

National Scientific Students' Associations Conference

**Balance of power in the XXI. Century:
Through the cases of Libya and Syria**

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Abstract

In this short paper I analyzed why the United States of America intervened in the civil war of Libya and did not in Syria. My assumption is that the protection of human rights is secondary for the US in the case of Syria compared to preserving the regional balance of power. To prove my hypothesis I go through many aspects of the two situations using Realism, Kenneth Waltz's and Henry Kissinger's power balance theory as a conceptual framework to understand the purpose and processes behind the actions. First, I look for the difference between the two countries' development and from that make a conclusion why Muammar Gaddafi could not make any strong commitment in the internal and external political fields. Besides that how the Al-Assad family could make strong international alliances with states like Russia and Iran. Secondly, I examine other important differences, which might influence the US decision makers like the structure of the two societies and the powers of the national defense forces. I show that Syria and the region is a mix of Islam denominations, which gives the reason of different complicated alliances between the regional countries. Thirdly, I use game theory to underpin my assumption and to show how the actors in the two civil wars behave and what strategy should be a rational one to follow. As a consequence I proved the assumption that the protection of human rights is secondary for the US in the case of Syria compared to preserving the regional balance of power. However this does not mean that they do not want to protect human rights or they consider it to be right not to do so. It means that with an intervention the conflict can be much deeper and lasting. Because of that an intervention seems to be an enormous jeopardy for the US and for the whole international community.

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1. Introduction

After the end of the Cold War a lot of political scientists thought that the power balancing approach from the realist Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 2000) was falsified. The truth is that several conflicts broke out nowadays, especially in North-Africa (Blight et al., 2012), which are civil wars where the society, the people of the country raise against their leaders and the political system. Every civil war and conflict has its casualties: - in these types of conflicts, innocent civilian people as well, so it is worth the analysis, how the international society, the USA as the most influential country in the world reacts on it. In order to do so, I compare two similar cases from the North-African region: the Libyan and Syrian civil war which started nearly at the same time (Bhardwaj, 2012), but the Libyan one has ended within 8 months (cnn.com, 2011), the Syrian is still not over.

The international society and the Obama administration in the Libyan case declared, that they cannot allow seeing civilians dying on the streets during the fights between the rebels and Libyan Dictator Muammar Gaddafi:

“Last week when I ordered our arm forces to protect Libyan people from the brutality of Muammar Gaddafi (...) I face no greater decision to than sending our military men and women (...) The US should not and cannot intervene every time there is a crisis in the world. But I firmly believe when innocent people are being brutalized, when someone like Gaddafi (...) could de-stabilize an entire region, and when the international community is prepared to come together to save many thousands of lives then it’s our national interest to act(...)” (Obama, 2011).

During the Libyan civil war nearly 2,000-3,000 civilians died (Black, 2013). The Syrian civil war’s casualty is, at the moment, more than 100,000 people (Cowell, 2013). In the other hand another serious moral issue occurred in Syria when the government used banned chemical weapons against their own public (bbc.co.uk, 2013). As we can see there is a big controversy in this issue. Why the US and the international society do not want to intervene against such brutality happening in Syria? What is the difference between Libya and Syria? Why the human rights are not protected in Syria?

In my paper I attempt to explain and why the international society reacted differently to “nearly” same problems, and show that Kenneth Waltz’s and Henry Kissinger's power balancing

theory in the Realist framework is still valid. *My hypothesis is that protection of human rights is secondary for the US in the Syrian case compared to preserving the regional balance of power.*

To prove my assumption I sum up the differences in my own interpretation between the two countries, using a conceptual framework of Realism (Burchill, et al., 2005, Steans, et al, 2010), Kenneth Waltz's power balancing theory (Waltz, 2000), and Henry Kissinger's realist approach (Kaplan, 1999). The steps I follow through my analysis in the two cases:

First I examine what differences developed between the two countries. What is the reason that Gaddafi could not make any strong commitment in the external or in the internal political fields? How the Al-Assad family could stabilize their power in the internal-, external politics?

Secondly, I search for other important factors which could influence the decisions made in the Libyan and Syrian case. What are the differences between the two societies? How well developed are the armies of the two countries? Do these differences have an impact on the adjudication of the two cases?

Thirdly, I analyze the role of the US in the two cases. What were the principles, which influenced the US decision makers? How the Obama administration made their decision about the two cases?

Fourthly, I use game theory to underpin my assumption and to show how the actors in the two civil wars behave and what strategy should be a rational one to follow.

2. Theoretical framework

In this section to ground my theoretical framework I mainly rely on books titled: Theories of International Relations (Burchill et al., 2005), An Introduction to International Relations Theory (Steans, et al, 2010), and on an article which summarized the thoughts of Henry Kissinger (Kaplan, 1999).

