

Borges Anderson**Populism as a Challenge in the Democratic Practice***(Berlin)*

Populism poses a twofold task to current political philosophy: on the one hand, there is a need to diagnose the reason why populism occurs; on the other hand, there is a necessity to identify its demands or, at least, enable possible overcoming strategies to this challenge. In this case a political philosophical account intended to scrutiny this phenomenon has to be attuned to social philosophy in order to question political and social factors across contexts where this phenomenon arises. The explanatory reason for this theoretical constellation can be understood through a pragmatic and realistic perspective in order to identify social and political demands that determine adequate normative solution to the existing political structure without succumbing to a moralist fantasy.

Barbara Biháryová**Populism – Ideology or Political Practice and Discourse?***(Bratislava)*

The term 'populism' is today so often inflected to universities, as well as to the actual political scene, in the media and in public. However, it is a matter of fact that this term is used in our society, but only few know what does it mean exactly. In my talk I will therefore analyze the very concept of populism as an ideology and as a political practice and discourse. In the first part of the talk I will discuss the main characteristics of populism and its classification. In the second part of the talk the attention will be paid to the analysis and interpretation of some theories of populism.

Finally, I will try to answer the following question: Is populism ideology or political practice and discourse?

Kamil Cekiera**Can There Be an Autonomous Philosophical Method?***(Wrocław)*

In his 1998 paper *Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy* G. Bealer defends the claim according to which philosophy can be pursued in a *a priori* fashion, autonomously in regard to real science. On this view, it is possible because of the reliance on the faculty of intuition. This outlook is consistent with the popular metaphilosophical picture holding that current analytic philosophers make significant use of intuitions in philosophical practice. However, many philosophers (especially those with the naturalistic attitude) do not believe that philosophy can go completely without at least some influence of real science. In my presentation I am going to argue for the latter claim. Firstly, I will try to show why conceptual analysis cannot be treated as an autonomous philosophical method. Secondly, I will point out some reasons to believe that philosophical analysis needs to be supplemented by the findings from empirical science.

Milan Cmár**Bookchin's Social Ecology***(Pardubice)*

The goal of this contribution is to highlight Murray Bookchin's Social Ecology in the context of environmental ethics. Social Ecology is an alternative environmental movement which connects the environmental crisis with the social crisis. It follows that Bookchin is convinced that the roots of environmental crisis are based on the social system and relations. Is it possible that the change of political system will also revise human's perception of nature's value? The further aim is to compare Bookchin's theory with other trends in environmental ethics.

Marcel Čas**On the Intellectual Causes of the Reemergence of Radical Politics***(Bratislava)*

In the last decade we are witnesses of a reemergence of radical politics. The corollary is that establishment politics is disappearing and that there is a widespread loss of faith in traditional institutions. Much has been said as to the causes of these phenomena. Intellectuals are quick to point out that at the heart of the problem is the lay public which is incapable to understand the society properly and therefore clings to easy answers. The aim of this paper is to ascertain the contrary notion, that the causes lie more in the disconnectedness of establishment intellectuals from the lay society.

Áron Dombrovski**A Problem for Modal Fictionalism in a Kripkean Framework***(Budapest)*

The main aim of modal fictionalists is to use the language of possible worlds without the ontological cost of literal commitment to such worlds by treating them as fictional entities, which obviously don't exist. However, I will argue in my presentation that accepting the main theories of meaning and reference, the fictionalists' project is failed. The reason is that – according to Kripke's book *Reference and Existence* – fictions and fictional entities actually exist in our world, because these entities are required to express meaningful sentences in the fictional discourse according to the mentioned semantical theories. My conclusion is that if the fiction of *Sherlock Holmes*, and if Sherlock Holmes itself exists, then the fiction of possible worlds, and the possible worlds themselves also have to exist.