

Contents

Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava

Paul Armstrong: Truth in Fiction and Responsibility	13
Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge: Fictionalism and the Semantics of Fictional Discovery	17
Christopher Brown: Truth in Fiction via Non-Standard Truth Functions	19
Michael Curd: Fictional Truth	23

Book of Abstracts

Carrie Harvey: Fiction	25
Elizabeth Archer: Counterfactual Models, Fiction, and the Understanding	26
Artis Domschke: Do Fictional Names Refer? Kratzer and Salmon on Negative Existential Statements	28
Maximilian Forstner: The Double Aspect of Fictional Artifacts	33
Martina Ghisla: Counterfactuals in Fictional Reference Models	35
Harold Ginzburg: Fictional Objects: A Quasi-Realist Approach	41
Frank Hahn: How to Pick Out Dragons	43
Luiza Adina: Fiction, Truth, and Truth	44
Sui-Fan Lee: The Semantics of Empty Names (II): Counterfactual Reference	44
Andreas Lorenz: The Semantics of Truth and Fictional Objects	47
Ulrich Muehlhölzer: Fictional Truth and Understanding	49
James M. Studdert: Reference and Fictional Objects	55
Philosophy of Language (I): Semantics & Fictional Discourse	57

Contents

Plenary lectures

Stacie FRIEND: Reference in Fiction	7
Petr KOŤÁTKO: Fictional Names, Fictional Characters and Persons Referred to in Narrative Fiction	8
Alberto VOLTOLINI: The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances	12

Contributed lectures

Paal ANTONSEN: Truth in Fiction and Indexicality	15
Bradley ARMOUR-GARB & James A. WOODBRIDGE: Fictionalism and the Semantics of Fictional Discourse	17
Christopher BADURA: Truth in Fiction via Non-Standard Belief Revision	19
Marina BAKALOVA: Pretended Truth and Its Truth Makers	22
Carola BARBERO: What Kind of Creatures Are Fictional Characters?	23
Elizabeth Amber CANTALAMESSA: Models, Fictions, and Understanding	28
Áron DOMBROVSKI: Do Fictional Names Refer? Kripke and Salmon on Negative Existential Statements	31
Matthieu FONTAINE: The Double-Aspect of Abstract Artifacts	33
Manuel GARCÍA-CARPINTERO: Is Fictional Reference Rigid?	35
Daniela GLAVANIČOVÁ: Fictional Entities: A Quasi-Realist Approach	37
Fredrik HARALDSEN: How to Pick Out Dragons	39
László KAJTÁR: Fiction Cannot Be True	42
Siu-Fan LEE: The Semantics of Empty Names (II): Counterfactual Reference	44
Anders PETTERSSON: The Ontology of Texts and Textual Elements	49
Göran ROSSHOLM: Fictional Truths and Understanding	53
Fredrik STJERNBERG: Bivalence and Fictional Creationism	55
Megan STOTTS: Compliance, Not Truth: Explaining Our Practice of Correcting Statements about Fiction	57
Lee WALTERS: Fictional Characters as Representations	59
Nathan WILDMAN & Christian FOLDE: The Upper Limits of Fictional Truth?	61
Zsófia ZVOLENSZKY: A Common Problem for Possible-Worlds Analyses of Deontic and Fictional Discourse	62

3. Possible solutions

a. Understanding in Science. Many philosophers of science take scientific understanding to be a cognitive achievement that can be composed of non-propositional explanations and processes such as manipulation, visualization, and modal reasoning (Lipton 2009). Additionally, it is not a necessary feature of literary works that they cannot contribute to our understanding of the actual world. Christine Elgin has argued that artworks also promote understanding of real world phenomena through the process of exemplification. I augment her argument by noting that pretense is involved in exemplification and can contribute to non-propositional explanations such as visualization and counterfactual reasoning.