The importance of these theories is to understand the main purposes and processes behind the Libyan and Syrian conflicts using “the Waltz-Kissinger lenses”. The balance of power is the process of the actions, Kissinger’s theory is the aim, which wants to be achieved by the states in the Syrian case, and Realism is the theory, environment in which I analyze these two conceptions.

In this part I mainly rely on a book titled: An Introduction to International Relations Theory (Steans, et al, 2010).

The reason why I choose the Realist theory for framework is because the principles of the balance of power and the views of Kissinger root in Realism. Commonly the Realist theory can be recreated as a “*billiard ball model*”, where the table represents the world and balls are the states (Steans, et al, 2010, p. 53). The sense behind it is that the key actors in a Realist world are the states. The states like people are selfish single units and their purpose is to secure their survival and protect their own interests in an anarchic world (Steans, et al, 2010). Realists think that the biggest problem in the international relations is anarchy. As „*there was no sovereign authority that could enforce the rule of law and ensure that 'wrongdoers' were punished*” (Steans, et al, 2010, p. 53). This assumes that there is no higher authority than states, so it is the states’ task to protect their own citizens against other states with power and higher military capacity (Steans, et al, 2010). In this paper I show through this perspective that there isn’t any international government which could make states observe the common law like the protection of human rights.

In the paper I explain that morality is secondary in the realist world of politics in the case of human rights. From the XVth century Niccolo Machiavelli’s most famous motto was to break promises for your own advantage because „*statesman had no real choice*” (Steans, et al, p. 55).

As a result it is clear that for states in the realist world there are higher purposes than morality if the “reason of the State” (*raison d'état*) is at play. Also there is a tight connection between the lack of an international government and morality: *“States in anarchy cannot afford to be moral. The possibility of moral behavior rests upon the existence of an effective government that can deter and punish illegal actions.”* (Burchill, et al., 2005, p. 49).

As I emphasized above power is as a significant factor as anarchy in the Realist theory. In realism power is ability and with it states can dominate others. Power balancing theory is about how this power redistributed in the international system. In realism power is often a form of military or physical power (Steans, et al, 2010).

The importance of power balancing is that it extends beyond the Realist theory. In Realism *“the states have no grounds to comment or criticize the domestic political (...) of other states.”* (Steans, et al, p. 69). However when states start to balance their power against each other they always hurt interests and get involved in the domestic politics. In an anarchic system states can act in two ways. First, they can use the “bandwagoning” strategy and stand behind a state against the others. However it can backfire when *“the country you strengthened turns on you”* (Burchill et al., 2005, p. 36). Instead of “bandwagoning” another strategy is the balancing against the strongest dominant states. The question I observe is the difference between Libyan and Syrian situation. Why the US got involved in the domestic politics of Libya but did not in Syria?

As mentioned before in an anarchic system states have to provide their own survivability and avoid a major threat from the dominant power (britannica.com, s.a.). This can be achieved in two ways: (1) increasing their own power or (2) increase your power to make other states to join in a policy of alliances (britannica.com, s.a.). As Waltz put it quite eloquently:

“Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world.” (Waltz, 2000, p. 28).

So as we can see the balancing behavior of the states is an intention to stabilize the balance in the international system.

On the other hand Henry Kissinger's approach has a significant relation to the concept of Kenneth Waltz. However Kissinger was a state man who shaped the international politics in the Cold-War era and because of that he is one of the most controversial political scientists of the twentieth century (Kaplan, 2013). Besides all the critics Henry Kissinger is right in some cases

especially in the Syrian actions. Kissinger believes when a state is in a difficult time or period its interest to maintain the preservation of status quo, so neither of the states can be dominant against others. This statement was especially true in the Cold War era (Kaplan, 2013). In the twenty-first century this statement has changed but proved to be still acceptable. In 2008, -the big economic crisis spread all around the world and made the big powerful states to struggle either. Every state-even the powerful ones-has limited resources and it is a challenge how they can get out of this economic crisis (Kissinger, 2009). The main tasks for them are to set their own priorities and try to protect their national interests (let.rug.nl, s.a). With this attitude they balance against each other, new powers emerging and these powers has to be taken into account (let.rug.nl, s.a). Using this explanation I assume that in the Syrian region the states are balancing against each other to protect their own interest and to keep the status quo in the region. These states are the US and Russia. In the next sections I show how this developed through the history and what other circumstances influenced the decisions made by the USA.

"You can trust the Russians to pursue their own interests" (Kissinger in: Blake, 2013).

