up a recursive rule. In this case, if I am indeed consistent for this, then I never could identify the meanings, considering that the application of the rule does not go ahead. Likewise, in a certain approach the ancient philosopher, Sextus Empiricus had already shown this principle. The statement attributed to Sextus's pyrrhonian skeptic *fundamentum argumentum* raised the regress argument against all forms of new knowledge.

“Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.”⁴

The pyrrhonian skeptic argument is really a threat to the identification model, provided that it depends on some type of factual terms and the way to recognize these also vindicate truth conditions. If we want to avoid this then it is necessary that we choose between the meaning identifier role of truth conditional statements and the possibility of mutual understanding. Since the latter cannot be selected – or at least the possibility of mutual understanding seems very likely– we have to eliminate the former. Therefore we also must think differently to Twin Earth thought-experiment. The mutual understanding and Twin-Earth thought experiment can consistent with each other only if the meaning can be determined by other conditions than the truth value of reference-determining statement.

In the next chapters I will show that although an attempt was made for the eliminating of truth conditions, in turn it is failed, because it went against with MS₂.

⁴ Sextus Empiricus. *Against the Logicians* trans. R.G. Bury (Loeb edn) (London: W. Heinemann, 1935) p. 179

Solution attempts

Fodor (1987: 27-55) argues that it is not problem, if the meaning cannot be determined by truth conditions. There is his fundamental idea that the distinction between Earthian's and Twin's narrow (mental) contents cannot be detectable on range of truth conditions. According to Fodor all that follow from the Twin-Earth thought experiment that the truth conditions of reference-determining statement of water may be different depending on what their factual conditions are. While mine and Twin's follow the statement: 'Water is used for drinking.' – under same potential circumstances would have different truth value because there are such metaphysically possible situation in which it is true from my mouth but it is false from Twin's mouth (Fodor 1987: 46). However it doesn't follow from this that our mental contents would have truth conditions essentially; "two tokens of the same thought can have different truth conditions, hence different truth values" (Fodor 1987: 46). Namely both of our mental contents are made on surface properties of the 'water', and haven't any truth conditions. The discretion prompted Fodor that he came to different conclusion from the definition of narrow content, according to which they are do not determine the reference. The mental contents are the baseline of evaluation; hence they are just a kind of functions which assign the truth conditions to meanings. It is worth quoting at some length:

"Well, it's presumably common ground that there is something about the relation between Twin-Earth and Twin-Me in virtue of which his 'water'-thoughts are about XYZ even though my water-thoughts are not. Call this condition that is satisfied by {Twin-Me, Twin-Earth} condition C (because it determines the Context of his 'water'-thoughts). Similarly, there must be something about the relation between me and Earth in virtue of which my water-thoughts are about H₂O even though my Twin's 'water'-thoughts are not. Call this condition that is satisfied by {me, Earth} condition C'. [...] Short of a miracle, it must be true that if an organism shares the neurophysical constitution of my Twins *and satisfies* C, it follows that its thoughts and my Twin's thoughts share their truth conditions. [...] [Now we have an extensional identity criterion for mental contents: Two thought contents are identical only if they effect the same mapping of thoughts and context onto truth conditions. [...] In effect, what we have here is an extensional criterion for 'narrow content'." (Fodor 1987: 48)

"So then, the condition for 'x is water' to be true requires that x be H₂O. Which, by

assumption, XYZ isn't it." (Fodor 1987: 49)

Fodor inferred from this that the existence of relation – which is between me and Earth in virtue of which my water-thoughts relate to H₂O even though my Twin's 'water' – thoughts are not – is needed to mental contents identify the meanings. Hence, the mental contents have not same necessary and sufficient conditions as the reference-determining statements – Fodor says against 2_B. We won't even find out from 2_B what the condition for meaning is. That is, the mental contents are not even those things which are determined by meanings, but those which can be determined, if they assign identical truth conditions to meanings. Fodor challenges the original definition of narrow content. While according to Putnam 2_B imply 2 because of his narrow content depended on the truth conditions of explanation statement; as long as, according to Fodor it cannot showed contradictory of 2 by Twin-Earth thought experiment and Frege's principle because 2 does not weaker statement than 2_B but they are independent from each other. It has not any necessary and sufficient criteria to determining for the reference, because the narrow contents are only certain functions which just allow the interpretation of meaning on range of truth conditions by the proper statements. In so far as this thought is true, then 2 can be an independent item which is consistent with methodological solipsistic assumptions, and is not inconsistent with Twin-Earth thought experiment. In other words; narrow content does not determine the reference but can determine the meaning.

