

Jelige: Albion

“The Greater *Frisson*”: Simulated Memory and Identity in Julian Barnes’ *England, England*

““What is real? This is sometimes how I put the question to myself.
Are *you* real, for instance – you and you?”” (Barnes 31)

Sir Jack Pitman, the creator of the Island Project he named “England, England,” questions not only the authenticity of artifacts, or the reality of his creation, but also the very nature of every person’s identity. Pitman’s words, a character inhabiting the world of Barnes’s novel entitled *England, England*, raise one of the greatest problems of the postindustrial society, resulting in an overwhelming anxiety. However, Pitman’s tone seems highly ironical, and this stance creates an ambivalence difficult to disentangle.

The present thesis builds around the concept and the phenomenon of the *simulacrum*. Barnes shows his interest and concern in sociological and cultural issues, providing an inherent critique of society but also of theory itself. The consideration of *England, England* from the viewpoint of the theory of the simulacrum functions on two fronts: on the one hand, the knowledge of how the simulacrum works may provide a new aspect for the reading of fiction and the understanding of the contemporary culture, on the other, the novel’s adoption of theories concerning the simulacrum, its criticism of the respective theories and its often ironic approach widen the theoretical field and add to our understanding of the simulacrum.

The approach outlines a progress from theory to practice, from philosophy to literature: from Plato to Deleuze and Baudrillard, from the philosophical approach to simulacra to the literary and implicitly sociological aspects of the matter. The different theoretical stances reveal the complexity of simulacrum, but also a progression towards a better understanding of it.

The common definition of simulacra is what Baudrillard builds his philosophy upon, what constituted Plato’s own interpretation, but what came to be questioned by Deleuze. This definition implies that the simulacrum is “a copy of a copy whose relation to the model has been so attenuated that it can no longer properly be said to be a copy” (Massumi 91). The present thesis intends to trace the process through which the copy ceases to be a copy and becomes the

simulacrum. Barnes's novel will provide the reader with stances revealing the gradually growing effect of simulacra.

Although theoreticians and the novel focus on the contemporary aspects of the simulacrum, its theory goes back to Plato, who was the first philosopher to be preoccupied by the dualism model-copy. In "The Allegory of the Cave", Book VII of *The Republic*, Plato, through a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, gives a symbolic description of the whole mankind. One of his philosophical assumptions is that the world perceived by our senses is not the real but only a poor copy of it. He further implies that the real world can be apprehended only intellectually. Here he presents people as inhabiting an underground cave, being chained so that their moves are limited, they can only see the shadows of the "real" things and people surrounding them. He (or Socrates) states: "what people in this situation would take for truth would be nothing more than the shadows of the manufactured objects" (Plato 221). His view implies that the majority of mankind inhabits a world of shadows which represent the reality they can experience. The possibility of leaving the cave in which shadows are perceived as the real things, and stepping into a world governed by light would result in pain and irritation. For them, illusion proves to be "more real than the real" (Baudrillard 1994, 1), shadows are truer than the objects themselves, and they prefer this state to the painful ascent into knowledge. The symbolic undertone of Plato's words implies that the society lives in such dark caves where illusions preside and only a select few reach lightness or intellectual liberation.

Baudrillard, relying on Plato's doctrines, gives an outline of the historical theory of sign structures. Starting from the preindustrial societies characterized by "symbolic" structures in which signs consisted of words with referents, he reaches the Renaissance period, in which the abstract code presided, meaning that language began to lose its reciprocity, and finally arrives at the late 20th century, in which signs are completely separated from their referents. Thus Baudrillard gives the definition of a new world which is dominated by simulacra without referents, without any reality except their own. This world of simulacra he terms "hyperreality": a world of self-referential signs. He identifies four distinct phases of the image which might be understood as a historical progress or change in the development of simulacra:

- 1 It is the reflection of a basic reality.
- 2 It masks and perverts a basic reality.
- 3 It masks the absence of a basic reality.
- 4 It bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum. (1994, 4)

While Plato's allegory presents images of the first order, which still retain their "real" equivalents, Baudrillard speaks about a society, about the contemporary world, as governed by simulacra "masking the absence of a basic reality" and "bearing no relation to reality": "We are in a world where the essential function of the sign is to make reality disappear and at the same time to mask that disappearance" (2002, 115). So, there can be seen a development which leads from the copy to the simulacrum itself. Simulacra can no longer be interpreted through dichotomies, they eliminate every possibility for understanding the world through the dualistic system we are accustomed to. As images become interchangeable, we find our world governed by utter indetermination.

This simulacrum brings all times into the present: the past becomes "instantaneous and instantaneously forgotten" (Baudrillard 1994, 87), incorporated in the simulacrum, which gains life through an implosion. As Baudrillard asserts, "simulation is characterized by a precession of the model" (1994, 16), meaning that the models always come first, they create the events. As a result, there is a confusion of the fact with the model, the implosion of antagonistic poles:

In fact, this whole process can only be understood in its negative form: nothing separates one pole from another anymore, the beginning from the end; there is a kind of contraction of one over the other, a fantastic telescoping, a collapse of the two traditional poles into each other: implosion - an absorption of the radiating mode of causality, of the differential mode of determination, with its positive and negative charge - an implosion of meaning. That is where simulation begins. (1994, 31)

The implosion becomes the beginning of the simulacrum: the two polarities of signifier and signified succumb; they still comprise the sign, but the bar separating them, the boundary disappears and unity ensues. Whereas the subject is previously understood as containing a bar that separates the signifier from the signified, Baudrillard reveals that through implosion "the bar of the sign falls" (1994, 18), it disappears and the sign as a unity emerges. All dichotomies disperse, consequently the world of simulacra is based on totality in which the particles sometimes are still visible, but the individual perceives the whole picture, without peeking into the texture of the simulacrum. Implosion transpires both on the level of the sign and on that of the world at large, seen mostly through the universalizing tendencies: "a universal market, not only of merchandise, but of values, signs, models, leaving no room for the imaginary" (1994, 123). The subsequent chapters of this thesis will firstly focus on delineating the process in the

understanding of the simulacrum, secondly the most important issues connected to the phenomenon as can be recognized in Barnes's novel.

The first chapter delineates the process through which the copy as such disappears, *since* the simulacrum incorporates it. This particular process will be presented through two major theoreticians: Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard, starting from the former's and arriving to the latter's theory concerning society at large. Debord's "society of the spectacle" (1990, 1994) relies on representation working on the level of "scene", which is changed by Baudrillard into simulation, operating on the level of the "screen".

