

“KEEPING HUNGARY HUNGARIAN”

The Rhetoric of PM Viktor Orbán in the Context of Migration Crises

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
2. Literature Review	4
3. Research questions and hypotheses	6
4. Data and methods	7
4.1. Qualitative analysis	7
4.2. Quantitative analysis	10
5. Results and discussion	11
5.1. Qualitative findings	12
5.2. Quantitative Findings	16
6. Conclusions	23
7. Bibliography	26
8. Appendix 1:	30
9. Appendix 2:	30
10. Appendix 3:	32
11. Appendix 4:	34

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1. Introduction

Migration has become a widely discussed topic in Europe predominantly since 2015, as conflicts in the Middle East urged large numbers of migrants to leave their homes in search of safety and protection. The right-wing government of Viktor Orbán in Hungary depicted this population movement as “an invasion set out for Europe” (2019-09-21) and became well-known for its role in spreading resilient anti-immigrant attitudes (Barna & Koltai, 2019). The far-right democracy comprises an “anti-immigrant discourse based on fear and hatred” (Rodríguez-Aguilera, 2014, p. 179), which seems to be extensively common in Orbán’s case. Over time, he has been discussed for using a “binary and alarming” rhetoric regarding migration (Mendelski, 2019, p. 8), for exploiting the migration issue to assemble an “exclusivist propaganda” in Hungary (Demeter, 2018, p. 194), and for launching a prejudiced national consultation in 2015 (Kiss, 2016).

Nowadays, Europe is experiencing a new migration crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which to the present day has forced millions of people to flee to neighboring countries. What has been noticeable in this case, is Orbán’s positive attitude towards these refugees, along with the readiness to offer hospitable treatment. An attention-grabbing detail has been the way he has differentiated the Ukrainians as **genuine refugees** while labeling the rest as **illegal immigrants**.

Orbán has extensive electoral support in Hungary and Hungary’s population is known for not being very immigrant-friendly (according to official results publicized in the Special Eurobarometer on the Integration of Immigrants in the European Union (Kantar, 2022)), thus it is timely and relevant to examine what strategies he has employed to express these negative attitudes and involve the Hungarian people in discussions about the migration issue.

In this paper, we study Orbán’s communication strategies employed in his political speeches. We focus on the topic of migration, define four different time-periods, and compare the dominant framing of migration in these intervals with each other. We apply the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as outlined by Reisigl & Wodak (2017), in combination with corpus-based quantitative analysis. Our qualitative analysis uncovers five prevalent discursive strategies employed by Orbán in his speeches, which are common in discourses of discrimination. We complement the qualitative research with quantitative analysis as well, we compute weighted word frequencies and examine – with statistical testing – whether they have changed over time, to reveal

the framing of migration in the different time-periods. The results of our quantitative investigation strongly corroborate the assumptions highlighted in the qualitative phase. The data reveals starkly negative portrayals of migrants from distant nations, compared with compassionate and empathetic depictions of refugees from the neighboring country – Ukraine. According to our interpretation, by deliberately highlighting these contrasts, Orbán amplifies his government’s reputation as a protector of both Hungary and Europe.

2. Literature Review

There have been numerous scientific investigations on this topic. For example, Azarova’s research on discourses of gender and nation in Viktor Orbán’s political speeches reveals that he has used a nationalist-conservative discourse to present his government’s policies since its establishment in 2010 (Azarova 2018). Batory (2016, p. 77) argues that Orbán’s speeches and interviews have conveyed a populist narrative since 2010, when Fidesz marked its electoral victory as a “revolution of *the people*”. Jagers and Walgrave (2007) define populism as a special political communication style that political actors use for assembling support and constituency. They highlight that this is conveyed in the form of talking about *the people* while comprising an anti-establishment position and exclusion of certain population categories in the same communication. In this line of thought, Pelinka (2013) posits that the general populist belief deems *the people* to be a *homogeneous composite* that uses national and racial identities to build up natural borders between ‘us’ (the supposedly indigenous people) and ‘them’ (the newcomers/foreigners). Thus, the populist anti-establishment sentiment expressly targets mass migration as well as those who allow the entrance of foreigners into the country (Pelinka, 2013).

The discourse of migration and crisis appeared in the Hungarian political sphere in 2015, when more than 220,000 migrants passed through Hungary (using it as a hallway) to reach Western- and Northern European countries (Menjívar et al., 2019). According to UNHCR¹, over one million refugees arrived in Europe by sea in 2015, 84% of which were estimated to be Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis escaping their homes due to conflict. As the situation became chaotic, in September 2015, the European Commission proposed a measure that would relocate 120,000

¹ UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency) is a worldwide organization that is committed to protect refugees and their rights. Website: <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us.html>

refugees within the EU, asking Hungary to accommodate a proportional number of them (European Commission, 2015). However, Hungary voted against the proposal and Orbán rather focused in building up a firm anti-migration campaign, facing consequently criticism from the international factor. Orbán's speeches are marked by a pervasive historical analogy, in which criticism from international institutions towards his decisions is equated to past national struggles for freedom against foreign oppressors (Sadecki, 2022). This amplification of past national trauma began being apparent at most in 2015 in Orbán's communications, giving both the politician and the political party, Fidesz, the chance to be portrayed as the saviors and defenders of the Hungarian nation against any potential repetition of the 20th Century's history (Toomey, 2018).

As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is ongoing, around 7,9 million refugees have left Ukraine by the end of 2022, from which more than 34 thousand have been registered for temporary protection in Hungary (UNHCR, 2023). Ukraine's neighbors have presented a welcoming stance and overt support for these refugees, however, for a while, the public discourse about refugees and migrants in the same countries has been racist and xenophobic (Reilly & Flynn, 2022). Hungary, being one of these countries, has been on the spot in the long run, for objecting to welcome and accommodate the refugees. Yet, not long after the conflict escalated in Ukraine, Orbán stated that Hungary will keep the borders open to the Ukrainians fleeing the war and added that "we are able to tell the difference between who is a migrant and who is a refugee" (Coakley, 2022). Orbán's government's discourse on the new migration crisis tends to classify the Ukrainians as "genuine and familiar" whereas the Africans and Middle Eastern as "dangerous" (Kyriazi, 2022, p. 1). In this regard, analysts have pointed out that such a treatment underlines a bias against those from the "Global South", who, upon seeking help of the same kind, have been preserved differently because of their racial and/or religious affiliation (Ramji-Nogales, 2022, p. 154).