3. Analysis

In this section I compare Libya and Syria to understand the differences between the two situations. Firstly, before we start going through the main points I give a proper definition to civil war:

“civil wars must be territorially enclosed exclusively within the borders of an internationally recognized state (...) the actors in a civil war must be clearly defined. The government must be one of the actors, functioning as an armed entity whose motive is to continue its control over resources, force, political mobilization, and self-determination (...) Rebel forces must be recruited locally (...) a minimum of 1000 deaths” (Bhardwaj, 2012, p. 78).

Secondly, we have to clear what does a humanitarian intervention means, for this I use the definition of it:

“Humanitarian intervention is the use of military force by one or more states within the jurisdiction of another, without its permission, to protect innocent people from violence by the target state’s government.” (Keohane & Holzgrefe, 2003, p. 18).

I start the comparison with the historical differences between Libyan and Syrian regimes.

3.1 Past-how this started

a) Libya:

The Mad Dog of the Middle East, this is how Ronald Reagan called Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (Reagan, 2010). *“President Gaafar Nimeiri of Sudan described the Colonel as someone suffering from 'a split personality - both evil'. Even Fidel Castro dismissed Gaddafi as a 'reckless adventurer'”* (Ogunbadejo, 1986 quotes Solomon & Swart, 2005, p. 469). Muammar Gaddafi was one of the deadliest dictators of the twentieth century who started his ‘reign’ in 1969 (Solomon & Swart, 2005). Gaddafi was a military man and after the coup d’état¹ when Libya’s king King Idriss power was overruled Gaddafi was the man who got the power and started to

¹ The coup which was organized by him against the king

build his 'legacy' (Solomon & Swart, 2005). Gaddafi's vision always was to establish an Arab Union against the West and the Israeli government (Solomon & Swart, 2005). Because of his revolutionary theory which was published in the Green Book and was called Arab socialism/The Third Universal Theory, he had several conflicts not just with foreign countries' leaders but even with his own citizens (Muhammad, 2010).

For instance when the Arab Socialism era came in the country, families' private properties - who had two or more houses/properties- were taken and given to the people who did not have (Blundy & Lycett, 1987, p. 111). Every account on which there were more than 1000 rupees was taken by the government (Blundy & Lycett, 1987, p. 128). These sanctions made him a lot of enemies within his own country because he did not respect the private ownership. When Gaddafi realized that the country can go on an economic growth track from the revenues of the oil companies he started to reprivatize these companies (Blundy & Lycett, 1987). Gaddafi's own wealth started to increase rapidly: the public saw how well Gaddafi was living and these circumstances made them to rise together as a whole unity (Durgy, 2011). There was a huge difference in Libya compared to Syria that Gaddafi built his power only on his personality cult and did not institutionalize it like the al-Assad family did (Hinnebusch, 2001, p. 65). The consequence of it was that nobody got the chance to get a 'little power' from him, then nobody wanted to support him in the homeland.

On the other hand in the beginning Gaddafi's foreign policy was clear. Through a Pan-Arabic vision as nationalist he always tried to establish-with the support of the region-the Arab Union against the imperialist West and the USSR (Solomon & Swart, 2005). This was an impossible mission for him because in these times the region was surrounded with dominant, corrupted dictators who wanted the same like Gaddafi: more power. This is the reason when Gaddafi wanted to press his visions and future plans to a country with another dictator, it always ended in bloody conflicts:

"Muammar Gaddafi provided either financial or military support to regimes in Africa of which he approve (...) Gaddafi ardently promoted Arab unit" (Solomon & Swart, 2005, p. 471). "Tripoli was also accused of plotting to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire in the mid-1980s. In the 1970s and 1980s rebel movements and dissidents were supported against incumbent governments in Sudan, Somalia, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal and Tunisia. Again during

the early 1980s, Libya supported attempts at military coups in Ghana and the Gambia.” (Solomon & Swart, 2005, p. 472).

Nevertheless Gaddafi had serious conflicts with the US as well. For instance, the conflict of Gulf of Sidra, where several Libyan ships were destroyed with no American casualties (Clift & Gerstenzang, 1986).

To conclude Gaddafi made dramatic decisions in the internal and external political fields. This is the reason why he could not make any strong commitment in the international political arena because he went against everyone’s interest and could not cooperate with anyone. He did not have the support from his own people, region, and neither from the Arab states (Howorth, 2013). Moreover, as a scholarly article sharply put it: “Gaddafi's generous donations and contributions have certainly given new meaning to 'chequebook' diplomacy” (Solomon & Swart, 2005, p. 477).