In contrast, according to Stalnaker (1990: 288) Fodor just attempts to correct the mental content so that he can identify the meaning basis on its relational characteristics. The correction is that the Twin-Earth thought experiment presupposes that the mental content of surface properties of the 'water' is a function which is capable to assign different truth conditions to meaning of 'water'. If it so, then the narrow contents cannot be captured with truth-conditional statement, by they define the relational properties of those. We will answer other questions if looking for the relational properties of intentional states, and we will answer also other questions if choose the contribution of agent which depends on only the mental content of organism from the intentional explanations. In turn, Stalnaker notices something, whereby we can see that Fodor although incorporate MS₂ (and MS₁) in his model of truth conditions but he deduce 2 from a certain troublesome identification doctrine.

How does Fodor's theory look like? Apparently he accepts the Twin-Earth thought experiment as something which is adequate to illustrate that the reference-determining statements depend on a certain factual criteria. However he claims that our mental contents

aren't such. There is someone which has a mental content, if it is satisfied by the necessary properties of relation. Thereby the identification of mental content depends on what kind of relations are between the external conditions and the human mind s. Despite that Fodor doesn't say anything about how these relations look like; still he thinks it is conceivable that the categorization of them can be identification method of the narrow contents.

In turn, Stalnaker (1990: 311-313) present the fault of Fodor's identification criteria by an analogy on the basis of Churchland (1983) and Stich (1983). According to these writers Stalnaker point out, inasmuch as we would like to understand the identification of intentional states or meanings by their related properties, then there is a typing process, which can be offer an explanation not for that why has someone a given intentional state, but only for that, if someone has a certain intentional state, then what is the relation which describes it. Hence, by that we categorize mental states accordance with their relations of causal; just we obtain such kind of explanatory model of intentional states, which realizes types. Although it answers what is the parameter of identification of intentional state or meaning, but don't answer why such intentional state has for the agent, which can be characterized by this parameterization. Stalnaker tries to formalize this distinction. Consider that an A-B-C string which describes signs of events of a certain causal process, where their sequences represent the causal efficient of events. So long as A is not necessary condition for B, but B is necessary condition for C, the reference to A will be irrelevant factor, when the question is: ' why does B cause C?' If we deem important to be able to identify one type of event of the causal process, then it comes in handy, if we know that because of B, in turn it won't answer that why B occurred (Stalnaker 1990: 312).

Fodor's narrow contents are suitable units for formulations of those conditional statements which also avoid the question whether why someone has a particular intentional state. The identification conditions of narrow content depend on what intentional states should make sense virtue of truth conditions. But it still is not clear that whether my intentional state in a particular case is the same with others. If I adopt 1 and 2, while I do not admit that someone else may recognize this exactly, what the truth conditions of the reference determining state of an expression then I cannot assume, that there are the same meanings for him as for me. Inasmuch as we accept Fodor's argument, our identification experiment would be hopeless in the matter of meanings. He just gives some parameters to the relation property in order to clarify the causal conditions, but it is not clear which things identify the narrow contents. Given the fact that, if I want to explain what my assumptions in matter of identification of meanings are, then I should not inquire of the causal conditions but the

particular causal relations (Stalnaker 1990: 295). So, if B is a formed relational property of C, and A is a condition why this should be so, then only the question ‘why is C happens?’ tell me how I can identify C.⁵