Having Orbán continuously differentiate the "genuine/deserving/harmless refugees" of the neighboring country from the "fake/undeserving/dangerous migrants" of Africa and the Middle East (Kyriazi, 2022, p. 11), some other critics have theorized that the real motive behind such discrepancies is embedded in racism toward non-Europeans (Pettrachin & Hadj Abdou, 2022). In this regard, they highlight communication as an important means for constructing opinions of cultural and ethnical differences, which is significantly linked with the anti-migrant sentiment:

“[...] the anti-migrant sentiment is driven by the perception of cultural/ethnic difference and is thus inherently linked with dynamics of racialization. Perception of cultural and ethnical difference, however, is also something that is constructed and shaped by communication. Paradigmatic historical examples are the Irish, who were previously considered to be ‘another race’, as were Italian and Polish immigrants in Western Europe. There are astonishing parallels between these debates and arguments that have later been used against newcomers from outside Europe” (Pettrachin & Hadj Abdou, 2022, pp. 1–2).

Additionally, ongoing studies postulate that Orbán is instrumentalizing this issue to portray a positive image of himself and Hungary, to benefit more from EU funds, and to show hospitality and solidarity for the mere purpose of evading criticism of its previous attitudes towards migrants (Kyriazi 2022).

3. Research questions and hypotheses

We defined the research questions and developed the hypotheses based on the learnings of the literature review and the initial observations of Orbán’s communications. After establishing the relevance of the existing literature, we looked for answers to the following questions:

- What political communication strategies has PM Viktor Orbán used on migration?
- How has he used the observed communication strategies to differentiate between the migration crisis of 2015 and 2022?

We would like to answer the above-mentioned research questions related to which we have the following hypotheses:

- H1: Orbán’s communication strategy in addressing the migration crisis of 2015 assembles a categorization of non-European refugees with negative labels. This is done to deliberately fortify the anti-migration sentiment in Hungary by basing judgment on religion and culture.
- H2: Orbán’s communication strategy in approaching the 2022 migration crisis consists of a categorization of European refugees with sympathetic and compassionate labels. This is done to intentionally reinforce an indication that Europeans are genuine and not dangerous.
- H3: Orbán’s political purpose for employing such communication strategies is to exemplify a securitization concept in which he places himself and his government as the defenders and protectors of Europe and Hungary.

- H4: The securitization concept is likely to be more associated with negative depictions of migrants, and less associated with Ukrainian refugees.

4. Data and methods

The database, containing the corpus of the prime ministerial speeches was collected, cleaned, and preprocessed by ELTE Research Center for Computational Social Science (RC2S2). It contained 671 speeches in total, delivered from 2013 to 2022. The speeches were retrieved from the English website of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, miniszterelnok.hu/en/ (to access the corpus, see Appendix 1).

The following table shows the distribution of speeches within the examined years.

Years	Number of speeches	Proportion of speeches (%)
2013	1	0,1%
2014	18	2,7%
2015	53	7,9%
2016	80	11,9%
2017	103	15,4%
2018	104	15,5%
2019	76	11,3%
2020	73	10,9%
2021	81	12,1%
2022	82	12,2%
Total	671	100%

Table 1: Number of speeches and proportion of speeches (%) according to years

4.1. Qualitative analysis

For the qualitative analysis, we applied a keywords-based sampling method for collecting the speeches, selecting only speeches that contained at least one of our target words: **migrant** and **refugee**. According to the keywords-based sampling, 42 speeches from 2015 to 2022 were chosen. Moreover, we included another 39 speeches dating from 2021-2022 by selecting only those that had a frequency greater equal than 1 for the word **migration**. We used the CATMA 6.5.3 software

to place the texts coherently and annotate them based on deductive tags, which were classified in accordance with the research questions and hypotheses. The codes were devised based on five essential principles that comprised manner of speaking, comparisons, correlations, and political agenda (see Appendix 2: Table: 3).

As an initial conceptual principle, Chilton's (2004) study of political discourse is a useful foundation in this paper, as it grasps important aspects that link politics with language. Chilton expands on Aristotle's concept of "speech", who fundamentally distinguished it from mere "voice" and argues that humans have the talent for using language to indicate and communicate what is right and wrong based on the groups they belong to. Chilton acknowledges that language is crucial for political activity, so the doing of politics itself is crucially embedded in language. Essentially, his work preserves that it is highly relevant to link linguistic communication, wording, and phrasing to political values and concepts. In this paper, we utilize this approach and concentrate on wordings and phrasings that typically tackle broader political perceptions and values.

On a practical level, we apply the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). This approach provides a solid structure to identify Orbán's discursive strategies in the context of migration while analyzing their underlying intended meanings and purposes. It functions based on the principle of triangulation, which includes background information regarding the topic, a combination of theories and methods as well as empirical findings and reflections (Reisigl & Wodak, 2017). Our emphasis falls most on discursive strategies, which are defined as intended practices that aim to accomplish social, political, and psychological purposes among others, that can be linguistically understood by studying terms, phrases, metaphors, and so on (Reisigl & Wodak, 2017). In particular, we study five discursive strategies that are listed in (Table 2.), elaborated by Wodak & Meyer (2001) in their discourse-historical analysis of right-wing politics in Austria. Their study was carried out on the "Austria first" petition in 1992 and 1993, however it was considered to serve as a general model that is applicable to other cases too.