This is the reason why the Arab League accepted the plan of an intervention from United Nation:

“why a UNSC Resolution on Libya became possible was the active support for such a Resolution on the part of regional actors such as the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.” (Howorth, 2013, p. 21).

b) Syria:

The hegemonic rule of al-Assad family started in the 1970s with Hafez al-Assad who was the President of Syria until his death from 1970 to 2000 (Hinnebusch, 2001, p. 63). In the 1970s Hafez al-Assad became the president of Syria and started to build his new political system (Hinnebusch, 2001, p. 65). First of all al-Assad realized if he and his family wants to be the political leader of this country he needs to create a new institutional framework. To reach that goal he created new stable political elite, whose revenue, wealth and (limited) power was thanks to the al-Assad family (Hinnebusch, 2001, p. 69). This system was very similar to the fifteenth century Turkish system where the Sultan gave territories, ranks and wealth to people who were loyal to the royal family. However what is more important that he had the power to take back these immediately from them which made them loyal to the family. This system was more stable than Muammar Gaddafi’s system and the Al-Assad family had supporters not only enemies within their own state. That provided the political background when Hafez al-Assad died it was easy to give his power to his son Bashar Al-Assad without any conflicts (Dwyer, 2013).

The foreign policy of the country was less ambitious than Gaddafi did. He had one single purpose to eliminate Israel (Hof, 2009). Why is this so important? Because he had a good relationship with the other Arab states and they could have a very similar vision and goal in their interpretation to break down the ‘unacceptable’ Jewish existence in the region (Hof, 2009). However this relationship with the regional states later became more volatile because of the opposition between the Alawi government and the Sunni public as I describe it later.

In his ‘mission’ against Israel he gained a very long deepened relationship with one of the strongest country in those times: the USSR (Manfreda, s.a.). This relationship remained important nowadays. It roots in three parts: economic, military, cultural/political. From the military part (1) Russia is the biggest weapon exporter of Syria and (2) the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean is located in Syria:

“According to data from the Moscow Defense Brief, the capital has more than \$4 billion in active arms contracts with Syria, including MiG-29 fighters, Pantsir surface-to-air missiles, artillery systems and anti-tank weaponry. Syria also hosts Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean, at Tartus.” (Amos, 2011).

From the economy part Russia is not the biggest exporter to Syria in numbers but in the number of Russian investments in Syria:

“Russian firms have a substantial presence in the Syrian infrastructure, energy and tourism industries. And with exports to Syria worth \$1.1 billion in 2010 and investment in the country valued at \$19.4 billion in 2009” (Amos, 2011).


The importance of this information explains why Russia used his veto against the UN intervention in Syria (Lauria, 2012).

The balance of power theory explains how Russia protects his national interest in a foreign country. Russia is protecting his economic interest and meanwhile protecting his role and power in the region, balancing against the US-Israel alliance. This is the reason why Syria is so important, to keep the status quo, to keep this balanced power. If their country loses his position in Syria the Russians will be squeezed out from the region which has serious consequences for the Russian foreign policy. As a result, I see it as one of the main reasons why the US did not intervene in Syria because the Russians’ veto against it made an enormous obstacle in front of the US foreign policy. They do not want to risk a serious conflict with the Russians.

As I analyzed above the differences in the development of the two countries had significant impact on the events. Gaddafi has been aggressive and non-cooperate in the region. Owe to this he did not have any international support against an intervention. Compared to Libya, Syria has an important ally, Russia who protects its interest in the region and balancing against the US. For the next parts I collect what other circumstances influenced the US foreign policy.

3.2 Differences

a) *Structure of Society:*



(Figure 1-The Complete Idiot's Chart to Understanding the Middle East, source: Fisher, 2013, changed figure on my interpretation)

It is important for the foreign policy makers that if they decide to intervene in a country they have to know against whom they are doing so. In this point I would like to discuss the differences in the two countries. Firstly, in Libya the majority of the people belong to Sunnis Arabs and Syria is a mix of religions. Therefore, in Libya there was a cohesive group of rebels, one united rebel forces. As a result it was easier to identify whom to support for the UN and the US (Shapiro,

2013). In Syria the civil war started between the Sunni rebels and Alawi government, but the rebels are not an identified unit, only an allocation of different Syrian rebel groups (Mooney, 2013). As seen in the chart above (Figure 1) that in this region there is a mix of different Islam denominations (Sunni, Shia, and Alawi) and the neighbor states want to support some of the two (three) sides. The biggest rivalry evolved in the centuries between the Sunnis and the Shias because of the different religious approaches to the Islam (economist.com, 2013). For this reason Iran supports the Syrian government because Iran's people are almost Shias, and it's their 'interest' to act against the Sunnis (Mooney, 2013). Turkey and Jordan supports the rebels because the people in the two countries belong to Sunni Arabs (Arango, 2013) (Mooney, 2013). As we can see this situation is far more complicated than the Libyan one. Syria is surrounded by different denominations of Islam and it is really hard to predict what would happen in the Gulf region after an intervention:

“Thus, while the recent approval of sanctions signal increasing Syrian isolation in the Gulf and increasing regional consolidation against Assad, and Arab states' approval of explicit foreign aid to Syrian rebels pushes the conflict more towards the brink, the complex sectarian ties and desire for power in the Gulf have so far prevented entirely cohesive regional influence for one side” (Bhardwaj, 2012, p. 88).

b) Military terms:

As I mentioned above for a foreign intervention it is important to know whom to support. In Libya it was clear, but not in Syria. Let us assume that it's not interesting for us at the moment and then we focus on the military differences. The cost of an intervention in Libya was much lower than it would be in Syria. The reason is that the Libyan air-defense forces were not as qualified and well-armed as the Syrian one:

“Libyan air defences were taken down in less than three days by B-2 stealth bombers, Tomahawk cruise missiles, A-10 close air support “Warthogs”, and F-16 fighters.” (Howorth, 2013, p. 21).

The Syrian army is well-prepared and armed with high-quality Russian weapons:

“unlike in Libya, the Syrian military is a highly efficient, well-armed and well-trained force with bases all over the country. Any hypothetical Western

intervention would be met with strong resistance and would be unable to avoid heavy collateral damage.” (Howorth, 2013, p. 24).

Just to bear in mind the fast Libyan military intervention was approximately 1 billion USD for the USA (Dywer, 2011). In this case the US does not want to risk a long, expensive war as they did before in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan (Londoño, 2013).

3.3 The Role of the US

In this section I make a deduction how to US foreign policy was adopted in the two situations.

It is important to see how much the two actions were supported by the public sphere and by the administration. In the first time Obama attacked Libya without asking the Congress using his presidential power (Montopoli, 2011). As I have already mentioned, it was more (1) clear with predictable future consequences, (2) the US administration got the support from the international community, (3) there was a clear purpose whom to support, (4) they could manage this intervention by ‘low’ cost, (5) and they did not harm any other states’ interest. The Syrian case is more and more troubling for the US. They intervened in Libya to protect the innocents but they do not intervene in Syria after the death of civilians killed by chemical weapons, and after Mr. Obama said:

“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.” (Kessler, 2013).

Obama knew that the US cannot make another huge mistake as they did in Iraq, where Britain and the US manipulated the evidence to prove a non-existing chemical weapon in Iraq (wahingtonsblog.com, 2011). So the question was: Are there any real chemical weapons in Syria? After the UN investigations the use of chemical weapons was approved (bbc.co.uk, 2013). Did the US intervene? No. My hypothesis that the protection of human rights is secondary for the US in the Syrian case compared to preserving the regional balance of power –appears to be vindicated. However it does not mean that US wants it to be happened like this or the US agrees with that. It means that they know that with an intervention they can have lasting, deeper conflicts with more innocent casualties. They know that with an intervention (1) they would go

against the interests of two very powerful nations: Russia and Iran. They do not know what (2) would happen in Syria after an intervention: Who would be (3) the new government because there is not any united rebel forces at the moment; How many (4) people have to be die innocently in a very long hard military intervention; How many (5) countries would intervene against or next to the US?

These are the reasons why Obama did not want to start an attack without the permission of the US congress in the case of Syria-not as he did in Libya-and because he did not get the support from the American people either (Montopoli, 2011). According to an opinion poll 62% of the American people want the US to 'stay out of the trouble' and not to intervene in Syria (nytimes.com, 2013). He knew that these steps would be too risky for him and for the whole American nation and these steps would break an unfair but still stable status quo.

4. Game Theory Model

Firstly, in this part I made a game theory model using my analysis to underpin the answers and the reasons why the US acted differently in the two civil wars. On the other hand, I show that game theory is a useful tool to analyze international relations from the strategic point of view. For this purpose I found that the two situations can be best described as a *sequential game* where the actors make their decisions one-by-one depending on the other actor's previous decision. The aim is to define the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the games and to compare it with the real world actions. In a sequential game the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is the best and most rational choice of the actors. If they want to maximize their payouts they should choose the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In this part I mainly relied on a game theory book to build up my model, which demonstrates the Libyan and the Syrian case (Osborne&Rubinstein, 1998).

Game Theory is a common modelling tool used in realist IR theories - mainly neo-realism. Since it is focused on players seeking to maximize gains and minimize losses under incomplete information and uncertainty, it fits the theoretical framework well. In IR Game Theoretical models, rational, gain-maximizing players are mostly states or decision makers representing states, who have clear preferences, can rank potential outcomes and evaluate their probability. These players start strategic interactions with each other. (Bennett&Nicholson, 1994) Since Game Theory also focuses on finding equilibria, it can also be paralleled to seeking a balance of power.

