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**DIFFERENT APPROVAL RATES OF EU ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AGAINST RUSSIA IMPOSED IN THE WAKE OF THE UKRAINE
CRISIS**

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I. INTRODUCTION

The 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was the largest mobilization of forces in Europe since 1945, threatening to destabilize the security structure of Europe created in the 1990s, especially in the already volatile post-Soviet region. Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his ambitions to capture Kiev and overthrow the democratically elected Ukrainian government, while several rounds of diplomatic talks between Ukraine and Russia failed to yield any means of ending the war (Bilefsky, Perez-Pena, & Nagourney, 2022).

As a response, an international coalition of more than 40 countries (hereafter: Coalition) formed with the goal of imposing economic sanctions on Russia. These "economic powerhouses" included among others the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Previously neutral countries such as Iceland, Singapore, and Switzerland also joined the sanctions (Bown, 2022). In this crisis the European Union's foreign policy did not lack assertiveness, in contrast with the common criticism, and the situation drew immediate attention from the EU institutions and its Member States. They responded in a remarkable speed to the armed conflict at its doorstep (Cardwell & Moret, 2022). The collective sanctions implemented by the coalition included among others financial measures against Russia's central bank and commercial banks, increased import tariffs and import bans, export controls, bans on investments, travel restrictions, seizure of internationally held assets and the suspension of international cooperation (Schropp & Tsigas, 2023).

The imposed sanctions serve diverse objectives. Sanction can seek to influence or pressure targets in third countries by forcing a change in behavior, restricting access to vital resources, signaling disapproval of specified activities, and stigmatizing a particular target (Giumelli, 2010). In addition, they can be a tool for exerting influence between major power (Taylor, 2010) or deter potential opponents from future violations (Cardwell & Moret, 2022). The sanctions imposed by the Coalition on Russia also seek to put such pressure on Russia and its allies, especially to thwart its economic capacities to continue military aggression.

This research examines economic sanctions, which have been used as an instrument of statecraft for centuries. However, the historical focus of economic sanctions altered considerably. Earlier, they were most commonly employed as a strategy for pursuing economic warfare. Today, they tend to serve as a coercive foreign policy tool employed as an alternative to military force (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023). In this sense, they can serve as a strategy to instigate political, economic, or social changes within the target country (Cortright & Lopez, 1995). In addition, they are also considered as a means of non-violent dispute settlement in the

international system (Le & Hoang, 2022). Therefore, scholars define economic sanctions as “actions that a sender takes to limit or end economic relations with a target in an effort to persuade the target state to change its objectionable policies” (Afesorgbor, 2019). The academics divide the economic sanctions according to their focus. They can be imposed unilaterally by a single state or multilaterally by a coalition of states or an international organization (as in the case of sanction implemented by the Coalition) (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023). However, how can economic sanctions be effective? To sanction an actor, one must first have some form of leverage in a pre-existing relationship. Sanctioning an actor with whom there is little interaction is difficult. Nonetheless, imposing economic sanctions tends to be harmful to the sender itself. It is an important principle that the target should be harmed more than the sender (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023). Considering such a factor was crucial for the European Union, as it has very significant trade relations with Russia (Hausmann, Schetter, & Yildirim, 2022).

In order to draw a more explicit bridging between the European Union and economic sanctions, it is important to point out that economic sanctions can be a response to express its competence in foreign and security policy, as granted in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1992. As a tool that helps the European Union to have a political voice commensurate with its growing economic importance, it goes beyond rhetoric and seeks to showcase the European Union's foreign policy in action. (Portela, 2023). The sanctions are in line with the European Union's Global Strategy (2016) which attempts to give the European Union's foreign policy a new and strategic voice: “Restrictive measures, coupled with diplomacy, are key tools to bring about peaceful change. They can play a pivotal role in deterrence, conflict prevention and resolution” (Council of the EU, 2016).

1. Sanctions

1.1 Legal Framework

The European External Action Service Communication refers to sanctions as instruments to further the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter also referred as: CFSP). They aim to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security. More specifically, they seek to safeguard EU's values, fundamental interest, and security. Therein belong the support of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the principles of international law.

Sanctions are imposed by the EU Council following the examination of relevant Council working groups. The decisions are also influenced by the proposals of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The EEAS assists the HR, and has a key role in preparation, maintenance, and review of sanctions (and for communications). The Council reviews and adopts the proposals prepared on behalf of the HR jointly with the European Commission proposals for regulation. Sanctions apply (1) within the jurisdiction of the European Union, (2) to EU nationals in any location, (3) to companies and organizations incorporated under the Member State's law, and (4) on board aircraft or vessels under the jurisdiction of Member States. The decisions are binding on the Member States themselves and the regulations are directly applicable within the European Union. All Member States must ensure that the sanctions are fully enforced. It is the European Commission's responsibility to monitor implementation and to issue implementation and enforcement guidelines for member states (EU text adopted, 2022).

In the case of economic sanctions imposed on Russia, the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 set out the framework. Thereby, the sanctions imposed on 23 February 2022 add to the existing sanctions imposed against Russia following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

1.2 Timeline

Between 23 February 2022 and 23 June 2023, the European Union has imposed eleven sanction packages. These sanction packages comprise economic sanctions, targeted restrictive measures (individual sanctions) and visa measures. This chapter looks at the introduction of economic sanctions targeting exchanges with Russia in specific economic sectors. They target among others financial, trade, energy, transportation, and technology sectors.

1. Figure: The illustration shows the chronological sequence of the sanctions together with the Eurobarometer surveys carried out there between




Figure 1 shows the chronological sequence of economic sanctions and the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in between (see Chapter 2). Following the initial first package of sanctions (Official Journal of the EU, L 42I, 23 February 2022), the second package of sanctions (Official Journal of the EU, L050, L051, L052, L053, L054, 25 February 2022) included complex individual and economic measures covering the sectors of finance, energy transportation and technology. The subsequent sanctions packages all included further expansion of bans on individuals and entities. The third package of sanctions (Official Journal of the EU, L 063, and 2 March 2022) as its main measure initiated the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT. Thereby, the European Union aimed to harm their ability to operate globally. The fourth (Official Journal of the EU, L 087I, 15 March 2022), fifth (Council Regulation (EU) 2022/576, 8 April 2022), and sixth (Official Journal of the EU, L 153, 3 June 2022) sanctions packages further broadened the coverage with additional measures in the areas of finance, energy, transport, and technology. The seventh package of sanctions, the “maintenance and alignment” package (Official Journal of the EU, L 193, and 21 July 2022) aimed to improve the implementation of sanctions and improve their effectiveness. It clarified existing measures and reinforced the export controls of dual-use goods. An additional important measure introduced

in the eight package of sanctions (Official Journal of the EU, L 259I, 6 October 2022), namely the price cap on the maritime transportation of Russian oil to third countries and additional trade restrictions. The ninth (Official Journal of the EU, L 322I, 16 December 2022) and tenth (EU Commission Press Corner, 25 February 2023) package of sanctions also further broadened the coverage with additional measures. The most recent is the eleventh package of sanctions (Official Journal of the EU, L 159I, 23 June 2023) included measures to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation with third countries to impede the circumvention of sanctions. It prohibited the transit of goods and technology via Russia and imposed further export restrictions.

1.3 Pros (Positives)

Recent scholarship has attributed certain developments to the short-term effectiveness of sanctions. However, it is important to note that the nature of these recent outcomes may also reflect other factors influencing the international arena. In line with such premises, the sanctions did not reach the outcome to thwart Russian aggression, however, Russia has significantly altered its military strategy. On 24 February 2022 Russia initiated a full-scale invasion and made advances toward Kyiv, surrounding the city and attempting to depose Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Yet in the following month, Russia changed its strategy and withdrew its troops from the capital. They concentrated their troops in Eastern Ukraine. In April 2023, Russia withdrew further from Kharkiv due to successful counter-offensives.

While it is important to point out that economic sanctions are not the only factor involved in the change in Russian military strategy, Russia's initial strategy of a full-scale invasion proved too costly. Economic sanctions undoubtedly contributed to reducing the scope of conflict and the change in Russia's calculated decision. In addition, economic sanctions likely contributed to preventing further territorial conquest and occupation (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023). After the invasion on February 24, 2022, Russian GDP fell by 2.5 percent in 2022 and inflation climbed to a high of 11.9 percent. Some scholars therefore claim that measures such as sanctions targeting high-tech exports (e.g. defense, aviation, maritime) imposed by the Coalition triggered a visible slowdown (Grozovski, 2022). In addition, net imports, net exports, and net flows of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) have dropped significantly (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023). Scholars also attribute indirect geopolitical implications to the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. As one such indirect affirmative effect, it is argued that the sanctions may also have deterrent role for other revisionist powers (such as China), by

showcasing the coordinated response of the West to a potential invasion of Taiwan (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023).

1.4 Cons (Skepticism)

The effectiveness of economic sanctions against Russia have been controversial. The most common criticisms of their effectiveness claim that (1) sanctions do not harm the Russian economy sufficiently to alter behavior, (2) sanctions have a delayed effect that comes too late to affect the outcome of the war, (3) sanctions can inflict unsustainable economic damage to the sender (especially on those historically dependent on Russian oil, gas, high-value metals and raw materials), and (4) sanctions affect the countries in the Coalition unequally and therefore their coalition is likely to fall apart (Schropp & Tsigas, 2023). At the center of the criticism lies the notion that sanctions cause more destruction than other weapons of war and that they rarely result in substantial political change (Mulder, 2022) and that economic sanctions can have distributional effects at the expense of domestic actors in the sender country (Giumelli, 2017). In fact, scholars argue that sanctions can sometimes even result in "catastrophic sanctions failures" with considerable negative policy externalities for both sender and target (Drezner D. , 2022). This can also be a source of doubt when it comes to the European Union. In the highly interdependent global value chains, the European Union is the leading actor in the negotiation of free trade agreements. Yet economic sanctions seem to be the opposite of such initiatives, as they disrupt rather than generate trade (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2008).

The effectiveness of sanctions has also been subject to criticism with regard to the legislative process for sanctions, which inevitably results in limited ambitions for restrictive measures. Restrictive measures in the European Union fall under the CFSP and therefore Member States must agree by unanimity. It is likely that Member States will push for limited restrictions so that they can reduce the potential risks to their domestic actors (Hellquist, 2012).

Certain developments in recent events support these hypotheses concerning the doubts raised about the effectiveness of sanctions. However, as noted for the Pros (see Chapter 1.3), it is important to underline that sanctions are not the only factors that influence the international arena. Yet certain considerations appear to be verified by a few factors in the short time span. The European Union originally sought to thwart the ability of Russia to continue its aggression. However, since the sanctions are still in place, it indicates, that the sanctions did not achieve this outcome. On the other hand, sanctions have not proven to be effective in removing Russian

President Vladimir Putin from his position or provoking a regime change to date (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023).

1.5 Third Country Alignment

Given that both the Standard Eurobarometer 98 (hereafter also referred to as: Std. 98) and the Standard Eurobarometer 99 (hereafter also referred to as: Std. 99) surveys covered non-member states, the author finds it important to outline how non-member states can be aligned with EU sanctions. In this regard, the European Union is an evolving and more relevant actor in international affairs and security governance. Its diplomatic activity can include third countries that are regularly invited to participate in part of the foreign policy of the European Union. Especially, the third country participation in CFSP has gained more attention due to the post-Brexit foreign policy cooperation interest indicated by the United Kingdom (Wessel, 2021). Such invitations for participation are not universal in nature and only specific countries are invited regularly. These countries usually involve Countries on the path towards an EU membership (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey), and European Free Trade Association and European Economic Area countries (e.g. Iceland, Norway, Switzerland) (Cardwell & Moret, 2022). These countries have been increasingly involved in the European Union's diplomatic coalitions. (Schade, 2023).