The second chapter turns from the more general sociological issues to the more particular literary representation of the same issues: through Julian Barnes's 1998 novel, entitled *England, England*, the theories concerning the phenomenon of the simulacrum gain new life and become closer to the individual. The process of representation molding into simulation will surface in the analysis of this novel, through the account of the process of creating the Island Project. The theoretical debate is further complicated by Gilles Deleuze's own understanding of the simulacrum, who distances himself from the Platonian theory furthered by Baudrillard, thus enriching our understanding of the phenomenon and of the novel.

The third chapter focuses on the complex issues of memory and memory-formation, which will prove to be directly linked to the feeling of nostalgia. Memory, a key cultural concern, becomes highly determined by simulation and thus greatly unreliable. Nostalgia, on the other hand, might become more graspable through the theory of the simulacrum, which asserts that the past and present have lost the distance between them, and so the contemplation of the past has become impossible. The result is a nostalgic longing for that past which previously pertained exclusively to the realm of the past but now is always present.

The last chapter purports to shed some light on the intricacies of the identity in general and of the fictional protagonist of *England, England* in particular, also analyzing the possible relationship between personal and national identity – through the relationship between personal and national memory, since memory itself plays a significant role in identity formation, as it will be revealed in the course of the thesis. To a certain extent, the issue of identity as such will prove to encompass the previously debated facets of simulacra, both on the level of the novel and that of the social world at large, but never providing an exhaustive solution. All these chapters taken together are written with the purpose to provide an encompassing approach to the theory of the

simulacrum, to provide insight into its multifaceted nature, but also to capture some of its manifestations through and in the novel.

From Representation to Simulation

Andreas Huyssen states in his *Present Pasts*: “[o]riginal remakes’ are in, and not only as merchandise: as cultural theorists and critics we are obsessed with re-presentation, repetition, replication, and the culture of the copy, with or without original” (20–21). The contemporary world gradually stops chasing a lost original, an “original” which nevertheless always proves to be a replica of an earlier “original”. Today’s individuals live in a world which functions as a system of simulacra, a system that comprises a new kind of reality.

Jean Baudrillard’s rather apocalyptic vision about simulacra is filled with a sense of loss, not only of real referentials, but of the individual self as well. He argues: “Like the illusionist in the story, we are suddenly aware of the rapid, unintended disappearance of something very precious (a disappearance for which we must in some way be responsible). But of what? And how are we to bring it back?” (2002, 116). His theory discloses the entangled web of simulacra, pertaining to different orders or levels, as he terms them. In his view, simulations, and since representations gradually become incorporated into simulations, they as well, cover more complex and more overarching simulacra that comprise the fabric of our lives. Baudrillard identifies the contemporary state as a stage from which there is no return, characterized by a strong sense of loss:

For we know that with us and all our undertakings, the world will never be real or original again, and that everything is doomed, henceforth, to the curse of the screen, the curse of the simulacrum. We are in a world where the essential function of the sign is to make reality disappear and at the same time to mask that disappearance. Behind each image something has disappeared (it is not so much what it represents as this conjuring trick inherent in the image which gives it its force as sign). (2002, 115)

Baudrillard depicts the simulacrum as an all-pervasive phenomenon whose main aim is to cover losses, disappearances. He understands the contemporary state of the world as “doomed” and “cursed”. However, while “reality” might disappear behind the screen, behind the simulacrum, a new reality is born: “hyperreality” which exceeds the boundaries of the real.

Simulacra go beyond simple copies which cling to lost referentials: they become new realities, they form a world in which the simulacrum as a distinct phenomenon is the real itself, thus becoming the hyperreal, as Baudrillard names it. The prefix “hyper” denotes something excessive and exaggerated; in this manner, the hyperreal becomes “more real than the real”. Baudrillard defines it as “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (1994, 1), which is “sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the real and the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models and for the simulated generation of differences” (1994, 1). The hyperreal becomes a condition in which real and imaginary are blended and it is impossible to distinguish them from one another.

Baudrillard identifies the disappearance of the “scene” and the “mirror” (1993, 126) in the contemporary world. He describes the previous understanding of “this whole intimate universe” (1993, 126) as corresponding “to the imaginary depths of the mirror and ‘scene’: there is a domestic scene, a scene of interiority, a private space-time (correlative, moreover, to a public space)” (1993, 126). While in this state there was a direct relationship between subject and object, in which the object worked as a mirror to the subject, today this distinction is no longer valid. The scene and the mirror disappear and the screen and network take over their place: “a nonreflecting surface, an immanent surface where operations unfold – the smooth operational surface of communication” (1993, 127).

Prior to Baudrillard, Guy Debord celebrates the new society, the “society of the spectacle”, and this conforms to the understanding of life which, in Baudrillard’s view, pertains to the past, today is gradually disappearing. Debord analyzes the society from the perspective of representations, without reaching the point at which these representations cease to exist, mold into the more complex design of the simulation. He speaks about a “spectacular domination” that “eradicate[s] historical knowledge” (Debord 1990, np) by the spectacle which “organizes ignorance of what is about to happen and, immediately afterwards, the forgetting of whatever has nonetheless been understood. The more important something is, the more it is hidden” (1990, np). Debord attributes the media, which surrounds us, the power to turn everything – past, present and future – into an eternity, into an amalgam of events that lose their importance: “When social significance is attributed only to what is immediate, and to what will be immediate immediately afterwards, always replacing another, identical, immediacy, it can be seen that the uses of the media guarantee a kind of eternity of noisy insignificance” (1990, np).