4.1 Conditions of the model


The actors of the game are the dictators of the two countries and the two superpowers: Gaddafi and Al-Assad; USA and Russia; in both countries the civilians who rise up against the dictators. Both games in Libya and Syria the civilians are who start to make moves against the regimes. The definition of the actors' actions is: the Civilians can act in two ways in the first round, they can support the regime or rise up against it. After that they can choose between continue the fight or to give up the fight against Gaddafi and Al-Assad; Gaddafi and Al-Assad in the second round can choose to resign and give up their power or to fight against the civilians which start a civil war. Then if the dictators choose to fight against the civilians and keep their power they do not

have any other moves in the two games; The USA and Russia can in two ways, they can intervene in the country or not.

The payoffs are measured in utility which was made mainly relying on my analysis part. We also assume that everybody is perfectly informed in the games and behaves rationally. The sequential game can be solved with backward induction.

4.2 The game of the Libyan civil war

In this game players are: Civilians, Gaddafi and the US. The reason why I put Russia out of the game is that they did not have any interests in the Libyan civil war to intervene against the US intervention as I described in the analysis part. Now I analyze the whole game with a decision tree, and I use the backward induction method to find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria:




Own graph 1-Decision tree 1

Before I solve the game I give a proper explanation how the utilities are created in the game. In the parentheses the first utility is the Civilians' utility, the second one is Gaddafi's utility, the third one is utility of the US.

For the US there are only two payoffs: 0; 1. For the US it is 0 if the Gaddafi regime remains in power because the US's aim is to protect the human rights and to democratize Libya against the regime. The payoff for the US is 1 if the democratization starts and the regime is overthrown by the civilians. For Gaddafi there are 4 payoffs. The best outcome for him is if the civilians support him and nobody wants to overthrow his power then his utility is: 4. If the civilians rise up against him he can choose to resign or to fight against the civilians. If he resigns he loses his power but remains alive for this scenario the utility is 2. If he chooses to fight and defeat the civilians his utility is higher than 2 because remains in power but smaller than 4 because he used a lot of resources to keep his power. The worst outcome for Gaddafi is if the civilians keep fighting and the US intervenes. If the US do not intervene Gaddafi's utility will be no more than 1 because his resources during the fight is coming to an end and it is more expensive to continue on fighting with the rebels. However he is still on power. If the US intervenes in Libya then Gaddafi's utility is 0 which is the worst scenario for him. The civilians overthrow his regime and he goes to jail or get executed by the rebel forces. For the civilians there are 4 payoffs. If they support the regime the civilian's utility is 1 because they did not have any casualties-as they would have had with a rise up-and everything remains the same. Their utility is also 1 if they fight against the regime but in the end they do not get any international support from the external political fields and have a lot of casualties. Their payoff is 2 if Gaddafi fights back against them and they give up the fight. Because in my interpretation with these actions the civilians can ease on the strict governance of the regime and can obtain advantages to avoid further fights and to get democratic rights from the government. Their utility is 3 if the fight ends with US support but they had casualties during the fight so it is smaller than 4. Their utility is 4 if in the first step when they rise up against the regime Gaddafi resigns and without any fights and casualties they can obtain democracy.

Now I solve the game with the backward induction method. The results are depicted by the decision tree where the red line indicates the chosen decisions made by the actors in every decision node. In the backward induction method we start to solve the game from the end with the decision of the US. The whole game is solved below:



Own graph 2-Decision tree 2


The subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria is indicated on the decision tree. With the backward induction method the last move is made by the US. As we can see the payoff for the US is 1 with intervention and 0 with non-intervention so the US chooses to intervene in Libya. Before that the civilians can choose to fight or to give up the fight but they know that the US will intervene if they continue to fight. Their payoff is 3 if they continue to fight and the US intervenes and 2 if they give up the fight. They choose to continue to fight. Before that Gaddafi can decide to resign or to fight against the civilians. If he fights against the civilians he knows that the US will intervene and the civilians continue to fight against him. His payoff will be 0. If he resigns his payoff will be 2 because he can leave the country without any harm and casualties. Gaddafi decides to resign because his payoff with a resign (2) is bigger than with the fight (0). In the first decision node the civilians will choose to rise up since they know that the best response for Gaddafi is to resign in that case. If Gaddafi resigns we get the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.

However as we know Gaddafi did not resign and continued to fight against the civilians in the real world. With the US intervention Gaddafi got captured and killed by the rebel forces (Black, 2013). As we can see Gaddafi got the lowest payoff from the decision tree. If he had chosen to resign he could have survived the revolution. The question is why Gaddafi did not choose the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In my opinion there are two explanations for this.