The third country alignment for the European Union can be desirable from different aspects. It can help providing a symbol of unity around the European Union, multiply its influence or prevent contradictory foreign policy activities (Macaj & Nicolaidis, 2014). From an external dimension, third country alignment with foreign policies can result enhanced influence of the European Union (Barbe, Herranz, Johansson-Nogues, Natorski, & Sabiote, 2009). In addition, it helps the European Union to enlarge its discursive clout, thereby creating the instance of differentiated cooperation (Schade, 2023).

However, the European Union's ability to influence has certain limitations. The process of alignment is hierarchic system. This results from the CFSP acts that are EU specific and non-negotiable with non-member states (Barbe, Herranz, Johansson-Nogues, Natorski, & Sabiote, 2009). CFSP is connected to other policy areas as sanctions, migration, trade, development, and environmental and energy policy. These rules also need to be taken into account in cooperation, and they can be difficult to respect in cooperation, especially because they do not bind both parties equally (Wessel, 2021). Whereas many countries are motivated by the desire to join the European Union or maintain good relations, the process stalls when core features of third

countries' statehood no longer coincide with the European Union's preferences. In fact, some countries need to balance their ties to the European Union with other policy preferences, such as maintaining good relationship with Russia (Schade, 2023).

As a result of regular alignment with these third countries, the CFSP is characterized by a patchwork of divergent and overlapping members and non-members that contribute to helping the European Union achieve its goals as a global actor (Wessel, 2021). Yet, the Treaties that established cooperation between the European Union and its Member States on foreign and security policy made no reference to any participation of third countries (Wessel, 2021).

2. Eurobarometer

Eurobarometer is a polling instrument, which is used to monitor the state of public opinion in Europe on issues related to the European Union, or the attitudes on political or social subjects. Its methodological approach is interviewing persons aged 15 years or older face-to-face, via telephone or online. It weights total sample to ensure demographic and geographical representativeness. There are different types of Eurobarometer surveys. In this research three types are included: flash, special and standard surveys. The (1) standard Eurobarometer is the European Commission's principal opinion survey, conducted twice a year and focusing on the observation of major trends. They can be also conducted in non-EU countries and territories. The (2) special Eurobarometers are in-depth thematic studies. The European Parliament's own Eurobarometer series (e.g., Paralemters) are also referred to as Special Eurobarometers. These surveys are typically conducted in the Member States. (3) Flash Eurobarometers are ad hoc thematic surveys conducted within a short period of time on a variety of specific topics. They are also mostly narrowed down to the Member States. (Official Website of the European Union, accessed on 15.10.2023)

Since the 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine several Eurobarometer surveys have been conducted to research the public opinion towards the war in Ukraine. Seven surveys researched the public opinion on "Economic sanctions against the Russian government, companies and individuals"(see Figure 1). Of the seven surveys, six surveys examined the extent of approval for the imposition of sanctions. The most recent poll, Flash Eurobarometer 533, addressed the question in a slightly different way, asking whether "the European Union should continue to impose economic sanctions on Russia". This stressed the argument of continuity so the survey was not included in this research. Both types of surveys asked respondents to indicate whether they approve or disapprove the economic sanctions. The respondents could reply in five

opportunities: fully approve, tend to approve, tend to disapprove, fully disapprove, or don't know. The surveys summarized the fully approve and tend to approve answers into a cluster named total approve, as well it summarized the tend to disapprove and fully disapprove answers into a total disapprove cluster.


Surveys other than these six that surveyed the extent of approval for economic sanctions had different designs, such as the Parlameter (EP Autumn Survey 2022), which surveyed financial, military, and humanitarian support under the same question. The six surveys were namely: Flash Eurobarometer 506 (EU's response to the war in Ukraine), and the Flash Eurobarometer 514 (EU's response to the energy challenges) flash surveys, the Special Eurobarometer 526 (Key challenges of our times) special survey, and the Standard Eurobarometer 97, Standard Eurobarometer 98, and Standard Eurobarometer 99 standard surveys.

II. METHODOLOGY

3. Research Design

This research examines the different approval rates of economic sanctions against the Russian government, companies and individuals among citizens of countries covered by the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys. The choice of topic is based both on the topicality and salience of the war in Ukraine and on concerns about sanctions expressed by Member States, as in the case of the national consultation in Hungary in October 2022. It approaches this sensitive topic from a well-founded manner since it draws on the results of two trusted data records. The research problem is framed by the argument that citizens in the countries studied have different rates of approval of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. On the other hand, it is framed around the realist argument that unitary states fail to align with collective measures.

2. Figure: The figure provides an outline of the initial research design plan as defined by the research problem, the research question and the hypothesis



The research seeks the casual mechanism behind the varying approval rate levels. The research facilitates an explanatory profile by looking for the casual explanation offering a deep understanding of the structure connecting the facts. To facilitate such explanatory research, the research question is: "Why do approval rates of economic sanctions against the Russian government, companies, and individuals vary across the countries surveyed?". In order to address the research question, the research hypothesis is that the realist paradigm (see Chapter 7) can provide an explanation for the dissatisfaction of countries surveyed. The research seeks to understand the phenomenon of dissatisfaction with collective measures (in this case, EU-level sanctions) among the members, candidates, and allies of a coalition (in this case the European Union, EU candidate countries and Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Therefore, the research choses to investigate the approval rate of economic sanctions on Russia in the 37 countries surveyed in the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 to uncover the similarities and differences between countries with similar rates of approval. By investigating this real-life context, the research aims to explain what factors can influence dissatisfaction with collective measures.

3. Figure: The figure shows the research design based on the realist paradigm, subdivided according to the scope of the data applied as indicators




Figure 3 illustrates how the research operationalizes realism in order to create an analytical framework applying the different aspects of the theory. Under the realist paradigm, the sub-theories are divided according to the scope of their data. These are: state endowments and public opinion. This facilitates that the research can be better structured throughout the analysis. State endowments build on the theory of classical realism covering the concept of power endowments of states and disintegration of coalitions, on the neorealist theory covering the concept of the role of hegemons and the balance of threat. Public opinion is considered from the point of view of neoclassical realism, which encompasses the concept of considering domestic political factors.

The research interpreted data in the following steps: (1) whether an indicator (e.g., GDP per capita) has shown significant p-value and coefficient of determination (R squared) the research derived that the concept has an explanatory value for casual mechanism. Therefore, the concept was assumed to have a potential explanation for dissatisfaction.

4. Research Method

4.1 Regression Analysis

This research applies regression analysis as the primary method because it is a method of casual data analysis. It helps to explore the interrelationship between multiple variables (dependent and independent) (Pennings, 2016). Regression analysis can be employed as an inference approach with the aim of predicting the value of one variable from a value of another variable (Agresti, 2018). As a major purpose, it aims to make predictions from the y-intercept and the slope of the regression function. (Wagschal, 2016). Regression models provide a tool to easily read from the regression coefficients and their significance level whether a hypothesis can be verified or should be rejected. They also provide information about which independent variables (denoted as x) are most important in determining the dependent variable (denoted as y), by assessing their impact. Therefore, they are widely applied in social sciences to test theories based on hypotheses (Wagschal, 2016). In addition, theories and hypotheses can be used to specify the causal mechanism between variables. As such, the research operationalizes realism in this research to create an analytical framework and apply the different aspects of the theory.

How are the variables defined in this research? Variable is a characteristic that can vary in value among subjects in a sample. Different subject may have different values of the variable (Agresti, 2018). In this research, the subjects are the countries cover by Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys. The dependent variable (y) is the approval rate obtained from either the Standard Eurobarometer 98 or the Standard Eurobarometer 99 survey. The independent variables (x) varied along the different chapters of the analysis (see Figure 6 or Chapter 7 regarding indicator selection).

In the first step of the regression analysis, the data of approval rates from the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys were collected for the data of the dependent variable (y). The data were accessed through the Open Data Portal. The research uses the “total approval” rate from the surveys, which summarizes “fully approve” and “tend to approve” responses.

In the second step, the data were collected from various databases for the independent variable (x), to test the hypotheses. In the case of state power endowments, the data used for the study were (1) the International Monetary Fund's database and sources on GDP per capita, GDP total, inflation, and the effects of gas supply cut-off; (2) the World Bank's database on

GDP growth, military expenditure, research and development expenditure, and unemployment rate; (3) the United Nations Development Program's database on Human Development Index (HDI) ranking; (4) Eurostat's database on gas dependence and gas import. In the case of political endowments, POLITICO research data (Politico, 2023) available on European polls and elections were used for the analysis. For the role of hegemons, data from The World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database were used. For the balance of threat concept, the proximity of countries was calculated manually using the "measure distance between points" feature of Google Maps. The data obtained from these databases were checked for the assumptions for the linear regression during the course of the analysis.

In the third step, the regression analysis was performed using the R-based statistical online software Statistics 202 in the case of linear regression and the statistical online software Stats.Blue in the case of polynomial regression. As a prerequisite for the regression analysis, the data were examined according to the principles of independence, linearity, homoscedasticity, outliers, and normality. Ascertained outliers (where one value deviated markedly from all other values) were not included in the analyses.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics

The research also applies the investigation of relative frequencies as a method of descriptive statistics. This is due to the adaptive research model, which relies on secondary methods when linear regression is not feasible. To research the concept of considering domestic factors under neoclassical realism, numerical data suitable for regression analysis was not available. Using the descriptive statistics method, the research aims to outline/assimilate the mean patterns between countries with different approval rates. However, the research acknowledges that this method is not able to provide predictions for similar circumstances (as regression analysis does).

Two set of clusters were defined: (1) right-wing, left-wing and centrist/independent for the y axis, and (2) low, near-median and high approval rates for the x-axis. The clusters created allow to reduce the data to a simpler and more understandable form (Agresti, 2018). Also, the clusters allow for a measurement scale based on categorical variables with a natural ordering value, an "ordinal" measurement scale. (In the case of regression analysis, the measurement scale is numerical). For example, in the case of approval rates, the research considers the high cluster to be the highest value, followed by the near-median, and the low approval rate to be the lowest value. However, it is important to note that there is no defined value between the

categories of the scale (e.g., what is the exact difference in approval rate between a country in the high and near-median cluster).

The research chose to divide the countries into clusters along the center by using the median of the data. The median is the observation that lies in the middle of the ordered sample. Unlike the average value, the median is not affected by outliers, i.e., observations that fall well above or below the bulk of data. Therefore, it can better represent the distribution of data in the case of skewed or asymmetric distribution of values, as it prevents the center from being drawn towards the direction of the outlier (Agresti, 2018)

In the first step, the research uses the approval rate data available from the Standard Eurobarometer 98 survey and from the Standard Eurobarometer 99 survey. It divides the countries ($n=37$) into three clusters according to their approval rates. These are the high ($n=12$), near-median ($n=11$) and low ($n=14$) approval rates. The clusters were defined in line with the median (for Std. 98 =74 percent, and for Std. 99 =72 percent) of the approval rate of the countries surveyed. High clusters include countries more than five percentage above the median ($5 > \text{median}$), near-median clusters include countries that are five percent or less above the median and five percent or less below the median ($+5 \text{ median}$), low clusters include countries more than five percent below median ($5 < \text{median}$).