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Referential / Nomination	Construction of ingroups and outgroups	membership categorization biological, naturalizing, and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies synecdoche (pars pro toto, totum pro pars)
Predication	Labelling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits implicit and explicit predicates
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
Perspectivation, framing or discourse representation	Expressing involvement Positioning speaker's point of view	reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances

Table 2: Discursive strategies (Wodak & Meyer, 2001)

Additionally, in their recent quantitative research using natural language processing and word embeddings, Zsófia Rakovics and Márton Rakovics (2022) revealed that there is semantic evolution of words regarding the issue of migration in Orbán's speeches. Although the focus of this paper is different, the referred findings motivate us to dive deep into the evolution of Orbán's discursive patterns, and the direction they follow over time.

4.2. Quantitative analysis

Our analysis focused mainly on comparing the two migration periods of 2015 and 2022. However, due to the relatively low number of speeches in 2015 and the observation that some trends changed significantly after 2018, we opted to group those four years into the first examined time-period. The second time-period is after the first one, between 2019 and 2021, as based on the qualitative insights, the framing of the speeches on migration changed within these years. The third time-period contains only one year, 2022. We compare the first and the thirds intervals together, as those are the most relevant for our research topic. (Table 1.) shows the proportion of speeches throughout all the years, whereas (Table 3.) shows the proportion of speeches placed into each migration period.

Target time-periods	Number of speeches	Proportion of speeches (%)
2015-2018	340	50,7%
2019-2021	230	34,3%
2022	82	12,2%

Table 3: Number of speeches and proportion of speeches (%) according to targeted time-periods

The quantitative phase of our analysis started with preprocessing done by the researchers of ELTE Research Center for Computational Social Science. Proper preprocessing is one of the key steps in automated text analysis, the goal of which is to establish the effectiveness of the analysis. One of the basic text processing steps is tokenization, whereby a document is broken down into a series of text units, called tokens, which are textual instances of a character sequence. Another basic step is lemmatization, which is used to find the normalized or dictionary form of words.

For the automated text analysis, we compounded words together to create complex tokens matching the focus of our research. We defined the list of corresponding words, based on the results of the quantitative analysis and as another preprocessing steps attached those word sequences to each other. We defined the scope of this analysis with a list of target words and phrases, which seemed to match at best the concepts and discursive strategies mentioned in the preceding section (see Appendix: 2: Tables 1 & 2). Each target was based on an empirical observation from Orbán's speeches; thus the selection was made purposefully, following the patterns witnessed in the qualitative analysis.

The toolbox of text analytics is rich, with a variety of approaches and methods available to suit the research questions. The most common approach is based on the bag of words model, where the frequency of words in a corpus is examined without recording information on their position and order within the text. This type of approach can be useful in a research project that investigates which words are predominant in the documents and how often they occur in them (Boda & Rakovics, 2022). In our research, we have chosen this approach, focusing our analysis on keywords related to the topic of migration. We used a methodological approach similar to the one applied in the paper of Boda & Rakovics (2022). Based on theoretical considerations, we looked for words and complex phrases (compounded tokens) that typically occur when discussing the topic. By examining the observed weighted frequencies for each period, we in a sense can trace the temporal dynamics of the appearance of words.

The goal of our analysis – according to our research question – was to examine the frequency of selected keywords or more complex phrases for the speeches of two different years. To compare the results of different examined periods, we standardized the occurrences. The length of speeches was considered in the analysis and relative frequencies were calculated by dividing the observed frequencies by the number of words. We relied on established procedures in quantitative data analysis. When examining the average weighted word frequencies of the speeches, independent samples t-tests were used. These t-tests are generally used to compare means to each other, so we compared the differences in the average weighted frequencies of words together according to the targeted time-periods. To see the occurrences of keywords and more complex phrases, and their evolution throughout the years, we compared the target variables in terms of the two migration periods (2015-2018 and 2022). The results were generally presented in bar and line graphs. The preprocessing of the corpus was done in R and for the automated text analysis, we used SPSS (IBM Statistics software).

5. Results and discussion

In this chapter we demonstrate the results of the research, describing both the qualitative- and quantitative findings and the interpretation of the given insights.

5.1. Qualitative findings

In this section, we present the patterns that emerged during the annotation process based on the applied codes. We also put some respective speech passages of Orbán into context and categorize their potential intended meanings.

One of the first observations we made was the consistent use of the pronoun “we” instead of “I” in Orbán’s speeches (e.g., “We Hungarians”). This form of address seemed to be used as a way to unify *the people* and the nation in the talk. As discussed in the preceding sections, the concept of *the people* is a crucial notion of populist communication, thus, this choice of words often served Orbán in building a clear divide between those who constitute the “we”: “The Hungarian people” (2015-07-25); “The European people” (2015-09-21); “The Hungarian nation” (2015-11-19), and those who do not: “others from outside Europe” (2021-09-01). Speech about identities and differences is relevant to that of discrimination, which is grounded exactly on the construction of “us” and “them” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). On one hand, Orbán categorizes Christian Europeans, who share “more or less the same values on the most important issues and stand on the same foundations” (2021-09-01), while differentiating, on the other hand, “the unsecured groups of people that could result in terrorism and many social difficulties” (2021-09-01). By means of these continuous categorizations, we considered that the “referential/nomination discursive strategy”, which is fundamentally used to construct separations between ingroups and outgroups, aligns well with Orbán’s rhetoric.

Next, we considered the “predication strategy”, which is frequently used by speakers to ascribe positive or negative attributions to certain social actors (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Orbán’s government has used the Christian identity for political leverage and has continuously exploited the migration issue to reinforce the “Christian discourse” while “stigmatizing refugees as terrorists” (Goździak & Márton, 2018, p. 133). Orbán has made numerous statements that implicitly or explicitly connotated linkages between migrants and terrorism: “[...] those who are coming are all Muslims and changing the composition of our continent.” (2021-09-01); “[...] there is a clear correlation between the illegal immigrants who are flooding into Europe and the spread of terrorism” (2015-07-25). Given the numerous terrorist attacks taking place in Europe at the time, Orbán appeared to reference such occasions in order to strengthen the perception that migration is the one serving the entry point for dangerous individuals into Europe. Especially after

the terrorist attack on January 2015 towards the satiric magazine Charlie Hebdo, Orbán stated that Hungary will not be welcoming immigrants under his governing, and further handled migration not only as a terrorist threat but also as an economic and cultural one (Bíró-Nagy, 2022).