Not only does Fodor persist in the conditional statement in the individuation model, but also Putnam. While Fodor uses up such conditional statements with which he can describe the relations properties of meanings, Putnam use up such conditional statements with which he can separate the ‘intension’ from the ‘meaning’. According to Putnam (MS₀) there is a condition that one grasps the meaning of a certain expression, this is that one *knows* that the ‘intension’ that one has ‘grasped’ is the ‘intension’ of the expression. Both kinds of the conditions only will be satisfied (true), if we know that someone else can grasp the meaning of something as regard the meaning. At the same time both philosophers argue that the narrow contents are such mental content, which are derived from methodological solipsistic assumption and they are in some kind of relationship with the meanings. In other words both admit that the identification of meaning has *factual* conditions, and the methodological solipsistic assumption plays a role in the identification.⁶

The original idea has been to somehow avoid the pyrrhonian skeptic argument. Since the mutual understanding cannot be proven by the truth conditions, therefore we should reform the identification of meaning. In turn, it seems the inquiring of the factual condition does not establish the possibility of this.

Nevertheless, there is a certain psycholinguistic identification model of meaning (Tomasello 1999) which is not connected to the conditional statement such as Fodor’s conception. Thus according to this model, it is not necessary to be clarified by the factual conditions of the reference determining statements. The model for us as semantic theory implies, that if I cannot prove the mutual understanding with the truth conditional statement,

⁵ It is conceivable, that C has no factual conditions, and therefore the A-B-C causal-explanation would be consistent with MS₂.

⁶ In this way starter attempts haven’t been successful; in short, I’m obliged to mention that not only Fodor tried to put to use factual conditions in identification model. Crane (1991) realized that the relational properties of intentional states is also can be described by truth-conditional statements. This is not about to say that the meaning identification function of the narrow contents depend on the factual conditions, but the relational properties of the intentional states depend on how the agent interprets them basis on their semantic criteria. Identification of meaning can be true or not depending on whether what is the semantic conditions of its reference-determining statement. These semantic terms consist of what do we think/believe about it, how to embed sense of the truth-conditional statements in our self fictional truth conditions (Crane 1991: 18). In such a semantic condition according to Crane would be that, if wide reference substitutes for narrow reference in a reference-determining statement (Crane 1991: 21). Why is it important to note this in addition to Fodor’s theory? The narrowness or wideness is a kind of product of the reflexing, which is a certain belief of the agent about own intentional state. However, if we want to use up the resulting conditions that we can successfully explain the identity then Crane’s method does not differ from Fodor. For what is concerned by belief also have factual conditions.

then those are not sufficient conditions for the ascertainment, that someone's intentional state on a given expression is same with mine. Quite simply the model propounds to exclude the truth conditions from the identification of methodological solipsistic assumptions (MS₂), thereby placing it overrides the view, according to which we should rely on factual conditions in case of identification of meaning. It is enough, if there are some intentional assumptions about a sort of reference, which are reconcilable with the methodological solipsistic assumption. And meanwhile does not need to the identification of intentional state or of meaning can be formulated by truth-conditional statement.⁷ So be it.

Psycholinguistic theories on learning of reference

Common sense suggests that even though we can make sure that what conditions of the reference-determining statement are, it cannot be concluded from this that it is known when we refer properly. At least we try to adapt to the abovementioned Stalnaker's model on causal connections. If we know 'why does B cause C?' in an A-B-C causal chain where A is not a necessary component, then we cannot be sure why did C occur in a unique case. The investigation of cause just can lead to "if... then" type conditional statements, but does not establish truth conditions on whether when something will occur. Likewise knowledge of truth conditions does not confer anything outside of knowledge of causal terms. Therefore, it is not reasoned to provide greater role for truth conditions, than what common sense dictates. The identification of meaning or the proof of mutual understanding has nothing to do with it.

The question is raised; how can one identify the meaning consistently with that which states that the mental content derives from methodological solipsistic assumption? Although the earlier authors (Putnam, Fodor) avoided such explanation which lacked truth conditions, we have not seen to win anything if we tried to make identification model by these. In turn, if the identification of the meaning is reasonable with mutual understanding, and the proof of mutual understanding not necessarily relies on the truth conditions then it can be given an explanation model which does not take account of external factors.

