

The November 2015 terror attack in Paris: case summary and legal aspects

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Abstract

*“Jihadists travelling from Europe to Syria and other hotspots in great numbers are a serious problem for European internal security. Urgent action needs to be taken.”*¹ – These sentences have been written by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in a report to the Council two years before the 2015 Paris attacks. This clearly highlights the importance and seriousness of the question of having effective legal instruments which are able to prevent radicalization (and consequently terrorist attacks) and to tackle the issue of foreign fighters returning from Syria (or elsewhere) to the European Union.

The purpose of this article is primarily to introduce the November 2015 Paris Attacks with special focus on the details of the case in relation to the relevant French and EU regulations. We firmly believe that a complex approach is necessary and indeed useful, therefore the facts of the case will be discussed in detail, including methodological aspects for criminal tactics usage. It will be shown that there is a strong relationship between the attacks and the foreign fighters issue, as at least some of the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks were EU citizens returned from Syria.²

Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, Paris attack, border control, foreign fighters

¹ Foreign fighters and returnees from a counter-terrorism perspective, in particular with regard to Syria. Report from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. 9946/13. May 2013. <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/jul/eu-council-terr-coordinator-syria-9946-13.pdf> (5 January 2019)

² Piotr Bąkowski & Laura Puccio: *Foreign fighters – Member State responses and EU action*, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2016 p. 3. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf> (22 December 2018)

1. Introduction

Terrorism, as an international phenomenon, is not one of today's novelties. An ancient Chinese definition has already reflected the foundations of today's terrorism: *"Kill one to intimidate ten thousand!"*³

We can find terrorism in antique Greek and Roman civilizations as well. However, it can be stated regardless that terrorism is typically a 20th century phenomenon, which became a major problem only after the Second World War.⁴ The renaissance of terrorism was clearly in 2001, when it underwent some major changes and started to emerge as a global risk factor.⁵

Without a proper definition effective cooperative work is unimaginable on the international level.

Of course, many attempts had been made to define terrorism or terrorist acts, but these attempts for the common definitions were total resultless until nowadays.

At the European regional level, the 2017/541/EU Directive has adopted a definition binding on the EU Member States, which has to be also quoted here. An offence⁶ should be qualified as a terrorist offence *"when and insofar as committed with a specific terrorist aim, namely to seriously intimidate a population, to unduly compel a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The threat to commit such intentional acts should also be considered to be a terrorist offence when it is established, on the basis of objective circumstances, that such threat was made with any such terrorist aim."*⁷

In the light of the definitions, one can easily conclude that the November 2015 Paris attacks – the deadliest terrorist attack in Europe since the Madrid bombings in 2004 – were likely terrorist offences. It is also meaningful, that the Directive gives a clear definition, for it is binding on the EU Member States – and thus also France.

[m1] megjegyzést írt: ez csak a szubjektív elem – az EU definíció két elemből áll, az objektív, hogy milyen bcse-el követhető el, és a szubjektív, hogy milyen célból

³ Béres János: *Napjaink muszlim terrorizmusának gyökerei és visszaszorítási lehetőségei*, PhD Értekezés, ZMNE Hadtudományi Doktori Iskola, Budapest, 2008, p. 10.

http://uni-nke.hu/downloads/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2008/beres_janos.pdf (31 June 2018)

⁴ Prof. Dr. Gál István László PhD: *A terrorizmus finanszírozása*, PTE Állam- és Jogtudományi kar Gazdasági Büntetőjogi Kutatóintézet, Pécs, 2010, p. 6.

⁵ Dávid Ferenc: *A terrorizmus és nemzetbiztonság az ezredforduló jogalkotásában*, Szakmai Szemle, 2013/1, p. 44.

⁶ The offences (serious crimes) which may be considered as terrorist acts are exhaustively listed in the Directive.

⁷ DIRECTIVE (EU) 2017/541 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision [2002/475/JHA] and amending Council Decision [2005/671/JHA]. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541> (10 January 2019)

II. The 13th November 2015 Paris attacks⁸

The attacks did not come as a surprise. In the past 30 years, French jihadists were involved in conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, which affected the French national security in terms of recruitment, support, propaganda, or terrorist acts. A research conducted in 2013 found that 11 percent (one in nine) foreign fighters returned to Western Europe to perpetrate attacks.⁹ According to Marc Trevidic, who was the leading French counterterrorism judge, 50 percent of the jihadis who fought abroad rejoined in terror networks after their return to France. Every major terror plot prevented in France since 2000 involved returnees (e.g. the Strasbourg Cathedral Plot in 2000, the U.S. embassy bombing plot in 2001, a chemical attack plot in 2002, and plans to bomb the Eiffel Tower and the Notre-Dame Cathedral in 2010.)