In this respect, the “perspectivation or framing strategy” comes into play when speakers try to stimulate certain images of a situation or group in the public, from a personal standpoint. Orbán uses this strategy to frame Muslims as “invaders”. To illustrate an example of this stereotype, let’s consider the following excerpt:

“Interviewer: Why did you refer to Muslims once as “invaders”? Orbán: That’s happened, that was the fact. So without any kind of legal permission, without any permission coming from any Hungarian authorities, they just destroyed the border, and they marched through the country. [...] in the Hungarian language we call it “invasion”. And they were all Muslims, anyway. That’s a simple fact. Interviewer: Did you understand how many Muslims find that offensive? Orbán: No, no, no, I understand it. Yes, of course I understand, but this was the fact. This was the fact. You know, in democracy you have to name the fact.” (2021-05-28)

Furthermore, his predications revolve around the risks that Muslims and migration overall impose on the Hungarian/European culture as well as the consequences they inflict on the national Hungarian/European identity. Orbán provides examples of these cultural and national aspects by defining Hungary as a *composite* entity with shared cultural values that migrants are unable to conform to. He emphasizes that Hungary is already “colorful and diverse enough” (2015-09-05), thus alternations of the *homogeneous cultural composite* are neither needed nor welcomed. Principally advocating for the nation to be kept as it is, we witness a very firm anti-change and anti-multicultural approach in his addresses: “We are against the creation of a new European race with a politically correct, multicultural mentality [...]” (2021-11-14). He regards the cultural composite as an entity that only Hungarians and Europeans should have access to: “We want to preserve Hungary as a Hungarian country. We would like Europe to remain the continent of Europeans.” (2015-07-25). When such messages are delivered from a leader, it isn’t surprising that highlighted negative attitudes toward foreigners are more likely to be present in the country, as well foreigners are more probable to be viewed as a threat to national culture (Goździak & Márton, 2018).

Given that the distinction between “us” and “them” is already apparent, it is even more critical to analyze the distinction Orbán makes within “them”, as his speeches undoubtedly suggest that not all members of this category are viewed the same way. On one hand, he groups the “illegal immigrants” and “economic migrants”, while on the other, he groups the “unarmed refugees”, “true refugees”, and “genuine refugees”. Ever since the discourse of migration became apparent in Hungary, Orbán constructed this divide, usually ascribing negative labels to the former and considerably positive ones to the latter. Especially in 2015, his statements strongly advocated this distinction: “Immigrants, however, are not the same as refugees: they want a better life, and this is why they come here” (2015-05-19); “naturally there are genuine refugees, but there are many more who are merely seeking to enjoy the benefits of the European lifestyle” (2015-07-25).

Considering the time frame and context in which these distinctions were made, it is understandable that the “illegal” and “economic” migrants Orbán talks about are mostly the non-European refugees who reached Europe from conflict zones such as Syria in 2015, whereas the “genuine”, “real” refugees he refers to are largely the Ukrainian refugees.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict provides a valuable perspective for examining this issue. For instance, the language he uses regarding the Ukrainian refugees differs significantly from how he approaches other refugees: “We fully sympathize with the Ukrainians, and they have our solidarity” (2016-02-19); “Our Ukrainian friends” (2016-11-30); “Helping the Ukrainians is something which can be expected at least from the V4” (2016-12-02); “Extend a helping hand to Ukrainian families” (2017-09-18); “We will help Ukrainian refugees. Ukrainians can count on Hungary and the Hungarian government” (2022-05-16). Moreover, when both these groups (non-Europeans and Europeans) are mentioned in the same passages, Orbán’s statements convey stark and prejudiced messages:

“Now everyone can see the difference between the frightened women fleeing from the fighting in our neighboring country with their bags and children, and the migrants from thousands of kilometers away besieging our borders. Hungary helps refugees but continues to reject migration.” (2022-03-16)

This begs the question: what makes those who come from closer regions so markedly different? Does this connote that women with children who are fleeing from fighting in non-neighboring countries are invaders? While it may seem sensical that countries with geographical closeness help

one another, politicians often decide to neglect the fact that offering aid shall not be centered in territorial proximity rather in purely helping innocent people who are seeking safety (Bayoumi, 2022). Pettrachin & Hadj Abdou (2022) also argue that this whole issue is not merely a question of distance and kilometers, but rather several other factors (one of them being racism) designate whom politicians decide to help and whom they decide to neglect.

Orbán's negative stance, however, has already been given a formal status as soon as the implementation of stark measures and policies to stop migration took place. In this regard, we observed patterns of justification and relativization of his decisions. To dive deeper into this, we considered the prism of the "argumentation strategy", which Wodak & Meyer (2001) describe as a tactic speakers use to rationalize discriminatory decisions. In 2015, Orbán's Government sent out a questionnaire with 12 questions and a letter from Orbán himself to 8 million Hungarian citizens, as part of a National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism. Some of the questions asked the citizens "whether they agree that the advance of terrorism is connected to the poor handling of immigration by Brussels", "whether they agree that immigrants threaten the workplaces and subsistence of Hungarian people", "whether they agree that the Hungarian government should support Hungarian families and children to be born, instead of supporting immigration", etc., (Prime Minister's Office, 2015). Some researchers and advocacy organizations considered this consultation not necessary in the first place, and some said that it only contributes to the spread of the high level of xenophobia and prejudice against immigrants in Hungary (Kováts, 2015). The results of the consultation revealed that the majority of respondents hold negative opinions toward immigrants, which offered Orbán an opportunity to validate his anti-immigrant stance and justify the limitations of illegal border crossings as well as the construction of the fence by the Serbian border (Bocskor, 2018). In a way or another, Orbán exploited the National Consultation results to legitimize these anti-migration measures, usually placing the attention on the fact that he is not solely objecting to the phenomenon, but rather the Hungarian nation as a whole: "We have reason to say that our measures are in harmony with the Hungarian people's will" (2021-09-23); "Hungary has decided, and this is how the Hungarian people have decided" (2015-07-25).