Bruner's (1983) and Tomasello's (1988, 1992b, 1999) researches directly reveal the connection between one's assumption of intentional states and one's ability of acquirement of

⁷ Nonetheless, this psycholinguistic model will permanently engage us to admit consistency of 2 and MS₂. If it is successful; then only should be placed claim of 1 in the theory.

meaning. This made possible a model of mutual understanding which does not approach it in terms of truth conditions, but native language acquisition. According to them these kind of intentional assumptions provide an explanation with regard to how we acquire the expressions in early stages of the language development without we could define their reference. Intentional assumptions by each other assuming establish a certain joint attentional scene between the human minds to they will be capable to recognize an intersubjective symbol.

Tomasello (1999: 97 – 100) psycholinguistic research started from the relationship between the native language acquisition mutual understanding and the attentional scenes, which include a subset of things in the human's perceptual world. He investigated why the attentional scene is not sufficient for the mutual understanding. According to this, if an American visitor in a Hungarian train station goes to the window where train ticket are sold, manned by a Hungarian speaker, and begins trying to obtain a ticket, and wouldn't share an understanding of each other's interactive goals for the exchanging of ticket and money, then their attentional scenes would lead nowhere. It is necessary to focus on a subset of object and activities for mutual consideration, and they are viewing themselves as a participant in the scene on a par with each other and the entity of joint attention.⁸ Tomasello used the joint attentional scene pursuant to the object concerned intention.

However the joint attentional scene is just the first station in the way of understanding an expression, because it is supplemented with that the intentional states still doesn't describe any relation which would be among the minds and external world. Tomasello pointed out that for somebody who is engaged in language acquisition can understand similar things like the competent language speaker who helps her in language acquisition; it is indispensable that there are assumptions of the language acquirer about the intentional state of the competent language speaker. The assumption of intentional states is a complex thing; when we learned an express of our native tongue, we assumed others have intentional states, and they are aware of that we are intentional beings. The latter assumption is justified for the following reasons: if I merely assume that one refers to the same thing like me then I will simply recognize that something is preferred in attention scene, and I will view myself externally as a participant in the interaction in which other trying to get me to attend to X still I wouldn't think that there is an intersubjective symbol which express it. However it needs more sureness if I would like to made accessible meaning of X to anyone like it would be independent from other's intention in the joint attention scene. That is in order that my assumptions should be directed only to the

⁸ See also other research on joint attentional scene; Sperber and Wilson (1986), Nelson (1996).

meaning; I have to actually come to share to attention to X with my partner (Tomasello 1999: 103). Then all of us will be same operators of my view of the attentional scene, if I assume about my partner that she also assume that I have intentional states (Tomasello 1999: 104). This can be achieved in so far as I simply substitute myself for my partner and I end up directing the symbol to myself (Tomasello 1999: 105).

Although in this case I assume that the meanings independent from us and it is part of the joint attentional scene, but I don't give any factual criteria which can be decided when it is indeed true or not. Any single fact alone cannot determine the reference; I only have subjective and reflexive assumptions about the intentional state which concern the reference. It gives such explanation for the mutual understanding where the intentional states during a communicative interaction is merely one party's assumptions. Meanings come from wherever but their identification hasn't any truth conditions in the mutual understanding. Simply it can be provided within the framework of approach of acquirer, which supply sufficient basis for it from a subjective point of view. And if the intentional states are only based on such assumptions, then it is not necessary to put them into a model which is explaining these independent criteria.

On the other hand the language acquirer assumptions are consistent with her methodological solipsistic assumptions. Researches have shown that actually in the ninth month of ontogeny evolve the assumption of intentional states.⁹ The language acquirer in this age can not conceive her world and the facts of her environment by truth-conditional statements. According to Bruner (1983) the child learn to participate in an interactive format that understands nonlinguistically the conventional use of the linguistic symbols which can be grounded in shared experiences. The child can understand the world by not making certain what it is actually. It seems that the linguistically expressed ontology does not necessary for her has certain meaning. And because her nonlinguistically understanding can be described perfectly with assumption of intentional states, hence they don't depend on what our ontology about other minds is like.