The highest number of foreign fighters from Europe in Syria and Iraq came from France. More than 2,000 French citizens and residents are taking part in Syrian and Iraqi jihadi networks, 600 of them are believed to be fighting alongside terrorist organizations abroad and 250 are believed to have returned.¹⁰

The shooting at Brussels's Jewish Museum was the first successful attack committed by a returnee in European soil in 2014. It has been followed by other attacks, "*culminating with the coordinated attacks in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in March 2016.*"¹¹

III. The details – facts of the case

In this chapter we are going to discuss the events as has been described in the White Paper.

On the evening of November 13, the nine attackers divided into three groups. One group went to the Bataclan, Salah Abdeslam drove three suicide bombers to the Stade de France, and another toward the bars and restaurants of the 10th and 11th arrondissements.

The first of three explosions took place at 21.20 outside the Stade de France stadium where thousands of fans watched France versus Germany in a soccer match. A terrorist with a suicide

⁸ The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. A Presentation of Findings. White paper. Courtesy of HSAC and the Paris Public Safety Delegation. June 2016.

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5782ad8f9de4bb114784a8fe/t/5783fec9d482e95d4e0b79bf> (28 September 2018)

⁹ Thomas Hegghammer, "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting," American Political Science Review, February 2013

¹⁰ Jean-Charles Brisard: *The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France*, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8 Issue 11. p. 5. <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-paris-attacks-and-the-evolving-islamic-state-threat-to-france/> (20 September 2018)

¹¹ Thomas Renard & Rick Coolsaet (eds.): *Returnees: Who are they, why are they (not) coming back and show should we deal with them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands*, Egmont Papers, February 2018, p. 4. http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/02/egmont.papers.101_online_v1-3.pdf?type=pdf (15 January 2019)

belt was prevented from entering the stadium near Gate D. The man backed away from security guards and therefore he detonated the explosives, causing the death of the bomber and a bystander. At 21:30, a second man detonated his suicide vest outside Gate H. President Hollande, who was inside the stadium watching the game during these events, was rushed to safety. The crowd was not notified of the events and the match continued. At 21:53, a third terrorist wearing a suicide vest self-imploded at a fast-food store near the stadium.¹²

At 21:25 in the 10th arrondissement, a district known for its plethora of bars, restaurants and cafés, gunmen in a black vehicle opened fire on Le Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge. Fifteen people died in the shooting, with fifteen severely injured. The terrorists continued on to Rue de la Fontaine au Roi in the 11th arrondissement and opened fire on two more restaurants, Café Bonne Biere and La Casa Nostra. Eight people were severely injured, while five were killed. Witnesses reported that the gunmen were travelling in a black car. At 21:36, gunmen opened fire on another bar in the 11th arrondissement, La Belle Equipe. Witnesses again said that the attackers were in a black vehicle. Nineteen civilian people died during the attacks, with nine severely injured. At 21:40, a terrorist – later revealed to be Brahim Abdeslam – entered the restaurant Le Comptoir Voltaire. The attacker detonated his suicide vest, killing himself and injuring fifteen others.

The deadliest attack of the day happened at the Bataclan, a 1,500 seat concert hall, where the American rock group Eagles of Death Metal was playing to a crowd. At 21:40, three attackers with assault rifles emerged from a black vehicle, entered the Bataclan, killed the security guard and began firing on the crowd. Ninety people were killed and the rest of the audience was taken hostage, the siege lasted over two hours. Police forces rushed the Bataclan at approximately 00:20. A police officer shot one of the terrorists and his suicide belt detonated. The other attackers self-detonated also. Ninety-nine injured were taken to the hospital.

Intelligence authorities think that one of the intents of the Stade de France attack was meant to draw security forces out of the city. Frequently after an emergency, law enforcement's reaction is to flood an area with resources, depleting the ability to react to another event.¹³

IV. The perpetrators¹⁴

According to a document of findings, the below mentioned persons took part in the attacks.¹⁵

¹² Jean-Charles Brisard & Kevin Jackson: *The Islamic State's External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus*, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 9 Issue 11, November/December 2016, pp. 11-13. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol9Iss1118.pdf (20 January 2019)

¹³ The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. A Presentation of Findings. White paper. Courtesy of HSAC and the Paris Public Safety Delegation. June 2016. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5782ad8f9de4bb114784a8fe/t/5783fec9d482e95d4e0b79bf> (28 September 2018)

¹⁴ See also: Daniel Milton: *The French Foreign Fighter Threat in Context*, CTC Sentinel, 14 November 2015. <https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-perspectives-the-french-foreign-fighter-threat-in-context/> (2 January 2019)

¹⁵ The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. A Presentation of Findings. White paper. Courtesy of HSAC and the Paris Public Safety Delegation. June 2016. p. 11. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5782ad8f9de4bb114784a8fe/t/5783fec9d482e95d4e0b79bf> (28 September 2018)

Abdelhamid Abaaoud. He is believed to be the mastermind of the November Paris attacks. Abaaoud died in a police raid five days after the attacks, after a throughout search and investigation nationwide.¹⁶

Salah Abdeslam, who was the only survivor of the Paris attackers. After four months he appeared in Brussels. His capture and interrogation was one of the reasons behind the Brussels attacks of March 2016. Abdeslam is in French custody today.