In the second step, the research organized the countries according to their political background of representation in the European Council in the case of Member States, since measures as economic sanctions are decided within the authority of the European Council. For non-EU members the research divided the leadership according to the most important public office role principle. Where no such authority was available (such as Switzerland), the research used data available on the most dominant political party. The three established clusters for political leadership are: right-wing, left-wing, and centrist/independent. As an example, if the representative is supported by a left-wing party, the country is classified as left-wing. In the case of coalitions from different political spectrums, the representative's own party determines the grouping.

In the third step, after establishing the clusters, the research looks into the relative frequencies' distribution. It calculates the frequency (in percentage) of countries of low, near-median and high approval rates appearing in right-wing, left-wing, and centrist/independent clusters. For example, 5 of the 8 low approval rate countries appearing in the right-wing cluster were considered as 62.5 percentage frequency. The research concluded that there is a 62.5-percentage frequency for Member States with right-leaning government to have low approval rates for economic sanctions.

5. Research Data

In both the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and the Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys, respondents from 37 countries were asked to state their level of approval of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. Their approval rates were as follows: (1) The Standard Eurobarometer 98 survey had an average approval rate of 71 percent, and the lowest approval rates were recorded for Serbia (29 percent), Moldova (39 percent), North Macedonia (47 percent), Bulgaria (47 percent) and Slovakia (49 percent). (2) The Standard Eurobarometer 99 survey had an average approval rate of 70 percent, and the lowest approval rates were recorded in Serbia (25 percent), Cyprus (35 percent), North Macedonia (37 percent), Moldova (44 percent) and Bulgaria (46 percent). Both survey findings show that the lowest approval rates are more than 20 percent below the average approval rate of the 37 countries surveyed. On the other hand, the data indicates that in these countries less than half of the population is satisfied with the introduction of economic sanctions. The research data thus supports the assumption that the approval rates in the countries surveyed vary. Nonetheless, the approval rates are still considerably high, as on average more than two thirds of respondents tend to be in favor of the sanctions.

5.1 Overall Results

This chapter presents the overall results of the six surveys. The aim of presenting the overall survey results is to examine the relationship between the two surveys researched in relation to other surveys that investigated the exact same survey question. Moreover, it examines whether the results of the two surveys are consistent with the results of the other surveys, and whether the results of the two surveys are outliers. The additional four surveys do not include all 37 countries surveyed, but the research finds it useful to examine any outliers within the Member States and to predict similar data normality for the countries not included.

4. Figure: The illustration presents the “total approval rates” of the six Eurobarometer surveys for the Member States and of Std. 98 and Std. 99 surveys in the case of third countries.




Figure 4 shows the approval rates recorded in the six surveys. The approval rates appear to be fairly consistent for the countries surveyed. Even for the countries that only participated in the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys, the results obtained appear to be fairly similar.

The largest differences between recorded approval rates can be found in Greece (32 percent), Estonia (25 percent), Hungary (25 percent), Austria (23 percent) and the Czech Republic (21 percent). In other countries, the variation in the recorded approval rates was less than 20 percent. These highlighted countries had the highest approval rates in the Special Eurobarometer 526 survey, whereas the lowest occurred in the Flash Eurobarometer 514 survey for Greece, Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic and in the Standard Eurobarometer 99 survey for Estonia. The Special Eurobarometer 526 survey took place in May 2022, after the

fifth sanctions package. The measures already included the SWIFT exclusion of banks and bans on solid fossil fuels. In addition, it recorded the highest approval ratings of 80 percent on average for the European Union. The Flash Eurobarometer 514 survey took place in December 2022, after the eighth sanctions package that introduced the oil price cap. This survey recorded the lowest level of approval for the average European Union approval rate, which was 71 percent. The research therefore assumes that these two surveys may deviate slightly from the normal values.

It is apparent from Figure 4 that the results of the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys are consistent with the results of the other surveys and that they do not exhibit atypical patterns compared to the other four surveys. In the case of countries with greater differences, the Std. 98 and Std. 99 surveys appear to capture a normalized skew.

6. Limitations

The author recognizes that the research design has certain limitations. The time boundary of the research focuses on events after 24 February 2022. The duration, extent, and outcome of the war in Ukraine are uncertain. The events could lead to a peace agreement that lifts sanctions against Russia and allows Member States to continue economic relations with Russia. Public opinion in the countries surveyed may be influenced by these factors. On the other hand, the European Union has undergone a unique integration process. Comparing the phenomenon of dissatisfaction with collective action with other, less integrated coalitions may not be accurate.

III. THEORY

In adherence to page restrictions, this chapter presents a concise overview of the theoretical framework underpinning this research. Detailed elaborations and explanations are provided in Chapter 7 of X. Appendices.

This research employs three types of the realist paradigm: classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. The concepts in accordance with the theoretical perspectives were identified according to Figure 5, which illustrates the breakdown as defined by (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019). The figure demonstrates that the common features of the realist paradigm are the perception of anarchy and the crucial importance of state power. Classical realism further links these two core assumptions to the statecraft ethics, where power trumps ethics, and to the inevitable human nature that results self-interest seeking and disintegration.

Classical realism and neoclassical realism also incorporate the leadership dimension. However, neoclassical realism links its dimension and subsequent foreign policy decisions to domestic society. Neorealism that focuses exclusively on state power and anarchy is unique because it links anarchy to a structure defined by great powers.

5. Figure: The figure is based on the table presented in the publication by (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019) to categorize the theoretical types of the realist paradigm and arranges accordingly the concepts covered in this research


	Classical realism	Neorealism	Neoclassical realism
ANARCHY	X	X	X
STATE POWER	X	X	X
LEADERSHIP	X		X
STATECRAFT ETHICS	X		
HUMAN NATURE	X		
DOMESTIC SOCIETY			X
CONCEPTS	Power endowments Political endowments	Role of hegemons Balance of threat	Considering domestic factors

In line with the theoretical elements outlined above, the common feature of realist ideas are based on four fundamental assumptions: (1) the pessimistic view of human nature, (2) conviction that international relations are inevitably conflict-driven and that conflicts are resolved by force, (3) the high regard for values of national security and state survival, and (4) a general skepticism about progress in international politics compared to such progress in domestic politics. Apart from these fundamental assumptions, realist scholarship is divided on many issues (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019). The core of realism represents a "general orientation" or "paradigm" rather than a rigid theoretical perspective, which has led scholars to distinguish between different types of realism (Donnelly, 2000).

IV. ANALYSIS

In this chapter the research investigates different casual factors that can result the outcome of different levels of approval rate of economic sanctions. The research chapter is divided into state endowments and public opinions. State endowments from the one hand, include quantitative power endowments of states. On the other hand, it includes the qualitative political endowments of states, as cause of the outcome. Public opinion is based also on quantitative results of the Std. 98 and Std. 99 surveys. Figure 6 provides an overview of how the indicators are structured by the theoretical concepts.

6. Figure: The illustration shows how the analysis design is structured in accordance with the independent variables that are tested as casual factors



8. State Endowments

8.1 Classical realism - Power Endowments


In this research chapter linear regression is applied. The dependent variable (y) is always the approval rate of economic sanctions, while different independent variables (x) are tested to determine whether they can be casual factors. The independent variables included to reflect the power endowments of the countries surveyed.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): To represent the power endowments of states GDP per capita, GDP total, and GDP growth were analyzed. Since the GDP growth rate is higher in less developed countries, the research also investigated the change in real GDP growth rates. Therefore, the difference in the change in real GDP growth between 2021 and 2022 and between 2021 and 2023 was calculated. The value of real GDP growth in 2021 was subtracted from the values for 2022 and 2023 and used these values as the differences. In most cases the difference

was a minus number, i.e., real GDP growth in 2022 and 2023 was lower than in 2021. With this the research aimed to compare how the real GDP growth changed since 24 February 2022.

GDP per capita: The EU average GDP per capita in 2023 is USD 39300.01. The highest GDP per capita is in Luxembourg (USD 132372.386) while the lowest is in Moldova (6342.648), which is approximately twenty times less. After applying a simple linear regression test, both Std. 98 and Std. 99 survey approval rates showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=0.0005$; Std. 99 $p=0.004$). However, the coefficient of determination explained a greater proportion of the variance for the Std. 98 survey ($R^2=0.274$) than for the Std. 99 survey ($R^2=0.186$).

7. Figure: Regression analysis of GDP per capita in 2023, current prices (U.S dollars), Std. 98 as a casual factor



GDP in Total, Real GDP Growth 2023, and Real GDP Growth Change Between 2021 and 2022/2023: The average GDP total in U.S. dollars of the countries surveyed was USD 5.99e+11 in 2022. The highest value was in Germany (USD 4.07e+12) and the lowest in Montenegro (USD 6.10e+09). The real GDP growth average for the year 2023 was 1.29 percent. The highest value appeared in Ireland (5.6 percent) and the lowest in Estonia (-1.2 percent). For the year 2021 and 2022, in average in the surveyed countries the GDP growth dropped with 3.22 percent. The lowest GDP growth decrease in 2022 was in Portugal (GDP increased 1.2 percent) and the highest in Moldova (-19.5 percent). Real GDP growth the year 2021 and 2023, in average in the surveyed countries the GDP growth dropped with 5.68 percent. The lowest GDP growth decrease in 2022 was in Slovakia (-1.7 percent) and the highest in Moldova (-11.9 percent).

After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for the indicators analyzed: GDP total in 2022 (Std. 98 $R^2=0.012$, $p=0.241$; Std. 99

$R^2=0.012$, $p=0.238$), real GDP growth rate in 2023 (Std. 98 $R^2=0.013$, $p=0.234$; Std. 99 $R^2= -0.001$, $p=0.336$), change in real GDP growth rate between 2021 and 2022 (Std. 98 $R^2= -0.019$, $p=0.568$; Std. 99 $R^2= -0.028$, $p=0.866$) and change in real GDP growth rate between 2021 and 2023 (Std. 98 $R^2= -0.019$, $p=0.568$; Std. 99 $R^2= -0.028$, $p=0.866$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between examined variables and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.

Military Expenditure: The average military expenditure in U.S. dollars for the countries surveyed was USD 9 522 088 906 in 2021. The highest value was in France (USD 56 646 996 216) and the lowest in Malta (USD 84 908 940.4). The average military expenditure in percentage of GDP was 1.643 percentage. The highest value appeared in Greece (3.867 percent) and the lowest in Ireland (0.265 percent). After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for either military expenditure in total (Std. 98 $R^2=-0.006$, $p=0.378$; Std. 99 $R^2=0.001$, $p=0.319$) or military expenditure per capita (Std. 98 $R^2=-0.023$, $p=0.662$; Std. 99 $R^2= -0.023$, $p=0.662$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between examined variables and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.

Research and development (R&D) Expenditure: The average research and development expenditure (percentage of GDP) in the countries surveyed was 1.54 percent in 2019. The highest value appeared in Sweden (3.39 percent) and the lowest in Bosnia and Herzegovina (0.193 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, both Std. 98 and Std. 99 survey approval rates showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=0.0013$; Std. 99, $p=0.00554$). However, the coefficient of determination explained a greater proportion of the variance for the Std. 98 survey ($R^2=0.244$) than for the Std. 99 survey ($R^2=0.182$). For both surveys, the values of the slope coefficient indicate an expected increase (Std. 98 $\beta_1=8.828$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=8.415$) in the approval rate when the research and development expenditure increases.

Unemployment Rate: The average unemployment rate was 6.56 percent. The highest value appeared in Montenegro (15.42 percent) and lowest in Moldova (2.28 percent). Different results appear for Std. 98 and Std. 99 for the unemployment rate in 2022 (percentage of total labor force). While the Std. 98 shows a weak static significance ($R^2=0.059$, $p=0.0794$) the Std. 99 shows no static significance ($R^2=0.045$, $p=0.109$). As such, it is likely that the weak static significance is not evidence of a definite linear relationship between the two variables. The war

did not seem to negatively affect the unemployment values, as most of the surveyed countries showed a decreasing trend of unemployment rate between the years 2021 and 2022.