From here it is clear why the identity of meanings is devoid of the truth conditions. The use of truth conditions determine that others' mind can get role either in ontology or in pragmatics. The aforementioned mutual understanding model allows that both agents who equally participate in a certain joint attentional scene can assign different things to the same symbol. If they are aware of this, and also know that this is the basis for their language, then

⁹ See more researches Gergely et al. (1995: 165-193).

they aren't obliged to consider the others' minds part of the same ontology just like their own mind. In any case, they have to admit to their assumptions nothing to do with truth, therefore those can be directed to anybody. As long as it is one of possible way to identify of meaning the practice is required to project our understanding to others' minds. There is no ground for considering that we relegate to account of ontology from account of pragmatic the intentional states. If we consider the necessity of verifiable, then the skeptical *fundamentum argumentum* pull the rug from under internalist epistemology. Nonetheless, we do not engage ourselves with the internalist epistemology by leaving open the possibility of mutual understanding then we are forced to give in the temptation to exclude the necessity of verifiable and accept MS₂.

Undoubtedly food for thought those cases in which our partner properly using the symbols and in accordance with the joint attentional scene we can agree what a symbol mean. Well-known Searle (1990) article, wherein the philosopher present a similar situation; if there was a person who closed in a room and we as outsiders seeing that he can translate our English writing into Chinese, then we will not be able to decide, that indeed he understand the Chinese language or he just carry out the necessary symbol modifications with the aid of a translation algorithms containing book being in the room. At this point we would suppose that the man in the room really understands what we write to him. But if it is true that the assumption of intentional states only arise in the practice without any ontological limitation, then we can suppose to understand us everyone and every system in so far as pass personal requirements of the joint attentional scene. From the fact that the assumption of intentional states can be applied as retroactive in such attentional scene, still doesn't imply that it has ontological conditions. So, if your identity model does not incorporate the truth-conditional statements then it is consistent with your methodological solipsistic assumptions (MS₂).

Now, let's look 2, MS₁ and MS₂. These items claim that the methodological solipsistic assumption has no truth value, and the meanings are derived from this. If the agent wants to understand more closely own mental contents then properly these items she can assign them with her meanings. However there will be an important distinction between the meaning and the reference. Since the meaning comes from methodological solipsistic assumption, the reference can only be understood by truth-conditional statements.

We have won or lost with that whittling of the ontological presuppositions? The assumption of mutual understanding without its truth value allowed us to protect our own intentional states against the skeptical *fundamentum argumentum*. This way the meaning is reinterpreted. The mutual understanding doesn't rely on the truth conditions, nevertheless it is indispensable conviction of the language acquirer in the joint attentional scene for that she

can manipulate her intentional states like language symbol or meaning. Of course the approach of language acquirer can be interpreted like the extended mind's assumptions. Should be noted, although the extended mind's assumptions can be formulated by anyone who is no longer language acquirer, there is nothing that obliges us out that insist to interpret the meanings on range of truth conditions. Once we can describe the nonglinguistical mutual understanding without truth conditions, then those same times are eliminated from the explanation of entire language development. In addition to neither of us – who were going through the abovementioned stages of language development – believes in the existence of other minds, or at least we consider that the mutual understanding is sufficient for the identification of meanings. If we were insist to search factual conditions for the mutual understanding then would be run into Sextus's skeptical argument. On the other hand because the assumptions of the participants in language development are consistent with the methodological solipsism besides that these are sufficient condition of the identification of meaning in the stage of language acquiring therefore every model which is not consistent with the methodological solipsism cannot be necessary for the identity model of meanings.