The spectacle, similarly to the simulacrum, is defined by repetition. Its power lies in continuously going back to the start, and thus altering everything, every “reality” for its own purposes. Guy Debord and his theory concerning the spectacle stand for an understanding of the world prior to Baudrillard’s, who draws attention to the fact that Debord is concerned with representations which still cling to their originals, to something accepted as real. However, the safety provided by this view is dispersed with the emergence of the theory of the simulacrum. As Baudrillard states in *The Vital Illusion*, “for Debord there was still a chance of disalienation, a chance for the subject to recover his or her autonomy and sovereignty” (2000, 66). This stands for an approach which can no longer be accepted, since reality becomes only an illusion. He states that in a world defined by excesses, particularly by the excess of reality which “puts an end to reality” (2000, 66),

We move into a world where everything that exists only as idea, dream, fantasy, utopia will be eradicated, because it will immediately be realized, operationalized. Nothing will survive as an idea or a concept. You will not even have time enough to imagine. Events, real events, will not even have time to take place. (2000, 66)

Debord’s thesis operates on the level of the scene, functioning as a mirror to the reality of everyday life. Baudrillard, as already presented, recognizes the disappearance of the scene, its turning into a screen: the new reality, the hyperreality which has no relation to the older perception of reality. It functions as a distinct entity, never allowing a peek behind or beyond it, building its own truth, its own unique world:

The era of hyperreality now begins. What I mean is this: what was projected psychologically and mentally, what used to be lived out on earth as metaphor, as mental or metaphorical scene, is henceforth projected into reality, without any metaphor at all, into an absolute space which is also that of simulation. (1993, 128)

This drastic shift in the world which Baudrillard identifies comes with heightened losses: the loss both of the public and the private life and space. As he remarks, “the one is no longer a spectacle, the other no longer a secret” (1993, 130). The society of the spectacle ended, with the society of the simulacrum taking over, “when all becomes transparency and immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable light of information and communication” (1993, 130). This hyperreality does away with every scene, with every image and consequently puts an end to every representation. According to Baudrillard, the present state of civilization is a

virtual surface which gradually integrates every reality situated outside itself, and makes them hyperreal.

England, England: The Perfect Simulacrum

Julian Barnes's novel reveals similar observations as presented through Baudrillard and Debord. It presents the shift through which Debord's society of the spectacle, a world dominated by representations gradually turns into Baudrillard's hyperreality, into the society of the simulacrum, of the screen. In the fictional work the boundary between the real and the replica becomes blurred, and ultimately the replica becomes the thing itself – as Jack Pitman, the great entrepreneur of *England, England* names it: “*der Ding an Sich*” (61). This concept has a great history, analyzed and defined by numerous philosophers from Immanuel Kant through Friedrich Nietzsche to Martin Heidegger. Kant assumed a *Ding an sich* in order to identify the cause of our sensations: “since the knowing subject cannot create sensations” (Philipse 141) (he/she being receptive), the *Ding an sich* could be made responsible for these. Husserl redefined its notion as an “ideal limit, inherent in the process of sense perception” (Philipse 141). *Ding an sich*, in the novel, represents the point at which the boundary between authentic and original is dispersed. Although the original ceases to exist in the world of simulacra, which in this case is “England, England”, since the characters move in the sphere of representation, they identify the simulacrum as original, and thus the perfect simulacrum gains existence. Consequently, the Island is believed to be England itself.

The essential principle of language, according to Ferdinand de Saussure, is that it consists of signifying chains, the individual elements of which are called signs and consist of the unity of signifier and signified (Saussure 70). Roland Barthes states that a “signifier word/ signified concept chain can continue *ad infinitum* by using the initial concept produced as a signifier for a further concept” (Barthes 111). In this chain there are no dichotomies, no positive and negative poles. However, signs themselves cannot be understood as comprised by the duality of signifier-signified, since these implode, creating the simulacrum in which signifiers point towards new signifiers: Lacan suggests that the meaning is attributed to the sign (as a unity) in relation to other signs from the signifying chain, like “rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings” (Lacan 116). The idea of implosion Baudrillard develops in numerous instances,

as being the inevitable consequence of the “explosive” processes, which constantly accelerate and acquire a fatal speed and ultimately lead to the system’s implosion.

Nevertheless, in the case of reproductions, the chain refers to signs which produce reversals and displacements, the very loss of a basis which would provide a sense of certainty about the reality. In *England, England* the French philosopher provides the reader with an elaborated thesis concerning the contemporary world. Coming to give a lecture to the crew working on the simulacrum of the Island project (the island which becomes more than the miniature replica of “Old England”), his assumptions seem to bear quite a few similarities with Baudrillard’s, however, while Baudrillard criticizes the world of “hyperreality”, the fictional philosopher praises it. As he states:

Once there was only the world, directly lived. Now there is the representation – let me fracture that word, the re-presentation – of the world. It is not a substitute for that plain and primitive world, but an enhancement and enrichment, an ionization and summation of that world. This is where we live today. A monochrome world has become Technicolor, a single croaking speaker has become wraparound sound. Is this our loss? No, it is our conquest, our victory. (Barnes 54)

The philosopher argues that the contemporary society prefers the replica to the original, the reproduction to the work of art itself. He states that “[w]hen such discoveries were first made, there were certain old-fashioned people who expressed disappointment, even shame” (Barnes 54), considering that the fabric of the society is undermined. Allusions to Baudrillard and other theoreticians are quite overt, the fictional philosopher even cites some ideas pertaining to him. However, he confidently affirms that “in the modern world we prefer the replica to the original because it gives us the greater *frisson*” (54).

The Island of *England, England* works on the basis of repetition: the actors performing various roles of historical figures enact and re-enact each event day by day, forming an infinite circle, which ultimately leads to the birth of a new reality. The actors identify so completely with their roles that they believe to have become the original. The issue of *Ding an sich* surfaces once again: the actors believe the illusion, and they become the new models for others. Thus, the old model, the “original” is destroyed, and this new model takes its place. The whole role-playing becomes authentic, since the copy takes over the place of the model allowing for new copies to appear. The initial phase of the novel reveals an approach which conforms to Debord’s handling of the duality of original-copy. At the beginning, the fictional characters lure the reader into the

illusion that everything presented in the novel has visible connections to an original (certainly, in the boundaries of the fictional world they inhabit). What becomes of great concern is the issue of authenticity, surfacing when we understand the world through the dichotomy of original and representation. Walter Benjamin approaches this issue from the perspective of the “aura” (Benjamin *passim*), stating that the original possesses an aura which is lost through reproductions. As Benjamin remarks,

Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art determined the history to which it was subject throughout the time of its existence. This includes the changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as well as the various changes in its ownership. The traces of the first can be revealed only by chemical or physical analyses which it is impossible to perform on a reproduction; changes of ownership are subject to a tradition which must be traced from the situation of the original. (215)

The element reproductions lack, according to Benjamin, is the aura itself. Since he considers that the “presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (215), with the loss of the aura that characterizes the original, every possibility for creating something authentic is lost. The numerous reproductions which, through time, became possible and widely used, substitute “a plurality of copies for a unique existence” (216), thus creating a crisis in which no original object can be found. With the advent of the age of simulacra, the concept of authenticity itself became altered: while at first originality was the prerequisite of authenticity, today the original has disappeared, but the authentic conformed to the new system. In the case of *England, England*, the central characters invest themselves into the very creation of a reproduction that would faithfully mirror an original, the country itself, at first attempting to preserve (the illusion of) that original. However, Sir Jack’s reaction to the French philosopher’s lecture becomes the point at which he detaches himself and his project from the plane of reproductions, deciding to create the perfect simulacrum.