Inflation Rate: Since the inflation rate might be regularly higher in certain countries, the research also investigated the change in inflation rates. In this chapter (as for GDP growth rate changes) the difference in the change in inflation rate between 2021 and 2022 and between 2021 and 2023 was calculated. The value of inflation rate in 2021 was subtracted from the values for 2022 and 2023 and used these values as the differences. In most cases the difference was a plus number, i.e., inflation rate in 2022 and 2023 was higher than in 2021. With this the research aimed to compare how the inflation rate changed since 24 February 2022.


Inflation Rate in 2023: For the year 2023, in average in the surveyed countries the inflation rate was 8.48 percent. The highest inflation rate in 2023 appeared in Turkey (50.6 percent) and lowest in Switzerland (2.4 percent). After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for the inflation rate in 2023 (Std. 98 $R^2=0.042$, $p=0.117$; Std. 99 $R^2=0.014$, $p=0.228$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between the inflation rate in 2023 and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.

Change in Inflation Rate Between 2021 and 2022/2023: For the year 2021 and 2022, the inflation rate increased in average with 9.39 percentage. The highest inflation rate increase in 2022 was in Turkey (52.7 percent) and the lowest in Switzerland (2.2 percent). For the year 2021 and 2023, the inflation rate increased in average with 5.17 percentage. The highest inflation rate increase in 2023 was in Turkey (31 percent) and the lowest in Luxembourg (it decreased 0.9 percent). Different results appear for Std. 98 and Std. 99 for the change in inflation rate between 2021 and 2022 and the change in inflation rate between 2021 and 2023. While for both variables the Std. 98 shows a weak static significance (between 2021 and 2022 $R^2=0.055$, $p=0.0868$; between 2021 and 2023 $R^2=0.069$, $p=0.0643$) the Std. 99 shows no static significance (between 2021 and 2022 $R^2=0.022$, $p=0.187$; between 2021 and 2023 $R^2=0.03$, $p=0.157$). As such, it is likely that the weak static significance is not evidence of a definite linear relationship between the two variables.

Human Development Index (HDI): The research used the data available from the database of the United Nations Development Program. The average HDI of the surveyed countries was 0.882. The highest Human Development Index value was in Switzerland (0.962) while the

lowest value in Moldova (0.767). After applying a simple linear regression test, both Std. 98 and Std. 99 survey approval rates showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=2.05e-06$; Std. 99 $p=2.49e-04$). However, the coefficient of determination explained a greater proportion of the variance for the Std. 98 survey ($R^2=0.465$) than for the Std. 99 survey ($R^2=0.303$). For both surveys, the values of the slope coefficient indicate an expected increase (Std. 98 $\beta_1=1.751$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=1.935$) in the approval rate when the HDI increases. Figure 8 illustrates that the approval rate increases 1.935 percent as the Human Development Index increases 0.01.

8. Figure: Regression analysis of Human Development Index (HDI) in 2021, Std. 98 as a casual factor



Imports from Russia in Natural Gas Supplies: The European Union average import in 2020 was 41.1 percent. The import dependency was the highest in Hungary (110.4 percent) while the lowest is in Malta and Ireland (zero percent). Different results appear for Std. 98 and Std. 99 for the imports from Russia in natural gas supplies. While the Std. 98 shows a weak static significance ($R^2=0.082$, $p=0.0767$) the Std. 99 shows no static significance ($R^2=0.036$, $p=0.167$). As such, it is likely that the weak static significance is not evidence of a definite linear relationship between the two variables.

Natural Gas Import Dependency, Output Losses Associated with a Potential Russian Supply Shut-off: The European Union average low "adjustment frictions", taking into account that the European Union is integrated in global LNG market is -0.4 percent. It suggests the lowest shut-off effects for Sweden (zero percent) and the highest for Hungary (1.1 percent). After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for either natural gas import dependency (Std. 98 $R^2=0.045$, $p=0.112$; Std. 99 $R^2=0.03$, $p=0.16$) or output

losses associated with a potential Russian supply shut-off (Std. 98 $R^2=0.059$, $p=0.114$; Std. 99 $R^2=0.013$, $p=0.254$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between examined variables and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.


8.2 Classical Realism – Political Endowments

In this research chapter the research investigates relative frequencies. With this method the research aims to investigate whether right-wing leadership is related to low approval rates due to the disintegration concept (right-wing led states tend to conduct realist foreign policy choices) of classical realism. As in the case of regression analysis, the research examines the approval rates of both surveys separately.


Figure 9 illustrates the clusters established as follows: After calculating a median approval rate from the “total approval” rates of the Standard Eurobarometer 98 survey, the median result was 74 percentage. (It fell very close to the average value for the 37 countries which was 73 percent). In line with the median value, the clusters included in the following rates the countries: high 79-100 percent, near-median 69.01-78.99 percent, and low 0-69 percent. The three highest approval rate was in Norway (95 percent), Sweden (95 percent), Poland (90 percent), and Denmark (90 percent). The three lowest approval rates appeared in Bulgaria (47 percent), Moldova (47 percent), North Macedonia (39 percent) and Serbia (29 percent). The 37 countries divided in the following way among the clusters: 12 with high approval, 11 with near-median approval and 14 with low approval. With this categorization countries seemed relatively equal distribution between the clusters.

Figure 10 illustrates the clusters established as follows: The “total approval” rates of the Standard Eurobarometer 99 survey, the median result was 72 percentage. (The average value for the 37 countries was 71 percent). Therefore, the clusters included in the following rates the countries: high 77-100 percent, near-median 67.01-76.99 percent, and low 0-67 percent. The three highest approval rate was in Norway (94 percent), Sweden (94 percent), and Portugal (94 percent). The three lowest approval rates appeared in North Macedonia (37 percent), Cyprus (35 percent) and Serbia (25 percent). The 37 countries divided in the following way among the clusters: 13 with high approval, 8 with near-median approval and 16 with low approval.

9. Figure: The illustrations show the distribution of countries along the various clusters determined by the median as the center of the data (Std. 98)




10. Figure: The illustrations show the distribution of countries along the various clusters determined by the median as the center of the data (Std. 99)




Following the creation of clusters, the countries were divided in the clusters according to their political orientation. The countries divided in the following way in 2022: 16 right-wing, 11 left wing, and 10 centrist/independent. In 2023: 14 right-wing, 10 left-wing, 12 centrist/independent. The research does not take into account leaders elected after the data collection period of the survey. This means February 2023 for Std. 98 and June 2023 for Std. 99.

The thereafter created stacked column chart, Figure 11, indicated in the case of Std. 98 that right-wing countries had the highest frequency in the low approval rate cluster (50 percent) and left-wing countries had the lowest (14 percent). Centrist/independent countries had the lowest frequency in the high approval rate cluster. For the Standard Eurobarometer 99 survey in Figure 12, left-wing countries also appeared in the lowest frequency in the low approval rate cluster. However, the right wing did not show overreaching results compared to other political clusters in the same cluster. In fact, centrist/independent countries had a higher frequency. In addition, the right-wing countries also appeared with the highest frequency in the high approval rate category.

11. Figure: The illustration shows the frequency of countries grouped by their political representation in the European Council. These groups are subdivided based on the previously established clusters for the approval rates (Std. 98)



12. Figure: The illustration shows the frequency of countries grouped by their political representation in the European Council. These groups are subdivided based on the previously established clusters for the approval rates (Std. 99)



8.3 Neorealism – Role of Hegemons

In this research chapter linear regression is applied. The dependent variable is always the approval rate of economic sanctions, while different independent variables are tested to determine whether they can be casual factors. The independent variables aim to reflect the influence of hegemons.


Trade with the United States

Import: In case of United States imports, the average partner share percentage was 3.74 percent. The highest value appeared in Ireland (15.47 percent) and the lowest in Croatia (0.67 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, the model showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=0.0197$; Std. 99 $p=0.0235$) for both surveys and explained a small amount of the variance (Std. 98 $R^2=0.121$, Std. 99 $R^2=0.114$). Also, the slope of the coefficient (Std. 98 $\beta_1=2.008$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=2.158$) in both cases indicates that the approval rate should increase as the share of the United States among import partners increases.

Export: In case of United States exports, the average partner share percentage was 5.28 percent. The highest value appeared in Ireland (30.79 percent) and the lowest in Montenegro (0.44 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, the model showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=0.0161$; Std. 99 $p=0.0226$) for both surveys and explained a small amount of the

variance (Std. 98 $R^2=0.13$, Std. 99 $R^2=0.115$). Also, the slope of the coefficient (Std. 98 $\beta_1=1.129$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=1.186$) in both cases indicates that the approval rate should increase as the share of the United States among export partners increases. Figure 13 illustrates that the approval rate increases 1.129 percent as the share of the United States among export partners increases 1 percent.

13. Figure: Regression analysis of share of United States among export partners (%) in 2019, Std. 98 as a casual factor



Trade with Russia

Import: In case of Russian imports, the average partner share percentage was 4.2 percent. The highest value appeared in Lithuania (14.51 percent) and the lowest in Switzerland (0.16 percent). Different results appear for Std. 98 and Std. 99 for the imports from Russia in natural gas supplies. While the Std. 98 shows a weak static significance ($R^2=0.053$, $p=0.092$) the Std. 99 shows no static significance ($R^2=0.02$, $p=0.198$). As such, it is likely that the weak static significance is not evidence of a definite linear relationship between the two variables.

Export: In case of Russian export, the average partner share percentage was 2.39 percent. The highest value appeared in Lithuania (13.97 percent) and the lowest in Albania (0.02 percent). After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for the share of Russia among export partners (Std. 98 $R^2= -0.013$, $p=0.475$; Std. 99 $R^2= -0.012$, $p=0.46$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between examined variable and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.

Trade with Germany


In case of German imports, the average partner share percentage was 14.64 percent. The highest value appeared in Austria (34.67 percent) and the lowest in Cyprus (5.98 percent). In case of German exports, the average partner share percentage was 15.35 percent. The highest value appeared in North Macedonia (48.66 percent) and the lowest in Cyprus (2.06 percent). After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for either share of Germany among import partners (Std. 98 $R^2 = -0.001$, $p = 0.329$; Std. 99 $R^2 = -0.019$, $p = 0.56$) or share of Germany among export partners (Std. 98 $R^2 = -0.013$, $p = 0.467$; Std. 99 $R^2 = 0$, $p = 0.324$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between examined variables and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.

8.4 Neorealism – Balance of Threat

In this research section polynomial regression is applied, because linear regression did not provide adequate fit to the data to support the concept (Std. 98 $R^2 = -0.027$, $p = 0.838$, Std. 99 $R^2 = -0.028$, $p = 0.961$). On the other hand, a U-shaped pattern appeared (see Figure 14), which is well-fitted by a polynomial line.

The average border distance of the countries from Russian borders (including the area of Kaliningrad) was 792.75 km. The most distant country was Portugal (2374 km) and the closest neighboring countries were Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland (0 km). After applying a regression analysis using a polynomial model, the model showed static significance (Std. 98 $p = 0.0154$; Std. 99 $p = 0.0173$) for both surveys and explained a moderate amount of the variance (Std. 98. $R^2 = 0.2176$, Std. 99 $R^2 = 0.2123$).