First, Gaddafi did not know the exact payoffs of the US and the civilians, therefore he could not have behaved rationally because of the lack of information. He could have thought that the US will not intervene and he can keep his power over the public. Second, he wanted to be in power so much that he did not behave rationally. With this game I demonstrated that Gaddafi had a better choice and payoff during the Libyan civil war and found two reasons why Gaddafi did not choose the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.

4.3 The game of the Syrian civil war

In this game the players are: Civilians, Al-Assad, US and Russia. Now the Russians are involved in the game because of the facts I showed above in the analysis part: they want to keep the status quo to protect their interests in the area. In the next part I analyze the whole game step-by-step using the backward induction method: to find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria:



Own graph 3-Decision tree 3


The method I explain and solve the second game is nearly the same as in the case of Libya.

Before I solve the game I give a proper explanation how the utilities are created in the game. In the parentheses the first utility is the Civilians' utility, the second one is Al-Assad's utility, the third one is the utility of the US and the fourth one is the utility of Russia.

For the US there are three payoffs: 0; 1, -1. It is 0 if the Al-Assad regime remains in power because the US's aim is to protect the human rights and to democratize Syria against the regime. The payoff for the US is 1 if the democratization starts and the regime is overthrown by the civilians. The payoff is -1 if the Russians intervene against the US because it brings longer and more complicated war with more casualties and expenses for the US government. Also it means that the US's diplomatic relations worsen with the Russians which have consequences on the economy and on the international political fields. For Russia there are two payoffs: 0, 1. Russia gains 0 if the Al-Assad regime resigns because they have to build a good relationship with the new government to stay in the favor and keep their position in the area. It takes time and can be expensive. Russia gains 1 if the Al-Assad regime stays on power because their influence remains

unchanged in the area without any additional costs. For Al-Assad there are 4 payoffs. The best outcome for him is if the civilians support him and nobody wants to overthrow his power then his utility is 4. If the civilians rise up against him he can choose to resign or to fight against the civilians. If he resigns he loses his power but remains alive for which his utility is 2. If he chooses to fight and defeat the civilians his utility is higher than 2 because remains on power but smaller than 4 because he used a lot of resources to keep it his utility is 3. If the US does not intervene he remains on power so his utility will be 1 because of the spent resources. If Russia reacts on the US intervene and he remains on power his utility will be 2 because finally he defeated the rebel forces. The worst outcome for Al-Assad is if the Russians do not react on the US intervention. He loses his power and maybe got captured and can go to jail because of using banned chemical weapons against the civilians. For the civilians there are 5 payoffs. Their utility is 0 if they get external help from the US but the Russians reacts on it and Al-Assad remains on power. In my opinion this scenario's utility is 0 because it means a total defeat for the rebel forces. If they support the regime the civilian's utility is 1 because they did not have any casualties-as they would have had with a rise up-and everything remains the same. Their utility is also 1 if they fight against the regime but in the end they do not get any international support from the US and suffer a lot of casualties. Their payoff is 2 if Al-Assad fights back against them and they give up the fight. Because in my interpretation with these actions they can ease on the strict governance of the regime and can obtain advantages to avoid further fights and to get democratic. Their utility is 3 if the fight ends with US support and without Russian intervention but they suffer casualties during the fights so this payoff cannot be the highest one. Their utility is 4 if in the first step when they rise up against the regime Al-Assad resigns and without any fights and casualties they can obtain democracy.

Now I solve the game with the backward induction method. The results are depicted by the decision tree where the red line indicates the chosen decisions made by the actors. In the backward induction method we start to solve the game from the end with the last decision of Russia. The whole game is solved below:



Own graph 4-Decision tree 4

The subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium is indicated on the decision tree. With the backward induction method the last move is made by Russia. As we can see the payoff for Russia is 1 with an intervention and 0 with non-intervention so Russia chooses to intervene in Syria. Before that the US can choose between intervention and non-intervention. If they intervene and they know that Russia will intervene too then their payoff is -1. If they choose not to intervene in Syria their payoff is 0 because Al-Assad remains on power. So the US chooses not to intervene in Syria to avoid the worst payoff the -1. Before that the civilians can choose to fight or to give up the fight but they know that the US will not intervene and Russia will. Their payoff is 1 if they continue to fight and 2 if they give up the fight. They choose to give up the fight and their payoff is 2. Before that Al-Assad can decide to resign or to fight against the civilians. If he fights against the civilians he knows that Russia will and the US will not intervene and the civilians give up the fight against him. His payoff is 3 if he fights back the civilians and 2 if he resigns. He chooses to fight. If the civilians rise up against the regime, and then Al-Assad fights and the civilians give up the fight we get the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium indicated on the decision tree.