Howsoever, if we want to prove 2 then in a first step does not need to know when the reference-determining statement true; it is enough to assume that there are such conditions which may make it true. Mutual understanding does not depend on whether the claim according to which our partner knows any factual conditions of reference-determining statement of our use of expressions is true or not, but whether there are such assumptions which fulfill the common assent of the obtaining of reference. Thus, if someone knows a meaning then although she can believe that has grasped is the meaning of an expression, but it is not one of true logical consequence. Hence MS_0 is false.

At the same time if MS_0 does not play a role of the identification of meaning then 2 does not follow from 2_B. Since the truth of MS_2 implies that the semantic conditions are not included the factual conditions and of course the Twin-Earth thought experiment is inconsistent with Frege's principle.

There is a possibility that we place the Frege's principle in the argument of 2; it is necessary that we explain what make sense Frege's principle is compatible with 2. Since the mutual understanding model made possible the appropriate interpretation of 2, therefore we should offer an explanation for Frege's principle.

If we examine more closely the Frege's principle, then we can see that is about how we grasp the reference for something. The meaning determine the reference. It is an assumption which is true if and only if one identify the meaning. Apparently not tell us

anything new about when the meaning determine the reference. But if we consistently with methodological solipsistic assumption identify the meanings, then doesn't need to tell new information moreover what is already assumed. Like the assumption of mutual understanding, I also doesn't point out what the truth condition for the reference-determining statement are, but explain what how we determine the reference. If one of us assumes about his partner that she also assume that his intentional states is directed to an object by an expression, then at the same time he assumes that each of them have intentional states which are directed to the same thing. Like we can saw these assumptions were the necessary and sufficient conditions for mutual understanding. Frege's principle intrinsically is a kind of summary of the logical relation between these assumptions. In all cases when we assume that there is a meaning is accessible to others, then the reference is also accessible to them. No doubt in this sense that what the factual conditions of intentional state are doesn't arise. After having the methodological solipsistic assumption doesn't tell us indeed what means for somebody an express, therefore it doesn't make sense that the basis of meaning establish possible various factual worlds, like Twin-Earth. Twin-Earth is only one possible world among those worlds which can be grouped basis of factual criteria. Of course this division into categories has also semantical conditions, because each of us need to know which way our intentional states relate to; for example we should know that what actually refer to by using water. And even though it has the chance to any of us to be disappointed, because other people use differently the same expression, but this doesn't alter meaning of the expression, considering it had been already acquired previously like learned the truth conditions of reference-determining statement of the expression. If somebody was discover XYZ, and it turns out that it is different from the Earth's water then not the meaning of water but the truth conditions of reference-determining statement of water will be changed. Of course we can suppose about a Twin-Earthian inhabitant that she understand the meaning of water. However this situation not different from the case of Chinese room; if we could uncloze her head in some way it could turns out that she is just a robot and thus we wouldn't attribute to her understanding factual criteria. It can be seen that the Twin-Earth thought experiment does not play a role in the supposition that the meaning determine the reference.

Prerequisites

In order to see clearly that why the proof of mutual understanding can lead us to *regressum ad infinitum* with the using of truth conditions, should be spelled out our view of truth conditions.

The one of newest theory of analytic statements give an answer why the claims cannot truth merely in virtue of meaning. Quine (1953/1980) argued that the truth can be defined only, if it depends in some way from our intentions. The truth of statements can be understood, if they are interpreted by not just certain hypothetical factual-compliance but also as semantic units which in some sense represent one's own intention.

“It is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact. The statement ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ would be false if the world had been different in certain ways, but it would be also be false if the word ‘killed’ happened rather to have the sentences of ‘begat’. Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. [...] But, for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statement simply has not been drawn.” (Quine 1953: 163-164)

According to Quine the adoption of truth of a statement is required both for the semantic and factual conditions. We cannot talk about the truth conditions without that we do not clarify what the meanings of them are. It seems, if we want to define the reference of a word by certain analytic statement using, before need to be aware the meaning of words of the statement. Although Quine pointed out that the linguistic components have a role in making what the reference of an expression could be, but it is also certain that we cannot say without circularity that this expression just could be true in virtue of meaning, provided that the definition of meaning is given in the terms of truth conditions. In this regard he has proven that the constituted idea of meaning by the neo-positivist relied terms of the truth conditions making the meaning and the truth conditions mutually presupposed each other. Therefore about the statement ‘No bachelor is married.’ cannot say that it's true in virtue of meaning, in case we would like to give to account for meaning of ‘bachelor’. The circularity can only be eliminated, if we recognize that the reference determining statements somehow depend on the factual conditions, which such kind of things are that no one is aware of. In other words, the

meaning in itself does not lead to the truth of a reference determining statement.