Mohamed Abrini: a friend of Abdeslam. He was instrumental in the attack on the Brussels airport. According to the photos about the attackers, he was known as “the man in white”. Weeks after the attacks, he was captured and detained in Brussels.

Cherif and Said Kouachi: French brothers who attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices. They were killed three days later in a shoot-out with police.

Armedy Coulibaly. He met Cherif Kouachi in prison. Coulibaly killed a policewoman in Montrouge and afterwards entered a Kosher market taking patrons hostage while killing four people. Finally he died in a police raid.

After Abaaoud’s death, Salah Abdeslam was the only suspected Paris attacker still alive. On November 15, the authorities released his name and photo to the public. In 15h December, police raided an apartment in Brussels. They found explosives and Abdeslam’s fingerprint. After a four month-long manhunt, Abdeslam was captured in Molenbeek on March 18. He was shot in the leg but he survived it. The family suspected of hiding him was also arrested. In the wake of Abdeslam’s arrest, Belgian authorities worried about the prospect of another terrorist attack. Belgian Interior and Foreign Ministers warned the public on March 20, and again on March 21, that authorities suspected Abdeslam and his accomplices were planning an imminent attack.

V. Modus operandi¹⁷

The attacks in Paris in 2015 caught authorities off guard for a number of reasons. Previous attacks by terrorists trained in Syria had relied on a single mode of operation: a shooting, an explosion or an attempted hostage-taking. In Paris, the attackers did all of the abovementioned, with the aim to overwhelm the country’s emergency response capabilities. The attackers employed new tactics, exploited the weaknesses of Europe’s border controls and showed a desire for maximum carnage, as opposed to directing attacks at symbolic targets. In many ways, the Paris attacks were similar to the Mumbai attacks in 2008. In India, ten attackers mounted a complex operation that lasted over sixty hours. The terrorists were each carrying heavy assault rifles and multiple rounds of ammunition, as well as improvised explosions. They split into four teams. One group targeted Mumbai’s main train station, and then a hospital. A second targeted a Jewish residential complex, the third team stormed the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, while the fourth group attacked the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel. All terrorits killed indiscriminately. Indian

¹⁶ Guy van Vlierden: Profile: Paris Attack Ringleader Abdelhamid Abaaoud, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8. Issue 12. p. 30.

¹⁷ The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned. p. 18.

commandos ultimately brought down all of them, although they had killed 164 victims. The Mumbai attacks required, "precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation, both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and overwhelming the ability of the authorities to respond." As in Mumbai, the attackers in Paris had carefully planned, carried heavy firepower along with explosives, and split into three groups, simultaneously attacking different locations to prevent the authorities from developing an accurate action of the situation. The terrorists were better planned than in the Charlie Hebdo attacks and their aim was mass murder rather than targeted killings. At the Bataclan, they killed the security guard first and then took large numbers of hostages, creating a siege. It seems, that the terrorists studied Mumbai and replicated what worked. While the attackers in Paris were organized into blind cells, they had extensive logistical support. They spoke the language and had knowledge about the geographical layout of the area. The group that attacked the restaurants in the 10th and 11th arrondissements targeting crowded places, provided a high number of potential victims, but also multiple options for ingress and egress. However, at least two of the attackers had trained in Syria.¹⁸

Main purposes of the religious terrorist is the religious cleansing, so to create religiously pure state. The basic device of this aim is a suicide bombing. The definition of the suicide attack from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism: "*as a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission*".¹⁹ This method has some advantages for the perpetrators, mostly that it is cheap, easy and – unfortunately – very effective. These three elements can enable to the lone wolfs to kill millions of people all over the world.

VI. Foreign fighters in French and EU law

The French Code pénal (Criminal Code) defines terrorism as a number of listed acts – including intentional homicide, assault, kidnapping, hijacking, theft, extortion, property destruction, membership in an illegal armed group, digital crimes, forgery, and more – carried out with the goal of "seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror." Preparing to commit an act of terrorism, and seeking, obtaining, and keeping material to be used for an act of terrorism, is also considered an act of terrorism in and of itself. Intelligence gathering and training for the purpose of carrying out an act of terrorism also falls under that definition, as does the habitual access to websites that encourage or justify terrorism.²⁰

Codified in Article 421 - 2 - 1 of the French Criminal Code, the AMT offence today penalises as a terrorist offence "the fact of participating in a group formed or in an agreement struck for the purposes of the preparation – characterised by one or several material facts – of one of the

¹⁸ *The Attacks on Paris: Lessons learned*. pp. 18-19.