Margaret Morrison (2015) has suggested that abstract mathematical representations are constitutive of our understanding of concrete physical phenomena, such as phase transitions and population drifts. Thus, it seems reasonable for abstract artifacts to give rise to understanding of concrete phenomena.

b. Semantic Inferentialism. Finally, perhaps it will be most useful to steer model discourse away from the idea that scientists are seeking "truths" about the phenomena under study. To sketch briefly, even if models are abstract artifacts it seems practitioners can evaluate models by comparing the successes of their respective material inferential consequences. Model builders and users are committed to the content of certain concepts in virtue of the inferences endorsed by their use. Experts then gain understanding¹ of concepts through the exploration of various "material inferential practices." This is why, for one, any model that instantiates equations for non-resorting linear force will be inconsistent with models that represent linear restoring force. The models each pretend to take the concept of force to *mean* something different and this is cached out in terms of the material inferences and their relevant appropriate consequences.²

Scientists, then, are the primary candidates for knowledge and expertise regarding the concepts relevant to their target system.³ However, I also want to suggest that semantic inferentialism may help make sense of not only how practitioners learn about the actual system but also how they can assert comparison claims between models, and between models and the actual system, thus contributing to scientific progress.

¹ Mastering a concept consists in "practically mastering the circumstances under which one becomes entitled to endorse a claim" (Brandom 64).

² Toon admits that the principles of generation governing a model's fictional world are "more difficult to specify explicitly" and "will vary from case to case" (12) and imaginings also include what sorts of inferences are considered "good" under that system.

³ According to Godfrey-Smith, a deflationary account can be given whereby model practitioners are understood to be "making claims about deductive relations, conditionals, and so on" (19).

Do Fictional Names Refer?

Kripke and Salmon on Negative Existential Statements

ÁRON DOMBROVSKI

(Pázmány Péter Catholic University)

The aim of my presentation is to give a comprehensive interpretation of Kripke's new book, *Reference and Existence – The John Locke Lectures*, focusing on the issues of the sentences containing empty names, especially the negative existential statements. After that, I will discuss Nathan Salmon's critique of Kripke's theory, showing that Kripke fails to solve the problem. However, I will argue that we can save the rigid designation thesis using Salmon's own theory, which is based on Kripke's ideas, avoiding its mistakes.

In the first section, I sketch the main problem of the *empty names* – names like Harry Potter or Sherlock Holmes, which doesn't have reference – and the *negative existential statements*, which denies the existence of something. Consider the following sentence:

- (1) Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist.

What is the problem with the statement above for a Kripkean? It is well argued, mainly by David Kaplan and Scott Soames, that if you are committed to the rigid designation thesis, you also have to commit yourself to the *direct reference theory* (DR for short). According to DR, a proper name's exclusive semantic content is its reference. One of the consequences of the DR is the neo-Russellian theory of propositions. In general, the propositional theory explains that a sentence has a meaning because it expresses a proposition. By the neo-Russellian theory, things which are referred to in a sentence, are fundamental elements of a proposition. Thus, if the referred thing doesn't exist, as in the case of the empty names, the sentence can't express a proposition, and therefore it can't have any meaning or truth value. However, we all understand and accept the truth of sentences like (1).

In the second section, I introduce Kripke's proposal to the problem, by discussing three distinctions. The first is the distinction between the different uses of fictional names. According to Kripke, when Conan Doyle writes his stories, he uses the name 'Sherlock Holmes' with no reference, merely *pretending to refer* to a brilliant detective – let's call this usage Holmes₁. While Conan Doyle writes his stories, a metaphysical and a semantical phase happens: Doyle creates a fictional character, which is an abstract artefact, and the name Holmes₁ begins to refer to it. Let's call this name with a reference Holmes₂. The second distinction is between the interpretation of the sentences in the fictional discourse. We can distinguish an in-the-story reading, where sentences like 'Sherlock Holmes plays the violin' are literally true (because according to the story, Holmes actually plays violin), from an out-and-out reading, where such sentences are false (because according to facts in our actual world, Holmes can't play the violin, he is just a fictional

character). In the third place, the distinction between the object-fictional sentences, that we usually use in an everyday fictional discourse, and meta-fictional sentences, which we can make up from them with the story operator 'according to fiction *f*, *p*' are also important. For example, from the upper object-fictional sentence 'Sherlock Holmes plays the violin' we can make its meta-fictional pair: 'According to *Sherlock Holmes* stories, Sherlock Holmes plays the violin'. Meta-fictional sentences bear a different meaning and work the opposite way than its object-fictional pair.