Repetition generates the anxiety which can be identified in the wish to be original, and the realization that nothing can be traced back to an original. The novel problematizes the complex issue of reality. Ultimately it reveals that this reality is not fixed but comprised of simulacra which provide a new version to the lost original, taking the place of that original. Everything belonging to this fictional world reaches its extremes, so that not even death can be accepted any more. Jack Pitman, though dead, must immediately be replaced by a new face,

which makes the grieving of his death impossible: one cannot visit the tombstone of a man and then cheer on his appearance as the leader of the Island:

The funeral was an affair of orotundity and black-plumed horses; some of the grief was real. But Time, or, more exactly, the dynamics of Sir Jack's own Project, had its revenge. In the first months, Premier Visitors came to pay their homage at the mausoleum, to read Sir Jack's wall-wisdom, and depart thoughtfully. Yet they also continued to tour the Pitman mansion at the end of the Mall, if anything in larger numbers. Such loyal enthusiasm pointed up the emptiness and melancholy of the building after its proprietor's death, and it seemed to both Jeff and Mark that there was a difference between making your Visitors reflective and making them depressed. Then the logic of marketing flamed like a message on Belshazzar's wall: Sir Jack must live again. (217)

Richard Bradford argues that "*England, England* (1998) addresses itself almost exclusively to its subject. Everything and every individual in the novel is a falsification, often a caricature, of questionable memories and nostalgic contrivances" (Groes, Childs 93). However, what shows itself as a mere caricature turns into a more serious matter: actors become one with their characters, Old England almost entirely ceases to exist, closing its gates to all countries, reverting into a primordial state, the Island taking away its position, even Sir Jack, the entrepreneur, who should be a "real" figure in this imaginary world, proves to play a role which must always be fulfilled by someone. So the question Pitman asks becomes central to the whole understanding of this fictional world and of our own world as well: "What is real? This is sometimes how I put the question to myself. Are *you* real, for instance – you and you?" (Barnes 31). The events show that nothing is real, not even those certainties to which we cling in our fear.

The novel gradually abandons every link to a supposed original: what it presents ceases to be mere representation, it becomes the thing itself, the simulacrum. As Deleuze remarks,

Plato gave the establishment of difference as the supreme goal of dialectic. However, difference does not lie between things and simulacra, models and copies. Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, and the difficulty facing everything is to become its own simulacrum, to attain the status of a sign in the coherence of eternal return. (1990, 67)

As Baudrillard claims, "representations stem from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real" (1994, 25), whereas simulation "stems from the Utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the reversions and death sentence of every reference" (25). Simulation incorporates the representation, thus

producing a simulacrum, distancing it from all referents, ultimately comprising an entirely new system.

The system of dichotomies in which signifier and signified are both present as distinct entities, is dispersed when an implosion takes place in which the boundaries are eliminated, and only the unity of the simulacrum remains. However, since every era's world view is based on dualities (e.g. Cartesian dualism), on the cherished dichotomy of model-copy, original-reproduction, image-likeness, this implosion causes chaos or the "crisis of signification", a sense of insecurity and anxiety pervading the scene and the audience – society at large. Baudrillard characterizes the new world as governed by "models", or "self-referential simulacra". The emergent hyperreality is a world with self-referential signs, in which simulation stands for the "generation by models of a real without origin or reality" (Baudrillard 1994, 1). In this manner, as Baudrillard remarks, "[t]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory" (1994, 1), we live in a world defined by the "precession of simulacra" (1994, 1).

Baudrillard's conclusion that "the map precedes the territory" stems from Jorge Luis Borges's fable and extends towards a general description of the contemporary world. In his "On Exactitude in Science", Borges presents an empire in which the mapping of a particular territory became so detailed and perfect that the map itself occupied that territory entirely. The wish for perfection drew the cartographers into mapping the entire empire, resulting in a map the exact size of its subject. This is what Baudrillard calls the hyperreal: an entity which exceeds the real, surpasses it, and results in the degeneration of the real, in its total disappearance. "The map precedes the territory" becomes not only an axiom, but a realization that simulacra precede reality and only hyperreality remains. The theme park of *England, England* functions as Borges's map that precedes Old England itself and engenders its existence. The island is hyperreal: "more real than the real", and England's "shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map" (1). While Baudrillard speaks about maps that entail the existence of an original and a connection between the two, Deleuze dissolves this connection and considers the simulacrum as a distinct entity from its appearance.

Gilles Deleuze takes the understanding of the simulacrum to a new level, contrary to Baudrillard. He states that "the copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance" (1990, 257). Thus, in his understanding, the simulacrum

undermines the very distinction between copy and model, and bears only an external resemblance to a model: “a thing, in order to become apparent, is forced to simulate structural states and to slip into states of forces that serve it as masks... underneath the mask and by means of it, it already invests the terminal forms and the specific higher states whose integrity it will subsequently establish” (Deleuze, Guattari 91). Contrary to Baudrillard’s four phases outlined in *Simulacra and Simulation*, Deleuze does not agree with the view that simulacra replace reality, but he claims that simulation “appropriates reality in the operation of despotic overcoding, it produces reality on the new full body that replaces the earth. It expresses the appropriation and production of the real by a quasi-cause” (Deleuze, Guattari 228).