Except for using argumentation as a strategy to justify these anti-migration policies, Orbán's rhetoric also involves elements of the so-called "intensification/mitigation" strategy, which according to Wodak & Meyer (2001) is used by speakers to strengthen or lessen the impacts

of prejudiced speech. Orbán reflects on the migration crisis in 2015 with metaphors that inflict a harsh, hostile image of migrants, comparing their influx to previous historical incidents: “During the great migration crisis in 2015, 400 thousand illegal migrants came to our borders. This is almost three times as much as Genghis Khan had when he invaded Europe” (2022-08-05). Thus, he accentuates that the governmental procedures taken to stop this “migration invasion” serve the protection of the country and the continent. In this logic, he mitigates the negative impacts of his stance by intensifying the seemingly positive effects that the policies have brought to practice. As such, he supplements xenophobia in Hungary, spurring clashes within the European Union and positioning himself as the protector of the nation (Haraszti, 2015).

In this context, his narrations portray him, his government, and Hungary overall as assistants of the securitization, protection, and defense of Hungary and Europe: “Our duty to protect the citizens of Hungary” (2016-02-15); “Protect Hungary and the Hungarian people” (2015-09-21); “To protect the people of Europe” (2015-07-25); “Let’s defend Europe” (2015-10-22); “Must protect its ethnic and cultural composite” (2015-09-05). In the majority of cases, this securitization concept is precisely used to indicate the prevention of illegal migration, which he attaches to the spread of dangerous activities across Europe, especially terrorism. While he uses this concept consistently both before and after the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, we observed a shift in its application following the influx of Ukrainian refugees into Hungary. Despite the significant number of refugees, the issue was no longer framed as an invasion but rather as a humanitarian challenge that required help. Such a change of narratives suggests that Orbán doesn’t perceive migration from Ukraine as a risk. As a result, his distinction between those arriving from the South, who are deemed dangerous and undeserving of receiving protection, and those coming from the neighboring country, who are considered genuine and deserving of aid, is evident:

“So we are able to make a difference: who is a migrant, they are coming from the South, stopped, fence; and who is a refugee. It’s two different words in the Hungarian language. Migrants: stop. Refugees can get all the help.” (2022-03-04)

5.2. Quantitative Findings

In this chapter, we reveal the results derived from our quantitative analysis, which mostly encompasses independent sample t-tests and corresponding tables as well as bar- and line graphs.

The following graphs visualize the average relative frequencies in percentages of the target words and target phrases across the two migration periods.




Figure 1: The average relative frequency in percentage of the target words across the two migration periods (2015-2018 and 2022)

First, we started with the two main words “refugee” and “migrant” and analyzed the average times they were used in both migration periods. Aligning with former assumptions, the results showed that the mean of the word “refugee” was more occurrent in the second migration period than in the first one, whereas the opposite was observed in the case of the word “migrant”, where a higher percentage was apparent in the first migration period than in the second.

The null hypothesis of the t-test assumes that the means of the two groups being compared are equal. Before performing a t-test, it is necessary to run Levene’s test to check for equality of variances between the two groups. The null hypothesis of Levene’s test assumes that the variances of the two groups are equal. For the word “refugee”, Levene’s test resulted in a significant p-value of less than 0.001. This indicated unequal group variances between the two periods at a 95% confidence interval. Moreover, the t-test revealed a significant difference in group averages with a p-value of 0.048. As the group sizes were unequal (340 speeches for the first period and 82

speeches for the second period), we also calculated the effect size and considered Hedge's g . We found that while there was a significant effect of the respective migration periods on the average use of the word "refugee", the effect was moderate in magnitude. Similarly, in the case of the word "migrant" Levene's test was violated with a p -value of less than 0.001, so we could not assume equal variances in the two groups. Based on that information, we checked the corresponding t -test statistics, which turned out to be significant with a p -value of 0.017. This indicated likewise that there is a significant difference in group averages.

Reflecting on our qualitative results, we saw that Orbán has often drawn linkages between Muslims and terrorism when referring to the migration crisis of 2015. In this regard, we found a significant fall in the average use of the words "Muslim" (from 0,37% in 2015-2018 to 0% in 2022) and "terrorism" (from 3,03% in 2015-2018 to 0% in 2022), which indicated that such linkages are not anymore focal in his oratory. Instead, in the second migration period, we observed the phrase "friendship between Hungarians and Ukrainians" to be apparent, which suggests that Orbán's approach has shifted from one of generating public moral panic of the dangers migration poses, to one of emphasizing the "European race" that is not affiliated with terrorism or Islam, and thus poses no threat.

Importantly, we noticed that there was an increase in the use of the words "protect" and "defend" in 2022, coinciding with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In the case of "protect", Levene's test resulted significant, however, the t -test resulted insignificant, which indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between the two group averages. In a broader sense, this implied that the speechmaking about protecting the country has been already a consistent theme in Orbán's political agenda.

After the simple keywords, we analyzed the relative frequencies of more complex phrases (compounded tokens) prepared according to the qualitative phase of our research (the results are demonstrated below in Figure 2., for a selection of phrases). For instance, the emphasis on protection was reinforced using the phrases "defend our border" and "protect our border", so we analyzed their frequencies. None of them resulted to have significant differences in their group averages according to the t -tests ($p=0.352$ and $p=0.389$).




Figure 2: The average relative frequency in percentage of the target phrases across the two migration periods (2015-2018 and 2022)

We believe that the upsurge in the usage of these words can be partially attributed to the Russian-Ukrainian war, which may have prompted their use and caused a slight shift in their context, framing them in terms of the protection of the country against potential military risks stemming from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. However, it is worth noting that the emphasis remained on safeguarding the country from migrants, without Ukrainians being considered in the equation, as, according to Orbán, they are not considered as migrants in the first place. As the (Figure 3.) shows, the two words “Ukrainian” and “refugee” go in all periods more or less in a same line, which reveals that over time these two words have had similar average scores. This indicates that Ukrainians have been identified with the word refugee more, in contrast to the word “migrant”, which reaches its peak in 2015-2018.