Perhaps this is why that Quine did not incorporate the factual conditions in his explanation of the linguistic component, and only treated them as some independent conditions from them. However, it does not necessary. According to certain representatives of semantic externalism there is another way to explain the analytic statements. Preti argues that the semantic externalism makes it possible to render consistent the idea that analytic truth is true in virtue of meaning (Preti 1994: 214).¹⁰ Inasmuch as externalism reject the traditional distinction between meaning and reference, therefore the meaning of an expression reveals the structural complexity of the property that, on this view individuates it, is a matter of its relations to other meaning with which it co-occurs in a truth-conditional statement (Preti 1994: 219). This gives a proper externalist individuation relation; meaning “mirror the structural relations of the properties that individuate them - by bearing those relations themselves” (Preti 1994: 220). Given the necessary identifier relations between the reference of expressions and the sense they express required by externalism, it will follow that truth conditions involving sense will likewise involve reference. The traditionalist can claim that sense-relations suffice and that therefore reference relations are beside the point, externalism. Thus “[t]he structural composition of the property of being a bachelor, we may say, necessarily comprises the property of being an unmarried male” (Preti 1994: 220). No other appeal will be needed to grasp the structure of the properties that determine the truth value of the sentence about these senses of these expressions. The sentence is true in virtue of meaning, and she calls it for ‘analytic statement’, because its meaning of expression comprises the factual conditions.

Notwithstanding, Preti did not calculate with that the externalist definition of the semantic conditions exactly has been formulated by an assumption that MS₀ and MS₁ are consistent with each other. And as we could see that Putnam assumed in this way that the statement: “On Twin-Earth the word ‘water’ means XYZ.” – is true if an Earthian would report from Twin-Earth. In other words; Preti only confirmed that what presuppositions of the externalism would be if we expand it into the theory of truth condition. The Earthian report would be true in case the meaning of water is equivalent with the reference determining truth-conditional statement of water. The equivalence is to ensure that the abovementioned statement is true in virtue of meaning. However Preti (1994: 221) does not call this analytic statement because the senses fail to capture H₂O, thus the recognition of the equivalence (H₂O

¹⁰ See also other externalist’s theory of analytic statements; G. Russell (2008: 176, 177)

= water) is a new knowledge. This entails that the scope of analytic statements only covers to the mental content because those derive from the sense. Two sensory data reconciliation really does not lead to new knowledge. Consequently Preti should accept 2, and reject MS₁. Nevertheless, since the rejection of MS₁ entails very dangerous consequences which can be not discussed in the framework of the paper, therefore the representatives of the individualism can feel safe themselves, but the debate is not closed.

It seems that there are two ways to lay the foundations of theory of the truth conditions. The one is the Quineian and the other is the Pretian; both theories are based upon specialized interpretations of relationship between truth conditions and meanings. The question is, that Quine's theory about truth conditions whether could get in the ring with the Putnamian-Pretian externalism in order to become the basis for the theory of semantic. From that time we only must choose one from the two theories.

Summarized, the Quineian prerequisites pointed out that the identification of meaning can touch upon the skeptical epistemological problems, if we accept the approach of semantic externalism and MS₁. Therefore instead of truth conditions we had to be vindicating weaker conditions. Since the mutual understanding made known unto us that it is unnecessary to be aware of truth conditions of the reference, if we use an expression, thus we can also easily admit, that it is enough to identify the meaning depending on whether what our assumptions are which are consistent with the MS₂.

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