The greatest difference between Baudrillard’s and Deleuze’s approach to the theory of the simulacrum would be the fact that while Baudrillard seems to ground his theory on the Platonic understanding of the simulacrum, Deleuze inverts the Platonic hierarchies. Baudrillard, in “The Precession of Simulacra”, returns to the Platonic dichotomy, only to reverse it: “It is no longer a question of imitation, nor even of parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself... Illusion is no longer possible because the real is no longer possible” (Baudrillard 1994, 19). Baudrillard’s “nightmarish vision of art offers no constructive alternatives to our image culture” (Camille 43). Contrary to this approach, Deleuze seeks to provide an alternative to Platonism, analyzing the novelty and the possibilities the simulacrum opens up in visual arts, emphasizing the role art plays in every individual’s life (“We have forsaken moral existence in order to enter into aesthetic existence”, 1990, 257). Deleuze considers the simulacrum to harbour “a positive power which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction*” (Deleuze 262, italics in original). This simulacrum is not subversive but receptive, all-encompassing, in which “there is no longer any privileged point of view except that of the object common to all points of view” (262). The point of view central to Plato’s construction of simulacra is displaced. The differences among the approaches to the simulacrum surface in the novel as well, in which the central characters occupy firm positions in the debate. However, these positions seem to provide an overview of the philosophers’ theories.

Sir Jack Pitman, the great entrepreneur of England, England, finds the French philosopher disappointing, since he speaks of reproductions, while they

are not talking Disneyland, World’s Fair, Festival of Britain, Legoland, or Pare Asterix. Colonial Williamsburg? [...]We are not seeking two-penny tourists. It is world-boggling time. We shall offer far more than words such as Entertainment can possibly imply; even

the phrase Quality Leisure, proud though I am of it, perhaps, in the long run, falls short. We are offering the thing itself. Der Ding an sich. (87)

Sir Jack is conscious of the simulacrum as both Deleuze and Baudrillard explain it: the simulacrum as being the new reality, with no connections to any original whatsoever, creating a new world, being itself the new world. Sir Jack's explanation of the simulacrum through the example of the nature we perceive as the "real" nature, untouched by man represents the moment at which every representation disappears, at which the hyperreal is born: The Island. As he states,

You, as a person passing through, would no doubt have assumed that Dame Nature was going about her eternal business. I knew better, Mark. The hill was an Iron Age burial mound, the undulating field a vestige of Saxon agriculture, the copse was a copse only because a thousand other trees had been cut down, the river was a canal, and the pheasant had been hand-reared by a gamekeeper. [...] It becomes the thing itself. (89)

The Island, similarly to nature, becomes the new authentic, acquires a reality distinct from everything preceding it, just as nature, accepted as the authentic, is something entirely constructed, deconstructed by man and then reconstructed for new purposes, as a new world. At this state all dichotomies collapse, there is no way of telling original from copy, since there is no such thing any longer: only simulacra, the world which struggles to hide its existence as simulacrum.

Memory and Nostalgia. The Past as the Lost Referential

Jean Baudrillard draws attention upon the appearance of a heightened sense of nostalgia, which results from losing the real and our sense of the past:

When the real is no longer what it was, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality - a plethora of truth, of secondary objectivity, and authenticity. Escalation of the true, of lived experience, resurrection of the figurative where the object and substance have disappeared. Panic-stricken production of the real and of the referential, parallel to and greater than the panic of material production: this is how simulation appears in the phase that concerns us - a strategy of the real, of the neoreal and the hyperreal that everywhere is the double of a strategy of deterrence. (1994, 6)

These issues are of primary importance because simulacra comprise in a perfect manner the relationship between past and nostalgia, our relationship to history. The sense of nostalgia is heightened in the course of a life lived surrounded by simulacra, by an altered history. Nostalgia

becomes the predominant feeling through which people struggle to reconnect with their past, with their roots, which is constantly altered and organized according to the logic of simulation.

Recent years presented the emergence of memory as a key cultural concern, which implies, contrary to earlier tendencies, a turning towards the past, a clinging to past events, a return to something which almost imperceptibly slides into oblivion. Andreas Huyssen reflects on the change in understanding the memory: he notes that memory for the Romantics was a force which “bound us in some deep sense to times past” (Huyssen 3), while today memory becomes something very present, since the act of remembering itself always happens in the present, and focus shifts onto the act. As he states,

Historical memory today is not what it used to be. It used to mark the relation of a community or a nation to its past, but the boundary between past and present used to be stronger and more stable than it appears to be today. Untold recent and not so recent pasts impinge upon the present through modern media of reproduction like photography, film, recorded music, and the Internet, as well as through the explosion of historical scholarship and an ever more voracious museal culture. The past has become part of the present in ways simply unimaginable in earlier centuries. As a result, temporal boundaries have weakened just as the experiential dimension of space has shrunk as a result of modern means of transportation and communication. (Huyssen 1)

Thus, he understands memory as “a mode of re-presentation and as a belonging ever more to the present” (Huyssen 4). What is of paramount importance in his understanding of the memory is that, as he states, “[i]nvariably, every act of memory carries with it a dimension of betrayal, forgetting, and absence” (Huyssen 4). Huyssen sheds light on the fact that memory is closely allied with forgetting, which is one of the most characteristic phenomena of today’s world.

Progress means shedding the past, destroying the past ways of living, of being in the world. Destruction takes active part in a progressive society: destruction of the past means forgetting, forgetting leads to amnesia: an amnesia that characterizes the whole world and threatens every individual. What defines today’s world is the disappearance of a sense of history, as Fredric Jameson states:

the way in which our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change that obliterates traditions of the kind which all earlier social information have had, in one way or another, to preserve. (Jameson 20)

This, in its own course, results in trauma as experienced by each member of the society. Huyssen defines trauma as being “located on the threshold between remembering and forgetting, seeing

and not seeing, transparency and occlusion, experience and its absence in repetition” (Huyssen 8). Memory and trauma both exist due to an absence, they are “marked by instability, transitoriness, and structures of repetition” (Huyssen 8). Consequently, there is an implied sense of loss, but not necessarily an overwhelming one. The contemporary world requires forgetting of the kind which manifests itself through the memory.

Barnes constantly plays with the concept of memory throughout his novel. As he writes in *England, England*, “Memories of childhood were the dreams that stayed with you after you woke” (6). Memory plays a key role, being the phenomenon which opens the novel and which guides the reader through it. Memory and the jigsaw puzzle run in parallel as two concepts representing the development of personality. The memory is a model which is constantly rewritten, altered by nostalgia, thus gradually losing all connection to the original.

Past events fall into an abyss, impossible to recollect. As Jonathan Culler notes, “one cannot track down and make present the event or cause because it exists nowhere” (163). Consequently, memory becomes a trauma, impossible to reconcile. Martha’s memories symbolized by her childhood jigsaw puzzle are the representatives of her constant search for her father and for her identity: “She did not know whether she was meant to remember or to forget the past. At this rate she would never build her character” (87). She feels that her life is unfulfilled, and the only way to retain some control and balance is through her memories of playing with her “Counties of England” puzzle.