Using the distinctions introduced above, we can distinguish four interpretations of the sentences of the fictional discourse and of the negative existential statements like (1):

- (2) [Holmes₁ doesn't exist]_{outside the story}
- (3) [Holmes₁ doesn't exist]_{in the story}
- (4) [Holmes₂ doesn't exist]_{outside the story}
- (5) [Holmes₂ doesn't exist]_{in the story}

Interpretation (2) describes a fact in our world, but it lacks of meaning, because it uses an empty name. In (3) the same problem could occur, but in this case, Kripke has a solution: in a complex 'story-telling language game' we base the truth value of the object-fictional sentence to its meta-fictional pair, thus (3) is false, in the story Holmes really exists. Statement (4) is also false, because in our actual world Sherlock Holmes as an abstract artefact does exist, created by Conan Doyle. Statement (5) is false again: in the story a flesh and blood Sherlock Holmes exists – which is Holmes₁ – not an abstract artefact.

Unfortunately, using (1), we would like to express its interpretation (2), the fact that in our actual world, a flesh and blood Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist, but according to the analysis above, we just can't say it is meaningful. Kripke's suggestion is that (1) is a special case and we interpret it as 'no such true proposition that Holmes₁ exists'. This account is surely not a persuasive one, and Salmon shows that indeed, it does not work.

In the third section, I introduce Salmon's own solution to the problem, which mainly stands on two bases. Firstly, Salmon rejects the distinction between the different uses of fictional names: when I use the name 'Sherlock Holmes', I *always* refer to an abstract entity. It might feel odd that our beloved stories are about abstract entities, but Salmon sets up an illustrative analogy with the movies: for example, in the *Godfather*, we merely pretend that Marlon Brando is Don Corleone. Reading a fictional story of an abstract entity, we use the same method, pretending that the abstract entity is a brilliant detective named Sherlock Holmes. So the problem of the empty names is eliminated, there are no empty names at all. What about the negative existential statements? Salmon applies a Russellian approach here and introduces the descriptive use of the proper name: sometimes we say sentences like 'Peter is an Einstein' or 'John is a Romeo', which are not expressing identities, but are predicates, such as Peter is very clever, or John is a romantic man. According to Salmon, using sentence (1), we would like to assign a meaning such as 'there is no such person as Holmes more or less as

he is actually depicted in the stories', or best: 'there is no such person who is both Holmes and Holmesesque'. At the end of his article, Salmon argues that this solution doesn't violate the DR, because this nonstandard usage of the name is parasitic of the more fundamental and usual usage of the fictional character's name.

With Salmon's theory I can conclude that the issue of the negative existential statements is not an inevitable problem for Kripke's rigid designation thesis – however he can't solve this problem in his *John Locke Lectures* in 1973.

The Double-Aspect of Abstract Artifacts

MATTHIEU FONTAINE

(UMR CNRS STL Lille, University of Sevilla)

According to the Artifactual Theory of Fiction (ATF), as defined by Thomasson [1999], fictional characters are abstract artifacts created by their authors. I argue that abstract artifacts must be conceived as *double-aspected* entities; i.e., entities that appear as abstract artifacts according to an external perspective on fiction, but as concrete entities from an internal perspective. I thus propose a combination of the ATF to a semantics for the fictionality operator, as introduced by Woods [1974]. Such a combination is necessary to fill some gaps in the ATF. The semantics is defined with respect to a modal framework, on the basis of the *world-lines* semantics of Hintikka [1975]. To begin, I will outline the Thomasson's ATF and its limits, by reference to some significant objections, including some of Voltolini [2006] and Everett [2005]. Then, I will give a general explanation of modal (fictional) individuals in terms of *world-lines* and I will define the semantics for the fictionality operator in a modal framework. I will finally attempt to answer some objections we will have referred to. In this abstract, I only give some general motivations.

To begin, Thomasson's [1999] makes use of the notion of ontological dependency to define the existence and identity conditions of abstract artifacts, in order to explain the reference to fictional characters. For example, Holmes exists as an abstract artifact that has been created by Conan Doyle. Roughly, Holmes is historically rigidly dependent on Conan Doyle: nobody else than Conan Doyle could have created Holmes, and Holmes could not have existed if Conan Doyle had not existed. Then, Holmes survives its author's death in a cultural and linguistic community as long as there exist some copies of the original work and some peoples able to read the novels: it is said that Holmes is constantly generically dependent on the existence of copies and readers. The dependency is only generic, because no copy and nobody in particular is required. The dependency is constant, because Holmes would cease to exist if there were no more copy or someone able to read the novels. Given that ontological dependency is intrinsically a modal notion, it seems natural to define it in a modal framework constituted of possible worlds and instants