14. Figure: Regression analysis of geographical proximity (km), Std. 98 as a casual factor



9. Public Opinions

In this research chapter linear regression is applied. The dependent variable is always the approval rate of economic sanctions, while different independent variables are tested to determine whether they can be casual factors. The independent variables included are other public opinions surveyed by Eurobarometer that are expected to correlate with the approval rate of economic sanctions. Importantly, the research compares with regression analysis public opinion within one survey (e.g., Std. 98 approval rate of economic sanctions is investigated to be related to Std. 98 level of trust in the European Union). Public opinions measured in different Eurobarometer surveys are not compared.

9.1 Neoclassical Realism – Considering Domestic Factors


Trust in the European Union and its Perception

Trust in the European Union: The average rate of trust in the European Union was 49 percent for the Std. 98 survey and 51 percent for the Std. 99 survey. The highest rates were found for Albania (71 percent) and Denmark (71 percent) in the Std. 98 survey and for Albania (77 percent) in the Std. 99 survey. The lowest rates were found in the Std. 98 survey for Turkey (29 percent) and the United Kingdom (29 percent), and in the Std. 99 survey for Serbia (32 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, the model showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=1.71e-05$; Std. 99 $p=1.63e-05$) for both surveys and explained a large amount of the variance

(Std. 98 $R^2=0.398$, Std. 99 $R^2=0.4$). Also, the slope of the coefficient (Std. 98 $\beta_1=0.92$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=1.029$) in both cases indicates that the approval rate of economic sanction should increase as the tendency to trust the European Union increases.

Trust in the European Council: The average rate of trust in the European Council was 46 percent for the Std. 98 survey and 48 percent for the Std. 99 survey. The highest rate was found for Malta (65 percent) in the Std. 98 survey and for Albania (67 percent) in the Std. 99 survey. The lowest rate was found in the Std. 98 survey for Serbia (20 percent), and also in the Std. 99 survey for Serbia (23 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, the model showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=6.34e-06$; Std. 99 $p=3.24e-06$) for both surveys and explained a large amount of the variance (Std. 98 $R^2=0.43$, Std. 99 $R^2=0.451$). Also, the slope of the coefficient (Std. 98 $\beta_1=0.918$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=1.166$) in both cases indicates that the approval rate of economic sanctions should increase as the tendency to trust the European Council increases. Figure 15 illustrates that the approval rate increases 1.166 percent as the trust in the European Council increases 1 percent.

15. Figure: Regression analysis of tendency to trust the European Council, Std. 99 as a casual factor




Positive Image of the European Union: The average rate of positive image of the European Union was 47 percent for the Std. 98 survey and 49 percent for the Std. 99 survey. The highest rate was found for Albania (75 percent) in the Std. 98 survey and also for Albania (85 percent) in the Std. 99 survey. The lowest rates were found in the Std. 98 survey for Serbia (30 percent) and Switzerland (30 percent), and in the Std. 99 survey for Switzerland (31 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, both Std. 98 and Std. 99 survey approval rates showed

static significance (Std. 98 $p=0.012$; Std. 99, $p=0.00113$). However, the coefficient of determination explained a lesser proportion of the variance for the Std. 98 survey ($R^2=0.143$) than for the Std. 99 survey ($R^2=0.243$). For both surveys, the values of the slope coefficient indicate an expected increase (Std. 98 $\beta_1=0.598$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=0.766$) in the approval rate when the level of positive image of the European Union increases.

Global Voice of the European Union: The average approval rate of the European Union's global voice importance was 71 percent for the Std. 98 survey and 70 percent for the Std. 99 survey. The highest rate was found for Sweden (91 percent) in the Std. 98 survey and for Denmark (90 percent) in the Std. 99 survey. The lowest rates were found in the Std. 98 survey for Serbia (56 percent) and the United Kingdom (56 percent), and in the Std. 99 survey for Italy (55 percent). After applying a simple linear regression test, the model showed static significance (Std. 98 $p=1.91e-06$; Std. 99 $p=1.82e-06$) for both surveys and explained a large amount of the variance (Std. 98 $R^2=0.467$, Std. 99 $R^2=0.468$). Also, the slope of the coefficient (Std. 98 $\beta_1=1.176$, Std. 99 $\beta_1=1.328$) in both cases indicates that the approval rate of economic sanctions should increase as the approval rate of the statement that the European Union's voice counts in the world increases. Figure 16 illustrates that the approval rate increases 1.328 percent as the tendency to believe that the European Union's global voice matters increases 1 percent.

16. Figure: Regression analysis of tendency to believe that the EU's global voice matters, Std. 99 as a casual factor



Financial and Economic Considerations

The average approval rate of the statement that the war has serious financial consequences for you as a person, was 64 percent for the Std. 98 survey and 60 percent for the Std. 99 survey. The highest rate was found for Cyprus (90 percent) in the Std. 98 survey and for Portugal (86 percent) in the Std. 99 survey. The lowest rate was found in the Std. 98 survey for Switzerland (30 percent), and also in the Std. 99 survey for Switzerland (29 percent).

The average approval rate of the statement that the war has serious economic consequences for the country, was 83 percent for the Std. 98 survey and 80 percent for the Std. 99 survey. The highest rate was found for Cyprus (97 percent) in the Std. 98 survey and for Cyprus (92 percent), Greece (92 percent), and Portugal (92 percent) in the Std. 99 survey. The lowest rate was found in the Std. 98 survey for Switzerland (57 percent), and also in the Std. 99 survey for Switzerland (53 percent).

After applying simple linear regression test, the data from both surveys show no static significance for either personal financial consequences (Std. 98 $R^2=0.024$, $p=0.178$; Std. 99 $R^2=-0.017$, $p=0.533$) or economic consequences for the country (Std. 98 $R^2=-0.017$, $p=0.54$; Std. 99 $R^2=0.023$, $p=0.488$). This indicates that the static significance for the relationship between examined variables and the approval rate of economic sanctions is low and the relationship between them is likely to be random.

V. DISCUSSION

10. Summary of Analyses

The regression analysis had the following findings:

- The statistically significant result test proves that the relationship between the two variables is related, and the coefficient of determination explains a large or moderate amount of variance for the followings, listed in decreasing significance level: EU's global voice ($p=1.82e-06$), Human Development Index ($p=2.05e-06$) trust in the EU Council ($p=3.24e-06$), trust in the EU ($1.63e-05$), GDP per capita ($p=0.0005$), EU's positive image ($p=0.00113$), R&D expenditure ($p=0.0013$), proximity of borders ($p=0.0154$)

- Likewise, statistically significant result occurs, albeit the coefficient of determination explains only a small amount of variance for export partner share of the United States ($p=0.0161$), and import partner share of the United States ($p=0.0197$)
- The models showed no static significance when the following factors applied as independent variable: GDP total, real GDP growth rate, change in real GDP growth rate between 2021 and 2022, change in real GDP growth rate between 2021 and 2023, military expenditure as percentage of GDP, military expenditure total, unemployment rate, inflation rate, inflation rate change between 2021 and 2022, inflation rate change between 2021 and 2023, natural gas import dependency, imports from Russia in natural gas, potential Russian gas supply shut-off, export partner share of the Russia, import partner share of the Russia, export partner share of the Germany, import partner share of the Germany, public opinion on personal financial consequences and on the consequences for the country's economy.

Descriptive statistics examining relative frequencies had the following findings:

- Right-leaning countries did not occur in relative high portion among low approval rate countries in both surveys, albeit they did in the case of Std. 98 survey
- Left-leaning countries appeared in both surveys in relatively small frequency among the low approval rate countries (up to 19 percent frequency)

11. Theoretical Discussions

In the following chapters, the research discusses whether these results confirm the theoretical frameworks applied. The research divides the discussion into the state power concept, the disintegration concept related to political endowments, the hegemon role concept, the balance of threat assumption, and the concept considering domestic factors.

11.1 Classical Realism

11.1.1 Power of State Concept

Four variables that were considered as the indicator of state power confirmed that they are related to the approval rate of economic sanctions. These were in decreasing significance: (1) Human Development Index, (2) GDP per capita, (3) R&D expenditure. All of them were representing wealth, military resources did not show any correlation with the approval rate, albeit they are also commonly considered as a state power indicator (Beckley, 2018). The results

support the classical realist perspective that states are motivated primarily by national interest, and the power relations is a fundamental feature of international relations (Gilpin, 1996). The behavior of countries with low approval rates can be explained by the fact that they see foreign policy as never being entirely reliant on other states because international agreements can be set aside if they conflict vital state interest (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019). Also, for these countries the most basic driver is state survival (Mearsheimer, 1994) and necessity of state trumps morality and ethics (Schweller, 1997). The countries with such feature might consider less the ethics of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and show less empathy. They calculate their interest in terms of power (Keohanne, 1986), and therefore they push for limited restrictions with the aim to minimize costs for domestic actors (Hellquist, 2012).

In addition, the researched highlighted Human Development Index as the strongest indicator, which transforms well-being into a single yearly index to rate a countries performance (Benjamin, Cooper, Heffetz, & Kimball, 2021). This can support further the argument raised by Beckley (Beckley, 2018) that net indicators are more precise than gross indicators, since the latter can systematically exaggerate the wealth and military capabilities of poor and populous countries.

11.1.2 Political Endowments

The disintegration concept could not provide a satisfactory explanation for the different levels of approval of economic sanctions. The concept expects that right-wing and nationalist turn in the last decades resulted realist foreign policies in these countries (Viotti, 2019). Therefore, in line with this the right-wing countries are expected to show a lack of trust in civilizing (Koskenniemi, 2010) and their foreign policies are based on power calculations. However, the results showed that right-wing countries do not occur in higher frequencies than the countries represented by centrist/independent leaders.

On the other hand, left-wing countries show lower approval rates less frequently. These countries possibly tend to approach foreign policies less through a realist perspective. They possibly place more trust in civilization and focus less on power calculations. Since realism focuses exclusively on disintegration, other theories such as liberalism or constructivism might provide a better interpretation of such foreign policy determinations.

11.2 Neorealism

11.2.1 Role of Hegemons

For the concept of trade with hegemons of neorealism, significant results were obtained in decreasing order for (1) the share of the United States among export partners and (2) the share of the United States among import partners. No significant result was obtained for either Russia's share or Germany's share among trade partners.

The research results demonstrate that less intensive trade relations (both exports and imports) with the United States is somewhat associated with lower levels of support for economic sanctions against Russia, thereby providing support for the neorealist concept of its hegemonic role. The results suggest that trends may in fact continue to favor the United States over the new emerging powers (Beckley, 2018). In line with the neorealist theory, the United States represents as an influencing power, and influences cost benefit calculations by providing collective goods (Kindleberger, 1973). The United States is also likely to use coercion to exert pressure or make promises to other actors in order to impose similar sanctions (Martins, 1992). On the other hand, the research findings shed doubt on the arguments that the United States has declined as a hegemon and that there has been a return of intra-European power politics (Mearsheimer J. , 2010), or that the United States is no longer a hegemon and therefore great power rivalries in Europe are resurgent (Zimmermann H. , 2021).

For Germany's share among trade partners, the results of this research have indicated no influence for Germany on the approval rate of economic sanctions. Echoing claims made by authors over the 2014 crisis (Matthijs, 2016) (Webber, 2019), Germany again appeared to be absent from the role of hegemon. German foreign policy may be shifting to maximize its influence (Reichwein, 2019) and pursue national interests, and it is anticipated to take the lead in Europe (Hellmann, 2016), but in the case of the approval rate of economic sanctions, the country demonstrated no influence. The approval rates suggest that Germany did neither show sufficient offensive language and coercive diplomacy as in 2014 (Forsberg, 2016) nor acted as a hegemon and strongly expressed its opposition to the close economic ties with Russia as in 2014 (Karolewski & Cross, 2017).