Memory fails to recall the past faithfully and, what is more, it is able to distort past events for its own purposes. Martha notes that what is represented by memory is not “a solid, seizable [sic] thing” (Barnes 3) in the past, but rather “a memory now of a memory a bit earlier of a memory before that of a memory way back when” (3). This leads to an infinite chain – the signifying chain – in which each memory points to an earlier one, never reaching truth *per se*, but only figments of the consciousness which compose a story about the past of the individual. Memory is no more than “a sign that only ever points back to another sign” (Henstra 97). As Sarah Henstra remarks, “Martha compares personal memory with national history to explain how the means supercede the ends when reconstructing the past”:

If a memory wasn't a thing but a memory of a memory of a memory, mirrors set in parallel, then what the brain told you now about what it claimed had happened then would be coloured by what had happened in between. It was like a country remembering its history: the past was never just the past, it was what made the present able to live with itself. The

same went for individuals, though the process obviously wasn't straightforward. (Barnes 6 qtd. in Henstra 97)

She understands memory as built and molded by the technique of *mise en abyme*, through which her memory becomes "a story within the story of what is its own statement" (de Man 86) through "mirrors set in parallel" (Barnes 6), in which memories are embedded into other memories, always pointing towards the next memory, never reaching an end. The result is an infinite reproduction of one's memories, and through them, of oneself: of one's own image. The process of remembering works as the chain of signifiers, constantly referring to new ones, ultimately achieving a state in which each memory is rendered unstable. Memory is always coloured and altered by new mirrors, reflecting on the present, impossible to distance from the present.

According to *The Times of London*, the newspaper published on the Isle of Wight, "Old England had lost its history, and therefore – since memory is identity – had lost all sense of itself" (Barnes 77). In an interview, Barnes remarked that *England, England* was "about the creation of false truths about a country, and these coarse icons that are made to stand in for real things" (Guignery, Roberts 59). The (re)creation of England and its consecutive decay stand at the centre of the novel. The process through which this is achieved relies heavily on memory: on tourists' memory of England, on their perceptions, on myths surrounding the country. As it is revealed in the course of the novel, memory is replaced by nostalgia. The text alludes to the fact that those who retain their memories of history remain outside the effect of simulacra. However, this proves to be almost impossible in a world which is conceived of simulacra and of forgetting through the media. Baudrillard, in his "Ecstasy of Communication", submits the concept of the "obscene" to surpass the medium of pornography and to pervade the entire society. He claims that "obscenity begins precisely when there is no more spectacle, no more scene, when all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to the harsh and irrevocable light of information and communication" (1993, 130). Thus the obscene appears when everything is visible, when there are no secrets left and, consequently everything is overly close to us. All boundaries between private and public spheres disappear, so as the boundaries between past and present. The distance from which we previously contemplated our past, a nation's history has disappeared: everything is present and obscene, as Huyssen's "detemporalizing processes" show. The "history" lived on the Pitco Island becomes obscene because of its proximity to the present: the insight into the true nature of its past and of

England's history is impossible. It seems that all that remains for the individuals to cling to is nostalgia.

Two distinct kinds of nostalgia are presented in the novel. The general one is represented by the tourists who seek entertainment by visiting a world of simulacra, an island re-presenting something lost, the past of a country, guided by the laws of the consumer society, of the "society of the spectacle". They, like Martha Cochrane herself, are in search of a world lost, but their attitude is one of passive gazing, of devouring the spectacular shows they are entertained with. Martha's nostalgia differs from the one represented by the tourists: she clings to her own past – tightly connected to that of a whole country –, and does not let her memories slip away from her consciousness. Her nostalgia might be "excused", as implied by Barnes, since it is "knowingly constructed and aware of its idealizing take on the past", as Sarah Henstra remarks (103). Her version of nostalgia is an active agent which serves to find a valid identity for the heroine, which acknowledges that the object of its affection is not and can never be real, but a simulacrum.

[De]Constructed Identity

Identity and its definition have become of central concern in the contemporary world: in politics, in sociological studies, at every level of enquiry, with fiction occupying an important position in exploring its politics. As is the case with Barnes's *England, England*, personal identity today seems to be interconnected with national identity. The individual and the country remember their pasts through the same process, Martha identifies her first memory to consist of her assembling the counties of England jigsaw puzzle: "this, she thought, might be a true, unprocessed memory: she had progressed from the floor to the kitchen table, and her fingers were swifter with the counties now, neater and more honest – not trying to force Somerset to be Kent – and she would usually work her way round the coastline..." (Barnes 5), and thus her very first notion of her identity is directly related to her getting to know her own country. "English identity... attract[s] increasing attention..., fuelled by nostalgic reconstructions of the myths of Englishness", Bentley remarks (11). The heightened sense of national identity provides a basis for searching the personal and for creating the illusion of community, of a shared system of values which seem to guide each individual's life in the society.

Anxieties surrounding the deconstruction and pluralization of the self have resulted in an interest in models of hybridity and inbetweenness, of identities that reside on the borders between, and in between, traditional categories of identity. This has led the novel to investigate questions of ontology often expressed as an uncertainty about the relationship between the real and the unreal, between simulacra and simulations, about authenticity and fakery, as well as nostalgia for lost or displaced selves and organic communities. (Bentley 10)

Nick Bentley reveals the relationship between identity formation and the novel which today focuses on the person caught up in a web of simulacra, unable to find “truth”, to rely on any reality. Memory plays a central role in constructing identity by distorting past events, by forming them according to its own purpose. It leads to the illusion of acquiring a clear identity and, through this identity, a sense of certainty, of safety in a world full of signifiers which lead to other signifiers, but never to signifieds: to a graspable reality.

Martha Cochrane, the central character of *England, England*, provides the occasion for the text’s enquiry into “the links between individual and collective identity, between personal loss and national decline” (Henstra 96). There is a clear-cut process of formation detected in her case, showing how, in the project which builds entirely on simulacra, from “Appointed Cynic” (Barnes 44) she becomes CEO and, in contrast to this, her sense that she loses her own identity is more and more heightened. From the very beginning, through the metaphor of her jigsaw puzzle, Martha’s “individual identity is linked to that of her country” (Henstra 96) – she is overwhelmed by “a sense of desolation, failure, and disappointment in the imperfection of the world” (Barnes 5) when she discovers a piece missing, and she feels complete only when the puzzle is completed: “Staffordshire had been found, and her jigsaw, her England, and her heart had been made whole again” (Barnes 6) –, an identity that can never be complete.