However as we know in the Syrian civil war the actors did not reach the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the real world. The civilians rose up and then after Al-Assad fought back at them and the civilians decided to continue the fight against the regime which resulted in a worse payout instead giving up the fight. In my opinion there are two reasons why the civilians decided to continue the fight.

First, the civilians did not know the payoffs of the US and Russia, therefore they could not have behaved rationally because of the lack of information. They could have thought that the US will intervene and help them to overthrow the regime. Second, they wanted to overthrow the regime so much that they did not behave rationally. With this game I demonstrated that the civilians had a better choice and payoff during the Syrian civil war and explained two reasons why the civilians did not choose the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.

4.4 Summary of the games

As a conclusion, I made these two games to underpin my hypothesis why the US did not protect the human rights in Syria and why did in the case of Libya. In the case of Libya the Russians did not have any interest to intervene against the US and without a long, deep conflict the human rights could have been protected. In the case of Syria the bad payoffs for the US with an intervention was overwritten by the Russians to keep the status quo in the region.

These two models are dedicated to explain how the players can react on each other's actions and to give an answer which could have been the rational strategy for the players. However the real life is much more complex and every factor cannot be involved in the games but it can give a proper insight.

5. Conclusion

Analyzing the differences and the similarities between the two states we can see that the Syrian situation is much more complex than we would think in the first time.

In the first part I analyzed how the two systems developed. Gaddafi did not have any support in the external and internal politics. Under the vision of Arab Socialism he did not respect the private ownership in the country and intervened in other states domestic politics either. This is the reason why the Arab League accepted a UN intervention. In Syria the al-Assad family had the internal and external support in their politics. They recreated a new elite which wealth and power was given by the al-Assad family. In the external politics they had one enemy: Israel with a very strong ally: USSR. Syria did not want to intervene in any other states domestic politics. As a consequence Russia is still strongest ally for the regime along with Iran.

In the second part I emphasized what other differences emerged between the two countries. The diverse societies can be one reason either. In Libya the population is almost Sunni while in Syria the Shia government rules a Sunnis country. Therefore some of the neighbor countries support the rebels or the government also which makes the situation very complicated. I also noticed that the level of the armed forces in the two countries is not same which could make a Syrian intervention more expensive and longer than in Libya.

In the third part I analyzed the role of the US in the two situations. It is clear that an intervention in Syria is more volatile than it was in Libya. The US does not have the support in the external and internal politics and also it is hard to predict how much it would cost for the US tax payers. Another important factor is that the US does not know who should support in Syria in the fight against the regime because there is not a united rebel force. Due to these the US cannot intervene in Syria besides that the human rights are not protected. Because of this my hypothesis proved valid that the protection of human rights is secondary in the case of Syria.

In the fourth part, I used game theory to underpin my hypothesis and to describe how the actors can behave in the two civil wars. I showed with the two games that in both games there is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. However the players did not decide next to this because they behave irrationally or they are lack of perfect payouts of the other actors. It has also has a contribution to see how the circumstances, payouts of the US change when Russia steps in the second game.

By now we know that there are situations when the protection of civilians is secondary for the whole international society but the questions occurs: How the world, the international community could evade such disasters? The former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan in a report on humanitarian intervention stated that the UN does not made any significant process of signaling humanitarian catastrophes because they are lack the *“capability to analyze and integrate data from different parts of the system into comprehensive early warning reports and strategies on conflict prevention”* (Annan, 2006, p. 26). For a further research I would seek for models and methods to signal and to evade these catastrophes. There are existing models, for example the model of Kleibl et al.

“Our models identify nine countries that are at a very high risk of a new civil war until 2012. Policy decisions on the allocation of resources for conflict prevention should never be solely based on a statistical risk assessment model. (...) Models based on quantitative data should be combined with qualitative observations”
(Kleibl et al, 2009, p. 931).

The next issue would be great to analyze is the transformation process of the international law system. If the West takes the protection of human lives seriously, it will be the task of our generations to make the world capable of making strong commitments next to the protection of human rights. We need clear, strong statements and laws with incentives, principles which will be kept by everybody and every nation in the world.

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6.1 Charts and Graphs:

Figure 1 (pp. 10)-Fisher, M. (2013). *The Middle East, explained in one (sort of terrifying) chart*. Retrieved November 22, 2013, from:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/26/the-middle-east-explained-in-one-sort-of-terrifying-chart/>

Graph 1 (pp. 15)-Decision tree 1 made by own calculations.

Graph 2 (pp. 17)-Decision tree 2 made by own calculations.

Graph 3 (pp. 19)-Decision tree 3 made by own calculations.

Graph 3(pp. 21)-Decision tree 4 made by own calculations.