In (Figure 4.), we examine the securitization concept represented by the phrases “defend our border” and “protect our border”. Both of them follow a similar line with “Muslim” in the first migration period, the former reaching a score of around 1%, and the latter a score of around 0,7%, which indicates in a way or another whom Orbán targets as the opponent to be protected from. We

can also see that “protect our border” becomes more apparent in 2022 as the Russian-Ukrainian invasion takes off.




Figure 3: Graph of the relative percentages of: “Ukrainian”, “refugee”, “Muslim”, and “migrant” in different time periods of migration




Figure 4: Graph of the relative percentages of “Muslim”, “Ukrainian”, “Defend our border”, and “Protect our border” in different time periods of migration

Furthermore, we noticed that in both time-periods the word “immigrant” was used frequently and in similar contexts. For instance, “we do not want Hungary to be a target country for illegal immigrants” (2015-05-19); “Hungarians said that they did not want illegal immigrants” (2022-05-20). This prompted us to test whether there was a statistically significant difference in the distribution of this word across the two time periods. When comparing the means, we noticed that the word was more apparent in the first time-period than in the second. Although Levene’s result was significant, the t-test assuming equal variances resulted in a p-value of 0.128, which indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between the average use of the word “immigrant” within the two time-periods.

In the case of the word “dangerous”, Levene’s test resulted in a p-value of 0.006, indicating a significant difference in variances between the two groups, yet the t-test resulted insignificant as the p-value was above 0.05. With this, we didn’t have enough evidence to conclude that there was a significant difference between the group means. This indicated that the word was part of Orbán’s narrations regardless of the time-period. This encouraged us to look a bit further into the context the word was used in, during both time-periods, to find out whether its direction changed over time.

We noticed a pattern of the word being often used in the framework of the EU relocation plan and the mandatory quotas: “mandatory resettlement quotas are dangerous because they would spread terrorism across Europe” (2015-11-16). While Orbán didn’t explicitly refer to migrants as the danger in this case, it is reasonable to infer that the compulsory quotas required the relocation of migrants, hence this excerpt is nonetheless directed to migrants. Later, he referred to the proposed measure as a “dangerous immigration policy” (2016-09-12) and linked it again with the threat of terrorism: “Europe, however, is forcefully pursuing an immigration policy which results in letting extremists, dangerous extremists, into the territory of the European Union (2017-10-12). In the following year, he backed up the idea of a homogeneous Europe, which according to his narration, must be reserved for Europeans, because a mixed “race” risks altering the European population: “[...] ever more plans are being prepared in Brussels for the transformation of the entire European continent into a continent with a mixed population. This is not in the interest of Hungary: it is dangerous, it is perilous, and I think that we Hungarians must reject it” (2019-05-

23). In 2022, the word is not associated anymore with terrorism, but is rather used in a more general sense “As the new government’s roster shows, Hungary can face the dangerous years ahead [...]” (2022-05-20). These findings indicate that, over time, the direction in which he used this word remained kind of consistent, except for the latter period, in which there was much less emphasis on terrorism and threats.

Different from the previous graphs, in (Figure 5.) we visualized the words “terrorism”, “threat”, “dangerous”, “migrant” and “refugee”, depicting the trends observed. While it is noticeable that the word “dangerous” becomes prominent in the first time-period, we see that it continues to be more or less consistent throughout the upcoming periods. However, we can see that both “migrant” and “terrorism” reach their peak in the first time-period and decrease in the second time-period. “Threat” also reaches its peak in the 2015-2018, however decreases in the second time-period, while the score of the word “refugee” shows that it isn’t as prominent as the other words in the first time-period.




Figure 5: Graph of the relative percentages of “dangerous”, “terrorism”, “threat”, “refugee”, and “migrant” in different time periods of migration

Lastly, we observed that the phrase “traditional values” appeared only in the first time-period, as during the 2022 migration crisis, the emphasis on endangered traditional European and

Hungarian values was not so much in focus. This shed light on how Orbán's rhetoric portrays Europeans as culturally similar and as compatible with the norms and traditional European values. Additionally, there were some other phrases, which we found occurrent only in the first time-period. For instance, the phrase "under siege", which was mainly used in the context of attack during the first migration crisis: "Hungary was under siege from migrants" (2016-02-08), found no more application in the upcoming migration crisis. We assume that this result came due to the fact that the current refugees are not anymore considered to be invaders, and the migration crisis itself is not anymore regarded as an incursion. In this respect, what supports this assumption significantly, is the complete decline in the use of the metaphor: "migrant invasion" in 2022, which in contrast used to be a frequent one in the first time-period.

6. Conclusions

This paper aimed to analyze Orbán's communication strategies concerning migration, with a specific focus on the high peak migration periods of 2015 and 2022. To answer our first research question – what are Orbán's discursive strategies around migration? – we analyzed his political speeches by combining two methods. We drew upon Wodak & Meyer's (2001) work on discriminatory discourse, which identified five common discursive strategies employed in constructing differences between groups. Through our qualitative analysis, we identified the presence of these discursive strategies in Orbán's speeches and pinpointed specific examples of accurate words, phrases, and metaphors that represented each strategy.

We first identified the referential discursive strategy, through which Orbán divides two camps: the natives and outsiders. He portrays the outsiders as either migrants or refugees, which is a core issue we examine in our paper. He employs the predication strategy to depict migrants in a negative light, using labels such as "attackers" and "besiegers" while portraying refugees positively with labels such as "genuine" and "true". Furthermore, Orbán utilizes the perspectivation or framing strategy to frame Muslims as "invaders", for which he employs metaphors to compare the 2015 migration crisis to actual historical events, such as the Mongol invasion of Europe.