Henstra notes that “[e]arly losses compounded by the inevitable failure of recall set the stage for Martha’s struggle to reconcile national and personal selfhood, while the suggestion here of indeterminate betrayal and uneasiness directs the reader’s attention to a narrative substratum of anxiety and grief” (Henstra 97). The entire process of her search for an identity is embedded in her country, which becomes even more powerful with her involvement in the Project. What haunts her throughout is the question of natural as against artificial identity, which leads to her anxiety, fearing that her nature “was no more natural” (Barnes 259) than the constructed reality of the theme park. Mark states: “As for being c–onstructed [sic]... well, so are you, Miss Cochrane, and so am I, constructed. I, if I may say so, a little more artfully than you” (Barnes

136). This proves that every individual, Martha included, is artificially constructed; our identities are formed by the illusion of being part of a community, and possibly “for all a lifetime’s internal struggling, you were finally no more than what others saw you as. That was your nature, whether you liked it or not” (Barnes 259).

Not only Martha’s perception of herself changes in the course of the development of the project, but the island itself begins to take on a life of its own, starting to look like “the thing itself”. This is nothing else but the victorious permeation of simulacra into the world, turning into a version of the real. The actors gradually identify with the roles they are playing, turning a world of copies into an autonomous miniature “hyperreality”, as Baudrillard would name it, in which there is no more space for the reality of the past. As Henstra states about the exemplary case of Dr. Johnson, his “is an identity rehearsed and reiterated into a coherent ‘self’ – a self whose foibles prove irreconcilably inconvenient to the profit-minded project. Watching this melancholy genius sway and twitch in her office, Martha suddenly finds herself believing in him” (Henstra 101). The complete identification with a character leads to the birth of a new personality, of a coherent identity which becomes true, ceases to be a poor copy:

The sudden truth she had felt as he leaned over her, wheezing and muttering, was that his pain was authentic. And his pain was authentic because it came from authentic contact with the world . . . By whatever means this vision had been put in front of her, she saw a creature alone with itself, wincing at naked contact with the world. When had she last seen – or felt – anything like that? (Barnes 217-18)

The case of Dr. Johnson proves that identity has nothing to do with real or fake, original or copy – identity gains birth in contact with others, in the “imagined community” Benedict Anderson speaks about. Martha realizes something important in the course of the actions namely, that “happiness, truth, and genuine contact with the world lie elsewhere than in the ever-elusive realization of one’s ‘true’ identity” (Henstra 101). What she witnesses in the actor’s becoming a “Dr Johnson” traces the birth of the simulacrum through an implosion: the two personalities merge and form an entirely new one from which there is no turning back. This individual himself becomes the epitome of the obscene:

Martha Cochrane scanned the file onscreen which summarized the complaints against Johnson. That he was badly dressed and had a rank smell to him; that he ate his dinner like a wild beast, and so quickly that Visitors, feeling obliged to keep pace, gave themselves indigestion; that he was either bullishly dominant or sunk in silence; that several times, in mid-sentence, he had stooped down and twitched off a woman’s shoe; that he was depressing company; that he made racist remarks about many of the Visitors’ countries of

origin; that he was irritable when closely questioned; that however brilliant his conversation might be, clients were distracted by the asthmatic gasping that accompanied it, and the needless rolling-around in his chair. (Barnes 265)

Dr Johnson, the historical figure becomes so close both to the actor and to the visitors, that none of them can objectively identify whether it is part of the show or something completely different. This too much proximity results in the visitors' witnessing details they should normally not see: like his foot fetishism, his drunkenness, rudeness, shouts. He is obscene in his every action, and consequently becomes one of the best personifications of the issue of the simulacrum in the entire novel.

As it was stated earlier, personal and national identity seem to meet in the course of the novel. The actors' changes presented above transpire in parallel with the great changes both the Island and the "original" England undergo. England, now under the name Albion (or Anglia), falls into a primordial state, but this very state is consciously organized and created in a simulacrum. It constructs new identities, every inhabitant takes up a new personality, fooling outsiders, even themselves. Jez Harris, formerly Oshinsky, an attorney working for an American firm, is an outstanding example of this phenomenon:

'Tell me,' the earnest hiker with the give-away new boots might begin, 'does that clump of trees over there have a special name?'

'Name?' Harris would shout back from his forge, wrinkling his brow and banging a vermilion horseshoe like a manic xylophonist. 'Name?' he would repeat, glaring at the investigator through matted hair. 'That be Halley's copse, half-drowned dog know that.' He would toss the shoe contemptuously into a pail of water, the fizzle and fume dramatizing his rebuke.

'Halley's copse ... You mean ... like Halley's comet?' Already the disguised sipper and browser of retarded humanity would be regretting that he couldn't take out notebook or recorder.

'Comet? What comet's that? No comet's round here betimes. Ain't never heard of Edna Halley then? No, reckon it's not what folk hereabouts like to tell of. Rum business, if you ask me, rum business.' (332)

The entire nation has reverted to its roots: roots that are impossible to retrace, and so they invent new ones for themselves. The nation living in Albion closes its gates to the outside world, becomes secluded, creates an entirely different world for itself: an agrarian world with no media, no international relations, only village people living from one day to another. For this simulacrum to function every citizen has to conform to its new rules. Consequently, many choose exile with the prospects of a successful life not obliterated by the Island Project or, to the

contrary: on the Island, as an actor. Those who remain, consciously choose the simulation of living, a simulation even more difficult to achieve and retain than that of the Island, since the roles of the inhabitants are not delineated beforehand by famous personalities of the past, but they have to construct these identities.