11.2.2 Balance of Threat

For the balance of threat theory of neorealism, simple linear regression did not indicate relation between the approval rates and geographical proximity. This means that simply getting further proximity from Russian border do not explain the threat possessed on countries.

However, when applying a U-shaped pattern (with a polynomial line) on the data, the results appeared to be significant. Countries that are very close to the Russian border and those that are farther away from the Russian sphere of influence show higher approval of the sanctions. If we excluded the countries that are distant from the Russian sphere of influence, the line would show that the further away we move, the lower the approval rate gets. The reason for this trend could be the following: (1) Countries that are very close to Russia are more likely to see the threat of Russia than the benefits of Russia's sphere of influence (e.g., trade relations). (2) Countries that are still in the Russian sphere of influence but farther away are perceiving Russia as less of a threat and therefore see the benefits of the Russian sphere of influence as still accessible (i.e., less of a risk).

The results suggest that the design of sanctions can be influenced by geographic concerns and the geographic concerns influence the behavior of the sender (Drezner D. , 1999). Since geographic threats are security threats emanating from the target country (Binder, 2015), i.e., Russia, neighboring countries or countries that are in very close proximity to Russia support harsher sanctions (in this instance, current sanctions are considered harsh and these countries have higher approval rates) because they consider the security threat to be high and are eager to coerce Russia to change its behavior (Giumelli, 2010).

11.3 Neoclassical Realism

11.3.1 Concept of Considering Domestic Factors

Simple linear regression indicated static significance for the public opinion related to EU institutions. The findings demonstrate that neoclassical realism has a highest explanatory of dissatisfaction in the case of economic sanctions against Russia. It indicates that even if states are facing anarchy, state behavior is conditional on domestic preferences (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019). However, in the case of consideration of financial and economic consequences the results showed no significant results. It questions whether the financial and economic considerations have equal relevancy and whether the sanctions inflicted unsustainable economic damage to the sender (Schropp & Tsigas, 2023).

VI. REFLECTION

12. Research Method

The research uses two types of research methods in this study: regression analysis, and relative frequencies. It is important to mention that each two methods have their weaknesses. In the case of regression analysis, the regression model should be traceable to a previous well-founded theoretical discussion of the causal relationship; otherwise, testing simple "trial-and-error" additive models is not sufficient (Wagschal, 2016). The research relied on a theoretical discourse, yet it tested several indicators and only moderate amount of them has provided statistically significant result. This may suggest that there may be better fitting methods that avoid the testing of simple additive models. On the other hand, the weaknesses of descriptive statistics are that we cannot make predictions based on them (Pennings, 2016). While countries appeared in higher frequency in clusters, it does not mean that it will likely happen again in similar circumstances. Also, in the case of categorizing the countries around the center (median), after applying criteria, the mean can be still slightly influenced by outliers, and it is also not an estimate on numerical data (Agresti, 2018).

13. Theory

13.1 Transnational Actors

The research relies on realism as the main theoretical paradigm. The theory is government-centered, focusing on interactions at the state level. It therefore fails to take into account actors operating at transnational level, such as non-governmental organizations and multinational companies, which are becoming increasingly important. Nor does it take into account the European Union's multi-level governance system, which also extends to the non-state level (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). Hence, realism can only provide a limited insight into transnational policy networks. Yet in this research realism is preferred, as transnational policy networks are not suitable for the analysis of all political systems. Their approach assumes a relative separation between public and private actors and centers on resources that are not concentrated in the state. When resources are concentrated at the state level, policy networks are less likely to emerge and are therefore less important in explaining policy outcomes (Rhodes, Bache, & George, 1996). In the case of the Council of Minister and national governments, there is a limited relevance of transnational policy networks (Nolke, 2003), and

this also applies to sanctions imposed by the European Council after examination by the relevant Council working groups (EU text adopted, 2022).

13.2 Intergovernmentalism

In order to better understand the phenomena of dissatisfaction or the varying approval rates in the Member States, the author proposes to examine the underlying context with the help of the intergovernmentalism approach, a concept of European integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism is a key theory of European integration (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borraran, 2022). It is a further developed concept of classical intergovernmentalism. Classical intergovernmentalism stems from neorealist analyses of intergovernmental negotiations. It is characterized by a state-centric approach and regards integration as a zero-sum game in which the winner takes all (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borraran, 2022). It views integration as limited to policy areas that do not interfere with the fundamental issues of national sovereignty and regards European integration as determined by the interests and actions of nation states (Hix, 1999). The theory also incorporates cost-benefit calculations, as it assumes that the main objective of engagement through qualitative cost-benefit analyses is the protection of national interests. In this respect, cooperation within the European Union is grounded on the premise that common solutions are often necessary to solve common problems. Therefore, it perceives integration as conservative and pragmatic (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borraran, 2022).

The liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) incorporates both realist and neoliberal elements (Rosamond, 2000) and hence offers a more rigorous approach than the classic intergovernmentalism (George & Bache, 2001). The two dimensions consistent with that of the two integrated features are demand and supply. The demand for cooperation stems from the national polity, whereas the supply of integration stems from intergovernmental negotiations (Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borraran, 2022). Their connection is influenced by various factors, namely economic interests, relative power, and credible commitments (Moravcsik, 1998).

13.3 Differentiated Cooperation

In order to better understand the third countries' approval rates of economic sanction, the author suggests investigating third country alignments through the differentiated cooperation concept. Differentiated cooperation covers any institutional arrangements that enable Member States to cooperate in a non-uniform way with no discretionary power at the disposal of the EU

institutions. In such non-uniform arrangements, Member States seek consensus and integration takes place through voluntary policy coordination (Vicere & Sus, 2023). It differs from the regulatory-based differentiated integration, as it is characterized by voluntary policy coordination (Fabbrini, 2013), and it often occurs in the margins or outside of EU institutional structures or legal frameworks (Grevi, Soler i Lecha, & Zeiss, 2020). The author proposes in particular to examine the five potential determinants identified by Schade in the case of third-country alignment with regard to the negotiations of the OSCE Permanent Council (Schade, 2023): (1) a country's institutional proximity to the European Union, (2) a country's involvement in ongoing conflicts, (3) the competing foreign policy goals, (4) a country's diplomatic resources (from a bureaucratic perspective), and (5) the unity of Members States on a given issue.


These would provide further answers on: (1) Whether countries with low approval rates have greater or lesser institutional proximity to the European Union and whether, once a country has been granted official EU candidate status, it undertakes to gradually adapt its national policy to mirror European Union policies (Aydin-Duzgit, Bond, & Scazzieri, 2021) (Hillion, 2017). (2) Whether countries are reluctant to align because the economic sanctions do not support their own view of the conflict in Ukraine as a whole and they promote a different reading of the underlying conflict. (3) Whether their views and interests are linked to the conflict and negatively affect their desire to join the European Union's common position (Cardwell & Moret, 2022). These countries may have an indirect or direct interest in the conflict, whilst other countries may be concerned to maintain good diplomatic relations. (Schade, 2023). The prerequisite for the alignment norm is that the third country has no competing foreign policy objectives (Hellquist, 2016). (4) Whether the country has diplomatic resources (from a bureaucratic point of view). Some countries may be too small to have an independent yet active voice at the international arena and may not have adequate diplomatic personnel. (5) Whether Member States' views on the adopted EU positions diverge and the position therefore represents the lowest common denominator. Such a process could result in a watered-down statement and consequently some countries may persist to align and prioritize their own statement (Schade, 2023).

VII. CONCLUSION

The findings demonstrate that the realist paradigm can provide an explanation for the dissatisfaction and concern voiced by the countries surveyed. The selected indicators indicate

that the concept of incorporating domestic determinants, such as public opinion, has the highest explanatory value. In particular, public opinion related to the level of trust and the perceived image and global importance of the institutions (i.e. the European Union) appeared to be the most prominent. The concept of power endowments also offers a reliable understanding of the phenomena. Indicators with such explanatory value include HDI, GDP per capita, R&D spending. Military spending and energy dependence, associated with security considerations, on the other hand, do not adequately describe the levels of dissatisfaction. The role of hegemony, the balance of threat and political endowment provide limited answers. The role of hegemony accounted only for a small amount of the variance. The presence of the United States, as indicated by trade intensity, provides a marginal explanation for dissatisfaction. The presence of Germany or Russia, as indicated by trade intensity, provides no explanation in this research. The geographical proximity element of the balance of threat concept demonstrates that a country located very close or at a greater distance from Russia tends to have lower levels of dissatisfaction. However, a simple linear projection of greater distance does not offer an explanation. The political endowments associated with disintegration driven by right-wing realist ideas corroborate the degree of dissatisfaction only to a limited extent. The right-leaning countries do not consistently indicate a tendency towards lower levels of approval in the surveys. These results are summarized in Figure 17, which depicts a simplified overview.

17. Figure: The figure illustrates the research results on an imaginary scale of explanatory power. The figure is only intended to provide a simplified understanding of the results; no universal conclusions can be drawn from it



How can the findings obtained in this research be translated into a practical setting? (1) With its high explanatory evidence, the concept of considering domestic factors suggests that influencing public perceptions of European Union institutions and altering trust levels can induce changes in approval rates for collective measures such as economic sanctions. Such instruments of influence for a state can be, for instance, communication channels, public speeches, or public opinion polls. (2) With moderate explanatory evidence, the concept of power endowments suggests that countries with greater power endowments are likelier to join collective measures such as economic sanctions. Such instruments of influence can be the provision of development aid, such as regional policy funds or recovery loans from the European Union. (3) The concept of the role of the hegemon suggests that a Member State that is more engaged in bilateral relations with the United States may generate slightly higher approval rates for collective action in cases where such action is also endorsed by the United States. (4) The concept of the balance of threat explains which countries are more likely to approve or disapprove of sanctions depending on their distance from the threatening country. It therefore identifies which geographical locations require more active targeting in order to change approval rates. It is important to stress that in the real context, the level of approval rates may be subject to multivariate casual factors, whereas this research only examined bivariate factors. The author recommends investigating possible related multivariate variables before utilizing the results in actual situations.

In conclusion, realism is a mainstream theory of international relations that dovetails well the different approval rates in the wider European Union and non-European Union contexts. However, the author suggests future research to investigate the different approval rates with alternative theories that can provide further interpretations. In particular, the notion of intergovernmentalism may provide further explanations regarding Member States, while differentiated cooperation may provide further explanations regarding third-country alignment.

VIII. SUMMARY

This research investigates the different approval rates of economic sanctions against the Russian government, companies and individuals among the countries covered by the Standard Eurobarometer 98 and Standard Eurobarometer 99 surveys. The choice of topic is based both on the topicality and salience of the war in Ukraine and on the concerns voiced by Member States about the harmful effects of sanctions. The research problem is framed by the argument that citizens in the countries surveyed have different rates of approval of the economic sanctions

imposed on Russia. On the other hand, it is framed around the realist argument that unitary states fail to align with collective measures. Therefore, the research question is: "Why do approval rates of economic sanctions against the Russian government, companies, and individuals vary across the countries surveyed?" To uncover the differences, the research investigates dissatisfaction through a realist paradigm, more precisely through the concepts of classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. To achieve this, the research employs regression analysis and investigates relative frequencies using descriptive statistics. The findings indicate that the realist paradigm can provide an explanation for the dissatisfaction or concerns voiced by the countries surveyed. The selected indicators demonstrate that the concept of considering domestic factors, such as public opinion, has the highest explanatory value. Concepts centered around power endowments also provide a reliable understanding of the phenomena. The role of hegemons, threat balance, and political endowments provide explanations to a lesser extent.