As Orbán continually attributes negative labels to migrants, his narratives are led by a securitization concept, through which he positions himself and his party as the protectors and defenders of the European, Schengen Zone, and Hungarian borders. This narrative is consistent

across all periods, as evidenced by our quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, it takes different directions depending on the context. When the topic is about migrants from Africa or the Middle East, Orbán positions the migrants as enemies and the government as the defender of the nation. On the other hand, when the topic is about refugees from Ukraine, the securitization concept is not directed toward them. In this case, the concept either remains focused on migrants from the south, or takes other directions, such as safeguarding Hungary against similar aggressions as those from Russia. In both cases, the focus on protecting and defending the country doesn't include the current Ukrainian refugees.

Furthermore, Orbán utilizes the argumentation strategy to justify his anti-migrant stance and the policies implemented by his government to halt migration and restrict migrants' access to basic benefits. Additionally, he uses the "intensification/mitigation" strategy to downplay the negative effects and emphasize the positive effects of his anti-migrant discourse and policies.

Our second research question aimed to explore how Orbán utilized his communication strategies to differentiate between the migration crisis in 2015 and the current one. We conducted a quantitative analysis to test the words and phrases relevant to answer this question and to assess our hypotheses. Our analysis revealed that during the period spanning from 2015 to 2018, negative categorizations were prevalent, as our first hypothesis suggested. We found instances of phrases that carried negative connotations toward migrants, such as "migration invasion", "illegal migration", "migrant threat", and "under siege".

Our next hypothesis suggested that Orbán uses positive labels to depict refugees as European people who are peaceful and not dangerous. We found evidence to support this hypothesis, as our quantitative analysis showed that Ukrainian refugees were often labeled with compassionate terms like "unarmed" and "genuine", while negative labels were more common in reference to migrants.

We did find support for our third hypothesis as well, which posited that Orbán uses these distinctions to reinforce the idea that he is protecting *the people, the nation, the country, and the European continent overall*. Throughout his speeches, the notion of protecting and defending the country was frequently emphasized, often in the context of migration.

Our fourth hypothesis suggested that these notions of defending and protecting were more commonly used towards migrants than refugees. We attributed this pattern to Orbán's political agenda, which aims to maintain Hungary and Europe's homogeneity by spreading anti-migrant

attitudes and inducing moral panic in the population. Our results indicated that his focus is to target non-European migrants as dangerous while portraying Ukrainians more favorably, as he considers them to share similar Christian values. Despite claiming that his government is democratic, his speeches suggest otherwise, as it is evident that he differentiates whom to aid based on their religious affiliation and cultural differences.

In conclusion, our qualitative analysis revealed that Orbán's speeches have a patterned structure of strategies, which are commonly employed in discriminatory discourses. At the same time, our quantitative analysis backed up the postulation that the way he links specific groups to certain words is a way of expression of discriminatory messages. All in all, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the impact that this rhetoric might have in public attitudes, further analysis of his political discourse and additional public attitude measurements would be necessary. Nonetheless, we believe that this study adds to the existing scholarly research on political and discriminatory discourse, revealing how a political figure as Orbán uses language to deliberately create distinctions between groups, potentially influencing prevalent societal attitudes.

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8. Appendix 1:

The total corpus of the speeches can be accessed via this link: <https://bit.ly/41TcSvr>

9. Appendix 2:

Words	Migration periods	Mean (%)
Refugee	2015-2018	1,31%
	2022	10,09%
Migrant	2015-2018	4,50%
	2022	2,20%
Immigrant	2015-2018	2,28%
	2022	0,93%
Dangerous	2015-2018	0,63%
	2022	1,20%
Protect	2015-2018	6,73%
	2022	8,74%
Defend	2015-2018	0,21%
	2022	0,50%
Muslim	2015-2018	0,37%
	2022	0,00%
Ukrainian	2015-2018	0,95%
	2022	7,96%
Terrorism	2015-2018	3,03%
	2022	0,00%
Invasion	2015-2018	0,13%
	2022	0,25%

Threat	2015-2018	2,05%
	2022	2,63%

Appendix 2: Table 1: The full list of target words

Phrases	Migration periods	Mean (%)
"Defend our border"	2015-2018	0,21%
	2022	0,50%
"Protect our border"	2015-2018	0,34%
	2022	0,74%
"Migrant invasion"	2015-2018	0,15%
	2022	0,00%
"Illegal migration"	2015-2018	0,44%
	2022	2,75%
"Under siege"	2015-2018	0,17%
	2022	0,00%
"Traditional value"	2015-2018	0,06%
	2022	0,00%
"Ukrainian refugee"	2015-2018	0,00%
	2022	1,24%
"Friendship between Hungarian and Ukrainian"	2015-2018	0,00%
	2022	0,10%

Appendix 2: Table 2: The full list of target phrases

Tags	Sub tags
Manner of speaking	Phrases Metaphors Sarcasm Criticisms
Comparisons	Prefixes added to the word migrant Prefixes added to the word refugee Between migrants & refugees Between Europeans & non-Europeans
Correlations	Terrorism Crime Threat Values Culture and/or religion Race and/or ethnicity
Political agenda	Nationalism Illiberalism Protection Homogeneity

Appendix 2: Table 3: Tags and sub tags applied in CATMA

10. Appendix 3:

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
refugee_relative_percentage	Equal variances assumed	55.008	<.001	-3.970	420	<.001	<.001	-.08782	.02212	-.13131	-.04433
The relative frequency in percentage of the word refugee	Equal variances not assumed			-2.011	81.721	.024	.048	-.08782	.04367	-.17470	-.00095

Appendix 3: Figure 1: Independent sample t-test of the word “refugee”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
migrant_relative_percent age The relative frequency in percentage of the word migrant	Equal variances assumed	11.869	<.001	2.016	420	.022	.044	.02305	.01143	.00057	.04552
	Equal variances not assumed			2.401	158.873	.009	.017	.02305	.00960	.00409	.04201