Conclusion

What this study attempted to do was to investigate the theories of the simulacrum in the analysis of a literary work for two purposes: firstly, to present a new approach that enriches the study of literature and, secondly, to present the phenomenon of the simulacrum not only from the perspective of philosophical and sociological studies but also from the viewpoint of a novel that combines these and formulates an inherent critique of them. Memory and identity were chosen as central concerns since they are of primary importance in the novel and also analyzed by theoreticians, and since they allow for an investigation into the workings of the simulacrum. In this undertaking of central relevance are such philosophers as Plato, Jean Baudrillard and Gilles Deleuze whose works together provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena pertaining to the theory of the simulacrum. The joint analysis of the above-mentioned theoreticians leads to multiple conclusions. On the one hand, one may declare that the theory of simulacra underwent a complex process of formation, which could be compressed in the form of the progress from representation to simulation, from the sign to the simulacrum, with the result that in the simulacrum the sign, the copy, and everything preceding it becomes incorporated. On the other hand, it can be safely declared that as yet there is no such thing as an all-encompassing definition of the simulacrum, since the very nature of the phenomenon entails that it can never be fully known or seen.

The present thesis set as a goal to present some of the sociological aspects of the issue, since the simulacrum is constantly gaining vaster territories and can be identified on more and more levels. As an argument for this could be considered the novel which consciously problematizes a world of simulation, shedding light on the generally unconscious nature of numerous projects (e.g. theme parks, museums, Hollywood, etc.). Julian Barnes's *England, England* is possibly one of the best examples of the sociological and cultural issues entailed in the simulacrum, at work in our lives.

The chapters delineated the process from the copy to the simulacrum, through which the copy is incorporated into the simulacrum, and no distinction whatsoever is possible: the “scene” is replaced by the “screen” which defines every individual and does not allow for peeking behind it: we become “voyeurs adrift in a sea of symbols” (Denzin vii). The general sociological issues were further presented and analyzed through Barnes’s *England, England*, through which the theories concerning the phenomenon of the simulacrum gained new life and became closer to the individual. Memory and nostalgia were proven to be not only interconnected, but also having great importance in the world of the simulacrum, in which the past became so close that it ceased to be understandable. Memories became unreliable, and the individuals became defined by a constant sense of nostalgia, which leads not to the past but to new simulacra. Through memory and nostalgia we arrived to the consideration of the issue of identity, since memory plays a prominent role in identity-formation. Not only the change in one’s identity was analyzed mainly through Martha Cochrane, but also the relationship between personal and national identity – through the relationship between personal and national memory, In the issue of the identity meet the other problematics of the simulacrum considered *a priori*, and this proved to encompass many facets of the simulacrum.

In conclusion, the present thesis operates as a brief and supposedly succinct work on the most general and pervasive aspects of the simulacrum, that reveal some areas in which its workings can be identified, and that may elucidate in what forms simulacra exist and exert their influence upon an individual. The novel enhances the understanding of these aspects and presents a critical attitude towards the issues it focuses on. Its analysis from the perspective of simulacra facilitates the understanding of both the novel and the theory.

Works Cited

Primary Source

BARNES, Julian. *England, England*. New York: Vintage, 1998, 2000. Print.

Secondary Sources

ANDERSON, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 2nd ed., London, New York: Verso, 1983, 1991. Print.

BARTHES, Roland. *Mythologies*. 1957. Trans. Anette Lavers. London: Paladin, 1972. Print.

BAUDRILLARD, Jean. *Screened Out*. 2001. Trans. Chris Turner. London, New York: Verso, 2002. Print.

---. *Simulacra and Simulation*. 1981. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Michigan: Michigan UP, 1994. Print.

---. "The Ecstasy of Communication." 1987. *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*. Ed. Hal Foster. Trans. John Johnston. New York: Bay P, 1993. 126-134. Print.

---. *The Vital Illusion*. Ed. Julia Witwer. New York: Columbia UP, 2000. Print.

BENJAMIN, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." 1936. Trans. Harry Zohn. *Illuminations*. Ed. Hannah Arendt. London: Fontana, 1968. 214-218. Print.

BENTLEY, Nick, ed. *British Fiction of the 1990s*. Oxon: Routledge, 2005. Print.

---. "Introduction: Mapping the Millennium: Themes and Trends in Contemporary British Fiction." Bentley. 1-18. Print.

BORGES, Jorge Luis. "On Exactitude in Science." 1946. *A Universal History of Infamy*. Trans. Norman Thomas de Giovanni. London: Penguin, 1975. 258. Print.

BRADFORD, Richard. "Julian Barnes's *England, England* and Englishness." Groes & Childs 92-102. Print.

CAMILLE, Michael. "Simulacrum." *Critical Terms for Art History*. Ed. Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1996. 31-44. Print.

CULLER, Jonathan D. *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell, 1985. Print.

- DEBORD, Guy. *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle*. 1988. Trans. Malcolm Imrie. London, New York: Verso, 1990. Print.
- . *The Society of the Spectacle*. 1967. Trans. Donald Nicholson Smith. New York: Gallimard, 1994. Print.
- DELEUZE, Gilles. *The Logic of Sense*. Trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. London: The Athlone Press, 1990. Print.
- DELEUZE, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus*. Trans. Robert Hurley. London: Continuum, 1984/2004. Print.
- DE MAN, Paul. *The Resistance to Theory*. Minnesota: Minnesota UP, 1986/2002. Print.
- DENZIN, Norman K. *Images of Postmodern Society: Social Theory and Contemporary Cinema*. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1991. Print.
- GROES, Sebastian. CHILDS, Peter, ed. *Julian Barnes: Contemporary Critical Perspective*. London, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011. Print.
- GUIGNERY, Vanessa, and Ryan Roberts, ed. *Conversations with Julian Barnes*. Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 2009. Print.
- HENSTRA, Sarah. "The McReal Thing: Personal/National Identity in Julian Barnes's *England, England*." Bentley. 95-107. Print.
- HUYSEN, Andreas. *Present Pasts. Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. Print.
- JAMESON, Fredric. *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-1998*. London, New York: Verso, 1998. Print.
- LACAN, Jacques. *Écrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Pub., 1977. Print.
- MASSUMI, Brian. "Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari." *Copyright 1*, 1987. 90-97. Print.
- McHALE, Brian. *Postmodernist Fiction*. London: Methuen, 1987. Print.
- PHILIPSE, Herman. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being. A Critical Interpretation*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998. Print.
- PLATO. "The Allegory of the Cave." *The Republic*. Book VII. Ed. G.R.F. Ferrari. Trans. Tom Griffith. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. 314-320. Print.

SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. 1916. Eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Trans. Roy Harris. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1983. Print.

STOTT, Cornelia. *The Sound of Truth: Constructed and Reconstructed Lives in English Novels since Julian Barnes's Flaubert's Parrot*. Marburg: Tectum, 2010. Print.