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X. APPENDICES

Chapter 7 has been included in the Appendix due to page restrictions. It provides detailed elaborations and explanations of the theoretical framework underpinning this research.

7. Theoretical Concepts Applied

7.1 Classical realism - Power Endowments

The research draws on the perspective of classical realism, whereby domestic political differences and diverging worldviews result in divergent foreign policies. The international system is based on fragmentation and tends to reproduce diversity. (Unlike neorealism, this process is not driven by the system, but states diverge in the first place.) (Hoffmann, 1966). The distribution of power can only be understood with respect to the purpose of the power (Rynning, 2011).

The state is essential for the good life of citizens, it guarantees the conditions of security. The state is considered the protector of its territory, its populations and their distinctive and valued way of life. States are primarily motivated by their national interests, and power relations are fundamental feature of international affairs (Gilpin, 1996). States can never rely completely on other states, as all states must pursue their own national interest. International agreements (such as the European Union) are seen as expedient arrangements that can be set aside if they conflict with the vital state interest (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019). No state can be certain that another state will not use its offensive capabilities. Therefore, the most fundamental motive driving the state is survival (Mearsheimer J. , 1994).

How can state power be calculated? The balance of power cannot be calculated precisely, as power is largely unobservable and context-dependent (Nye, 2011). Nevertheless, the power of a state is often defined as its ability to shape world politics in accordance with its interest, based on terms of resources, particularly wealth and military. The approach relies on the logic that states with more wealth and higher military capabilities tend to shape world politics more often in line with their interest. These resources are commonly measured by gross indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) or military spending (Beckley, 2018).

Power can be measured in two ways (Nye, 2011) (Tellis, Layne, & Bially, 2000). The most common approach to focus on tallying (quantifying) the wealth and military assets of states. States can exert influence through wealth, using aid, loans, investments, and payoffs. They can cultivate soft power, which is an ability to attract and co-opt other states. Such soft power is achieved by funding global propaganda campaigns, building skyscrapers, hosting international expositions, or sporting events (Nye, 2004). Whereas military resources enable a country to destroy enemies, attract allies and extract concessions (i.e., allowances) and bribes (i.e., payoff) from

weaker countries by threatening violence and offering protection (Beckley, 2018). In this research, power is considered under such an approach.

The other approach to measuring power focuses on outcomes (Baldwin, 1989) and puts winning in the first place. However, this approach has several weaknesses. It is difficult to assess the overall balance of power as power outcomes are inherently issue specific. To determine which state won the dispute (outcome), it is necessary to know the preferences of each actor involved, i.e., what each state wanted in the first place (Morris, 2002).

This research employs the approach of tallying wealth and military assets of states. Accordingly, states are unitary rational actors that seek to maximize their power. In the presence of power assumptions states seek power and calculate their interest in terms of power (Keohanne, 1986). Power is a fundamental feature of international politics and the necessity of state trumps morality and ethics (Schweller, 1997). In Chapter 8, the research investigates factors that define state power and how they relate to countries' approval of economic sanctions. The following section introduces indicators of state power that were used as independent variables in Chapter 8.1.

Indicators

The research investigates the following indicators to measure the power endowments of states: (1) GDP, (2) GDP growth, (3) military expenditure, (4) R&D expenditure, (5) inflation and (6) energy dependency.

(1) GDP is commonly used to measure the power of states (Beckley, 2018). It is the gross domestic product, and it measures the monetary value of final goods and services which are produced in a country in a given period of time. It counts all outputs generated within the borders of a country. Besides goods and services produced for sale, it includes certain non-market production, such as services provided by the government (education, defense) (Callen, 2008). (2) As an indicator centered on such factors to measure power, this research also considers GDP growth, as changes in real GDP growth are often used to measure whether the average citizen of a country is better off or worse off (Callen, 2008). (3) Military capacities are also widely used to measure the power endowments. Military resources can enable a country to destroy enemies, attract allies and extract concessions (i.e., allowances) and bribes (i.e., kickback/payoff) from weaker countries by threatening violence and offering protection. Therefore, states with such assets tend to shape world politics in line with their interest more often. (Beckley, 2018). (4) The research adopts R&D expenditure as an indicator, as it can provide an indication of a country's economic growth potential. Sustainable economic growth can be achieved through endogenously determined innovation, as innovation has a constant rate of return for human capital employed in R&D sectors. Then it is utilized in the production of final goods and results in permanent increases in the growth rate of output (Ulku, 2004). For this reason, innovation is the key to economic growth, and governments are eager to promote innovation from the resources at their disposal (Cherif, Hasanov, Grimpe, & Sofka, 2022).

(5) This research also investigates inflation since it has become indispensable for managing economies over the last hundred years (O'Neill, Ralph, & Smith, 2018). Inflation reflects a country's economic stability and can be defined as the rate of increase in prices over a given period of time. It typically measures broadly the overall increase of prices and the cost of living in a country (Oner, 2010). The increase in the price level can have adverse effects, as it can lead to a decline in the purchasing power of money (O'Neill, Ralph, & Smith, 2018). Therefore, policymakers seek to stabilize inflation through disinflationary policies. However, endeavors at state-level might have limited effect when inflation is driven by global developments (Oner, 2010).

(6) The research also employs the HDI as an indicator that gives implicit consideration to power endowments. It focuses on capacities, taking into account other factors such as life expectancy, literacy, and school enrollment (Callen, 2008). The root of the indicator is the capabilities approach to well-being (Sen, 1985). Capabilities are defined as features of individuals and their state of life that determine what activities and internal experiences a person can effectively (in fact) choose. A direct value on freedom in the practical sense what an individual can do is emphasized through the approach. The concrete list of core capabilities includes among others life expectancy, health, freedom from violence and coercion, freedom to determine one's own life path, property rights or political participation (Nussbaum, 2011). The United Nations Development Program defines HDI as a summary measure of average achievement in three key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. It is a geometric mean of normalized indices for the three dimensions, it transforms well-being into a single yearly index to rate a countries performance (Benjamin, Cooper, Heffetz, & Kimball, 2021).

(7) This research also considers energy dependency as an indicator of power endowments, as it can indicate a country's ability to achieve energy security. Energy security considered to be a multidimensional issue which must consider societal, geopolitical, and technical development (Jaaskelainen, Hoysniemi, Syri, & Tynkkynen, 2018). The European Union have taken measures to address a potential energy crisis following the natural gas supply crises in 2006 and 2009, and it has developed a European energy security strategy in 2014 (Jaaskelainen, Hoysniemi, Syri, & Tynkkynen, 2018). It has received the most attention arising from the disruptions in 2006 and 2009 (Jirusek, Vlcek, & Henderson, 2017) and following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In addressing energy dependence, a key consideration must be traditional energy sources such as coal, natural gas and oil considered to be the most effective drivers for economic growth (Ellaban, Abu-Rub, & Hurlin, 2014). However, energy relations between the EU and Russia centered on natural gas supplies. On the other hand, coal and oil are traded on global basis which results highly liquid and transparent price-setting mechanisms (Jirusek, Vlcek, & Henderson, 2017). Hence, the primary focus of this research is on the dependence on gas.

7.2 Classical realism – Political Endowments

The research derives support from a classical realist review of the European development and integration over the last decades. According to such a review, European integration in the postwar Europe created an institutional architecture and normative foundation that reduced the fear and uncertainty among states and marginalized material capability calculations among a wide range of actors in foreign policy (Belloni, 2016). As a counterpoint, current political changes indicate that the Europhoria has faded in Europe. A shift from multilateralism to bilateralism or unilateralism is appearing, driven by the political right. This seems to undermine liberalism and the architecture of multilateral institutions that have been the basis since the World War II (Viotti, 2019). Perceived insecurity and lack of trust in “civilizing” are becoming more prevalent (Koskenniemi, 2010) giving space for the explicative role of the realist perspective (Belloni & Sala, 2019).

The shift coincides with a rightward, nationalist turn in domestic politics. Several events, such as the rise of Vladimir Putin and Russia's nationalist policies, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, President Donald Trump's administration in the United States, or the rising nationalist sentiments in European countries, raise these concerns. The phenomena challenge the post-World War liberal initiatives, such as the increasing opening of borders, the reliance on international organizations, the maintenance of international

monetary liquidity, the arms control and reduced allocation of military spending, as well as the global promotion of economic development, democracy, and human rights. The events suggests that the system of international relations is returning to realist geopolitics (Viotti, 2019). Therefore, the concept can be useful to explain the different approval rates of sanctions. Furthermore, the research investigates in Chapter 8.2 whether right-wing political leadership has an impact on the surveyed countries' approval rates of economic sanctions.

7.3 Neorealism - Role of hegemons

The research also employs neorealism, which focuses centrally on the structure of the international system and introduces the idea of domination by hegemons. In terms of structure, the theory asserts that the international stability is based on the bipolar system, similar to that existed earlier between the United States and Soviet Union. Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted a less stable multipolar system (Waltz, 1979). After the temporary unipolarity attained by the United States as hegemon, it gradually diminished. More recent neorealist scholars argue that the gradual decline of the United States as a hegemon and external moderator resulted in the return of intra-European power politics (Mearsheimer J. , 2010). In terms of hegemons, the hegemons can influence cost benefit calculations of states by providing collective goods to overcome certain problems (Kindleberger, 1973). Without a hegemon it is likely that the great power rivalries reemerge in Europe (Zimmermann H. , 2021).

Contrary to classical realism, the diverse foreign policies do not originate from diverse domestic interests, but they originate from the system. The CSDP is driven by deep structural changes. It is defined by the relative power of great powers and occasionally also by geography (Rynning, 2011). However, there is a debate between neorealists, who divide the theory into three groups. Scholars might view CSDP as (1) the precursor (forerunner) to the balance of American power, or (2) as mean to maintain America engagement in the Euro-Atlantic region, or (3) as a balance of German power.

Contemporary neorealist research is concerned with the idea of whether the United States still fulfills a dominant hegemonic role in the world. Since the 1990s, especially since the financial crisis in 2008, It is argued that the unipolar movement of the United States is being swept (blown) away due to the rise of new powers (Beckley, 2018). Concerns also center on the observation that United States during the administration of President Donald Trump shifted away from its hegemon leadership tasks. It decreased its interest in the liberal institutions and cooperative processes. It stated a question if the United States is under a temporary phenomenon of domestic politics and if it will continue to sustain the cooperation (Viotti, 2019). However, Beckley (2018) argues that the United States is waning as a hegemon and hence proposes that claims about the rise of China are based on gross indicators. He argues that the United States economic and military lead over China is much larger when cost accounted for. Likewise, the overall trends lean predominantly in favor of the United States (Beckley, 2018).

The role of the United States as a hegemon also appears with regards to economic sanctions. The United States is considered to be in privileged position with immense market power and informationally and financially embedded hubs (nodes) in the global economy. Therefore, it has used economic sanctions as a tool one of the most frequently (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016). In addition, research suggests that the United States is likely to showcase coercion and exert pressure, make promises or impose threat on other actors to adopt a similar set of sanctions (Martins, 1992). In this context, it is argued that the United State exert pressure on the European Union to accept sanctions against Russia. Some research findings obtained from elite interviews with decision-makers have highlighted that there is a coercion and co-adjustment effect. Decision-makers in the European Union have

to respond pressure exerted by the United States and moreover, adapt the design of sanctions with regards to information retrieved from the United States (Meissner, 2023). The European Union looks at the United States as a pioneer, who sets the benchmark of appropriate reaction to the target's misconduct (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006).