Appendix 3: Figure 2: Independent sample t-test of the word “migrant”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
immigrant_relative_percent age The relative frequency in percentage of the word immigrant	Equal variances assumed	5.358	.021	1.338	420	.091	.182	.01348	.01007	-.00632	.03328
	Equal variances not assumed			1.530	148.235	.064	.128	.01348	.00881	-.00393	.03089

Appendix 3: Figure 3: Independent sample t-test of the word “immigrant”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
dangerous_relative_percent age The relative frequency in percentage of the word dangerous	Equal variances assumed	7.592	.006	-1.390	420	.083	.165	-.00570	.00410	-.01376	.00236
	Equal variances not assumed			-.870	87.657	.193	.387	-.00570	.00655	-.01872	.00732

Appendix 3: Figure 4: Independent sample t-test of the word “dangerous”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
protect_relative_percent age The relative frequency in percentage of the word protect	Equal variances assumed	9.943	.002	-1.101	420	.136	.271	-.02019	.01833	-.05622	.01584
	Equal variances not assumed			-.766	92.064	.223	.445	-.02019	.02635	-.07252	.03214

Appendix 3: Figure 5: Independent sample t-test of the word “protect”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
defend_relative_percent age The relative frequency in percentage of the word defend	Equal variances assumed	54.720	<.001	-4.334	420	<.001	<.001	-.08709	.02009	-.12658	-.04759
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.560	85.711	.006	.012	-.08709	.03402	-.15471	-.01946

Appendix 3: Figure 6: Independent sample t-test of the word “defend”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
muslim_relative_percent age The relative frequency in percentage of the word Muslim	Equal variances assumed	4.816	.029	1.109	420	.134	.268	.00367	.00331	-.00284	.01017
	Equal variances not assumed			2.260	339.000	.012	.024	.00367	.00162	.00047	.00686

Appendix 3: Figure 7: Independent sample t-test of the word “Muslim”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
ukrainian_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the word Ukrainian	Equal variances assumed	73.003	<.001	-5.158	420	<.001	<.001	-.07013	.01360	-.09686	-.04341
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.129	86.567	.001	.002	-.07013	.02242	-.11469	-.02557

Appendix 3: Figure 8: Independent sample t-test of the word “Ukrainian”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
terrorism_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the word terrorism	Equal variances assumed	10.609	.001	1.842	420	.033	.066	.03035	.01648	-.00204	.06274
	Equal variances not assumed			3.754	339.000	<.001	<.001	.03035	.00809	.01445	.04625

Appendix 3: Figure 9: Independent sample t-test of the word “terrorism”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
invasion_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the word invasion	Equal variances assumed	3.153	.077	-.922	420	.178	.357	-.00122	.00133	-.00383	.00138
	Equal variances not assumed			-.846	112.189	.200	.400	-.00122	.00145	-.00409	.00164

Appendix 3: Figure 10: Independent sample t-test of the word “invasion”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
threat_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the word threat	Equal variances assumed	2.722	.100	-.777	420	.219	.438	-.00584	.00752	-.02061	.00894
	Equal variances not assumed			-.600	97.855	.275	.550	-.00584	.00973	-.02514	.01347

Appendix 3: Figure 11: Independent sample t-test of the word “threat”

11. Appendix 4:

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
defend_our_border_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Defend our border"	Equal variances assumed	7.929	.005	-1.434	420	.076	.152	-.00286	.00200	-.00678	.00106
	Equal variances not assumed			-.936	89.232	.176	.352	-.00286	.00306	-.00894	.00322

Appendix 4: Figure 1: Independent sample t-test of the phrase “defend our border”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
protect_our_border_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Protect our border"	Equal variances assumed	3.156	.076	-.863	420	.194	.389	-.00406	.00471	-.01332	.00519
	Equal variances not assumed			-.536	87.394	.297	.593	-.00406	.00758	-.01913	.01100

Appendix 4: Figure 2: Independent sample t-test of the phrase “protect our border”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
migrant_invasion_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Migrant invasion"	Equal variances assumed	4.691	.031	1.078	420	.141	.281	.00152	.00141	-.00125	.00430
	Equal variances not assumed			2.198	339.000	.014	.029	.00152	.00069	.00016	.00289

Appendix 4: Figure 3: Independent sample t-test of the phrase “migrant invasion”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
illegal_migration_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "illegal migration"	Equal variances assumed	40.062	<.001	-3.243	420	<.001	.001	-.02305	.00711	-.03701	-.00908
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.779	83.597	.039	.079	-.02305	.01296	-.04881	.00272

Appendix 4: Figure 4: Independent sample t-test of the phrase “illegal migration”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
under_siege_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Under siege"	Equal variances assumed	5.628	.018	1.171	420	.121	.242	.00174	.00149	-.00118	.00467
	Equal variances not assumed			2.387	339.000	.009	.018	.00174	.00073	.00031	.00318

Appendix 4: Figure 5: Independent sample t-test of the phrase “under siege”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
traditional_value_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Traditional value"	Equal variances assumed	2.133	.145	.727	420	.234	.467	.00062	.00086	-.00106	.00231
	Equal variances not assumed			1.482	339.000	.070	.139	.00062	.00042	-.00020	.00145

Appendix 4: Figure 6: Independent sample t-test of the phrase “traditional value”

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
Ukrainian_refugee_relative_percentage The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Ukrainian refugee"	Equal variances assumed	25.314	<.001	-2.551	420	.006	.011	-.01238	.00485	-.02193	-.00284
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.248	81.000	.108	.216	-.01238	.00992	-.03213	.00736

Appendix 4: Figure 7: Independent sample t-test of the phrase "Ukrainian refugee"

Independent Samples Test											
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means							
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
						One-Sided p	Two-Sided p			Lower	Upper
friendship_between_Hungarian_and_Ukrainian The relative frequency in percentage of the phrase "Friendship between Hungarian and Ukrainian"	Equal variances assumed	17.131	<.001	-2.044	420	.021	.042	-.00101	.00049	-.00198	-.00004
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.000	81.000	.160	.320	-.00101	.00101	-.00301	.00100

Appendix 4: Figure 8: Independent sample t-test of the phrase "friendship between Hungarian and Ukrainian"