In the case of trade relations with Russia, the European Union has much more significant trade relations with Russia than the United States or other member of the Coalition. The European Union accounted for 41 percentage of Russian imports prior to the invasion (in 2014), while the United States accounted only for 2.3 percentage (Hausmann, Schetter, & Yildirim, 2022). Therefore, despite the fact that the economy of United States and its market power overreaches the European Union, the effect of sanctions imposed by European Union can be much more impactful. However, Member States are more likely to be harmed by such sanctions (Tsouloufas & Rochat, 2023). Economic factors of this kind potentially led to the European Union emulating the behavior of the United States during the events of 2014. The European Union in several steps met on the same day when the United States announced further sanctions and agreed on similar restrictions. The United States exercised pressure on the European Union to move to a full economic sanction package (Speck, 2016). Therefore, the research investigates in Chapter 8.3 if trade relations with Germany, Russia or the United States might affect the Member States' approval rate of economic sanctions.

This chapter referred above to the recognition of Germany as a new regional hegemon in Europe by various scholars. In line with this argument, scholars argue that Germany due to the perceived security threat and fear of military capabilities of Russia, after some hesitation acted as a hegemon in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. The country strongly expressed its opposition to the close economic ties with Russia, pushing its European partners for economic sanctions (Karolewski & Cross, 2017). It was reflected in clear offensive language and coercive diplomacy, accompanied with the introduction of sanctions in 2014 (Forsberg, 2016). The use of such a coercive foreign policy tool has made clear that Russia did not act in line with the international law. In addition, academics note that the country's leadership role was highly praised by European Union partners (Hellmann, 2016). Academic scholarship advocating Germany's regional hegemonic role also argues that the country's foreign policy has changed in the last three decades, and now Germany is expected to take the lead in Europe (Hellmann, 2016). An ongoing gradual process can be seen since the 1990s in Germany's today self-conception. It changes to a more proactive, assertive and offensive foreign policy, aiming to maximize its influence and pursue national interest (Reichwein, 2019).

On the other hand, Germany receives critics for failing to act as a hegemon during the recent European crises (Matthijs, 2016) (Webber, 2019). Critics claim that shortly after the temporary unification of the Member States through Germany's active leadership, certain Member States started to make progress towards Russia (Zimmermann H. , 2021). In addition, the backing of the United States seen as an essential trigger for the eventual adoption of sanctions (Mearsheimer J. , 2014) (Speck, 2016). It is also questions with regards to energy supplies if Germany is able to become independent of Russia (Saxer, 2022).

The research examines the share of trading partners as an indicator, as trade policy is argued to be driven in the different regions of the world by the logic of competition and rivalry with other major economic powers (Meissner K. , 2018). From a neorealist perspective, the behavior of actors in the integrated world economy is that states continue to use their power and they implement policies with the aim to change economic relations favorable to their own national interest. They aim to receive from the international economic activities (such as trade) a

favorable share of the gains, and preserve their national autonomy (Gilpin, 2001). On the other hand, trade can generate security externalities that can positively or negatively affect their power. Therefore, trade plays an important role in the overall security of states (Gowa, 1994).

7.4 Neorealism - Balance of threat

The research also argues the findings according to which sanctions are closely related to geopolitical concerns. A sanctions design can be influenced by geopolitical concerns and it can influence the behavior of the sender (Drezner D. , 1999). These geopolitical concerns in the context of threats are namely the political and security threat arising from the target country (Binder, 2015). The sender is more likely to apply harsher ("hard") sanctions in situations related to security threat, with the aim to coerce targets (Giumelli, 2010).

The balance of threat theory approaches the geographical concerns from four aspects: aggregating power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intention (Walt, 1987). Aggregating power refers to the total resources of a state (Bock, Henneberg, & Plank, 2015), somewhat in line with the emphasis of classical realism. Offensive power can be understood as a term for the ability to launch some kind of attack on an actor's interests (Person, 2017) while aggressive intentions as the way states perceive a potential enemy (Bock, Henneberg, & Plank, 2015). Offensive power in relation to Russia is partially addressed in this study by examining power endowments and the trade partner share. The level of Russia's aggressive intentions is anticipated to be the uniform in the countries surveyed. The research focuses on geographical proximities, which pertains to the distance between potential adversaries. Increasing the distance means that "the ability to project power" is more limited and so is the potential threat (Bock, Henneberg, & Plank, 2015). Therefore, in the research the distance from the Russian border is used as an indicator in Chapter 8.4.

7.5 Neoclassical realism – Domestic Society

Neoclassical realism differs from the other two types of realism because it connects realism with domestic society, it introduces the internal characteristics of states. These internal characteristics include among others the level of societal cohesion (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009). The theory argues that the international structure constraint states although it not ultimately specifies leadership policies (Sorensen, Moller, & Jackson, 2019). Meanwhile states are facing anarchy, state behavior is conditional on domestic preferences. Four clusters of domestic variables are emphasized: the strategic culture, the images and perceptions of foreign policy decision makers, the role of domestic institutions, and the state-society relations (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). This research connects public opinion as a component of domestic political decisions that influences state behavior. Consistent with neoclassical scholarship, it suggests that policymakers take public opinion into account when formulating foreign policies and decisions.

The research employs public opinion on trust as an indicator. Trust is often perceived as trust in people, yet trust can also be addressed to organizations (Nooteboom, 2002). Trust can be defined as a psychological state that involves the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about the intentions of an actor (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Such an object of trust can be an organization (Karens, Eshuis, Klijn, & Voets, 2016), as in this research the European institutions. Trust is multidimensional and one of its dimensions is competence, which refers to the capacity and professionalism of government (Karens, Eshuis, Klijn, & Voets, 2016). This implies whether a government is actually able to create and implement policies that achieve its goals

(Hetherington, 1998). The research therefore also addresses the perception of the European Union's global voice and image. The importance of such an indicator is also supported by earlier findings that point to a common intuitive assumption that the European Union would be more effective on the global stage if its Member States spoke with one voice (Conceicao-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). Similarly, during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, policymakers and media analysts urged that the European Union speak with one voice in order to have a greater impact on Russia's actions (Conceicao-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). In addition, financial and economic considerations are investigated as indicators, in line with the argument that economic sanctions can have distributional effects at the expense of domestic actors in the sender country (Giumelli, 2017) and sanctions can inflict unsustainable economic damage to the sender (Schropp & Tsigas, 2023).

14. Excel File: Kohut_Atila_FIMB_Appendix

To detail the data used in the regression models, an Excel file was submitted with the SSA paper. Presented below is the Excel sheet 4.1 "Regression Analysis", which summarizes the results of the regression analyses and the conclusions in Chapter 10 and Chapter 11.

LINEAR REGRESSION						
independent variable	Eub. survey number	coefficient of determination (R^2)	p-value	intercept	slope coefficient	conclusion
State endowments						
GDP per capita	Std 98	0,274	0,0005	59,726	0	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining moderate portion of variance
	Std 99	0,186	0,00444	59,487	0	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
GDP total	Std 98	0,012	0,241	68,763	0,241	no statical significance
	Std 99	0,012	0,238	67,54	0	no statical significance
Real GDP growth in 2023	Std 98	0,02	0,194	74,19	-2,648	no statical significance
	Std 99	0	0,328	72,635	-2,216	no statical significance
Real GDP growth 2021 2022	Std 98	0.013	0.234	75.527	1.394	no statical significance
	Std 99	-0.001	0.336	74.058	1.285	no statical significance
Real GDP growth 2021 2023	Std 98	-0,019	0,568	74,339	0,626	no statical significance
	Std 99	-0,028	0,866	70,946	0,205	no statical significance
Military expenditure GDP %	Std 98	-0,023	0,662	73,52	-1,708	no statical significance
	Std 99	-0,023	0,679	72,648	-1,788	no statical significance
Military expenditure USD	Std 98	-0,006	0,378	69,407	0	no statical significance
	Std 99	0,001	0,319	68,067	0	no statical significance
R&D expenditure GDP %	Std 98	0,244	0,0013	57,088	8,828	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining moderate portion of variance
	Std 99	0,182	0,00554	56,278	8,415	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
	Std 98	0,059	0,0794	79,108	-1,269	weak statical significance + explaining minor portion of variance

	Std 99	0,045	0,109	78,215	-1,285	no statical significance
Inflation rate in 2023	Std 98	0,042	0,117	75,305	-0,533	no statical significance
	Std 99	0,014	0,228	0,228	-0.455	no statical significance
Inflation rate 2021 2022	Std 98	0,055	0,0868	75,917	-0,547	weak statical significance + explaining minor portion of variance
	Std 99	0,022	0,187	74,192	-0,469	no statical significance
Inflation rate 2021 2023	Std 98	0,069	0,0643	75,786	-0,968	weak statical significance + explaining minor portion of variance
	Std 99	0,03	0,157	74,057	-0.826	no statical significance
HDI	Std 98	0,465	2,05E-06	-99.876	1.935	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
	Std 99	0,303	2,49E-04	-84.685	1.751	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining moderate portion of variance
Natural gas import dependency	Std 98	0,045	0,11	70.653	-0,012	no statical significance
	Std 99	0,03	0,16	69,761	-0,012	no statical significance
Imports from Russia in natural gas	Std 98	0,082	0,0767	80,153	-0,138	weak statical significance + explaining minor portion of variance
	Std 99	0,036	0,167	77,845	-0,123	no statical significance
potential Russian supply shut-off	Std 98	0,059	0,114	80.389	16.571	no statical significance
	Std 99	0,013	0,254	77.834	13.877	no statical significance
US export	Std 98	0,13	0,0161	64,824	1,129	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
	Std 99	0.115	0,0226	63,522	1,186	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
US import	Std 98	0,121	0,0197	63,271	2,008	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
	Std 99	0,114	0,0235	61,709	2,158	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
RU export	Std 98	-0,013	0,475	72,299	-0,634	no statical significance
	Std 99	-0.012	0,46	71,513	-0,724	no statical significance
RU import	Std 98	0,053	0,092	75,466	-1,116	weak statical significance + explaining minor portion of variance

	Std 99	0,02	0,198	73,766	-0,949	no statical significance
DE export	Std 98	-0,013	0,467	74,005	-0,216	no statical significance
	Std 99	0	0,324	74,604	-0,322	no statical significance
DE import	Std 98	-0,001	0,329	64,23	0,441	no statical significance
	Std 99	-0.019	0,56	65,381	0,293	no statical significance
Public opinion						
EU trust	Std 98	0,398	1,71E-05	25.376	0,92	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
	Std 99	0,4	1,63E-05	17.201	1,029	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
EU Council trust	Std 98	0,43	6,34E-06	28.768	0,918	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
	Std 99	0,451	3,24E-06	13.695	1,166	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
EU image positivity	Std 98	0,143	0,012	42.944	0,598	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining small portion of variance
	Std 99	0,243	0,00113	32.288	0,766	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining moderate portion of variance
EU's global voice importance	Std 98	0.467	1,91E-06	-12,347	1,176	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
	Std 99	0,468	1,82E-06	-23,185	1,328	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + explaining large portion of variance
Personal financial consequences	Std 98	0.024	0.178	88.153	-0.273	no statical significance
	Std 99	-0,017	0.533	78.103	-0.138	no statical significance
Country economic consequences	Std 98	-0,017	0.54	55.496	0.185	no statical significance
	Std 99	0.023	0.488	30.606	0.183	no statical significance
POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION						
Proximity	Std 98	0,2176	0,0154	80,7253	-0,0318	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining moderate portion of variance
	Std 99	0,2123	0,0173	79,6396	-0,0335	statical significance proves that the relationship of the two variables are connected + but explaining moderate portion of variance