¹⁹ Béres János: *A nők és az öngyilkos-terrorizmus*. Felderítő Szemle, Magyar Köztársaság Katonai Felderítő Hivatal, Budapest, 2007/3, p.16.

²⁰ Kevin Buchanan: *FALQs: Terrorism in France*, In Custodia Legis, Library of Congress, 2015. <https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/01/falqs-terrorism-in-france/> (28 August 2018)

acts of terrorism mentioned”. These acts of terrorism include attacks on life and physical integrity; the hijacking of planes and other modes of transport; theft, extortions, destructions, degradations; membership in or support of dissolved armed groups and movements; offences in relation to armaments, explosives, and nuclear materials; dealing in stolen goods related to these offences; as well as some aspects of money laundering and financing. These acts become ‘terrorist’ provided that they occur with the additional qualification of “aiming to seriously trouble public order [ordre public] by intimidation or terror. The 1986 law created a specially composed Assize Court (La Cour d'Assises spécialement composée), entitled to adjudicate on terrorist-related offences. This specially composed court, contrary to the composition of the regular Cours d' Assises with respect to non-terrorist-related criminal matters, is without a jury. Instead, it is composed of the Court's President as well as professional judges, of which there are four at first instance and six on appeal. The speciality of this regime is derogatory but its application by ordinary magistrates ensures it derives its origin from within French Law itself. The prosecution of terror-related crimes, which incur a penalty up to 10 years of imprisonment, takes place before the 16th Chamber of the Court of first instance in Paris, which is composed of a bench of three judges. The prosecution of terror-related crimes, which incur a penalty above 10 years, are judged by the Paris Cour d' Assises specially composed of professional judges only. A terrorism investigation takes an average of two to three years.²¹

The attacks in Paris have brought a significant amount of attention to the issue of border controls, in particular since it has been confirmed that at least one of the terrorists, holding a Syrian passport, entered the EU through Greece via a route used by refugees. It is also suggested that the Paris attackers, themselves EU citizens, had left the EU to fight in Syria and returned to carry out the attacks in Paris, and that one of them, Salah Abdeslam, could even have managed to flee to Syria after the attacks. This is the phenomenon of so-called “Foreign Fighters”: EU citizens who become radicalised and leave their home in the EU to join the war in Syria before returning to Europe.

As Salah Abdeslam is French and not a third-country national, he could not, by definition, be the object of an alert related to the immigration policy. When he was checked by the French police during the night of 13 to 14 November, he was not known to the French authorities apparently because, despite being French, he was living in Belgium. He was also not the object of an alert for the purpose of arrest as the EAW was only issued by Belgium after the attacks, on Sunday. He had however been signalled in the SIS by the Belgian authorities as a person to be the object of a “discreet or specific check”. Following Article 36 of Council Decision 2007/533, such an alert may be issued for the purposes of prosecuting criminal offences and for the prevention of threats to public security, “*in particular where an overall assessment of a person, in particular on the basis of past criminal offences, gives reason to suppose that that person will also commit serious criminal offences in the future.*”²²

²¹ Sharon Weil: *Terror in Courts*, French counter-terrorism: Administrative and Penal Avenues Report for the official visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights May 2018, p. 8. <https://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/sites/sciencespo.fr/psia/files/Terror%20in%20Courts.pdf> (22 June 2018)

²² P. de Bruycker et D. Watt & H. Labayle & A. Weyembergh et C. Brière: *The Paris Terrorist Attacks : Failure of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?* January 2016 <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2016/01/08/cooperation-judiciaire-penale-the-paris-terrorist-attacks-failure-of-the-eus-area-of-freedom-security-and-justice/> (25 June 2018)

In the past few years since the attacks in Paris occurred, the European Union took many steps in order to ensure that such an attack will not take place again. However, it has been since 2013 that issues like foreign fighters and radicalization were on the agenda of the Council of the EU and the European Council.

Even before the January 2015 Paris attacks, the members of the European Council announced a statement, in which they expressed their strong belief on the importance of safeguarding common values against terrorist attacks. The three main elements of the announcement were the protection of the security of citizens, the prevention of radicalization, and the enhanced cooperation with international partners.²³

In March, 2017, the Council adopted a new directive on combating terrorism, which has been already mentioned and cited above. The directive aims to strengthen the EU's legal framework in order to be more able to prevent further attacks. It also includes the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, however, it gives a definition on terrorism acts for common use.²⁴

At the same time the Council also adopted a regulation, which amends the Schengen borders code. It reinforces checks at external borders, while it makes a systematic check against relevant databases on all persons crossing external borders obligatory for member states to carry out.²⁵ Protecting citizens and reducing vulnerability to attacks is one of the most important priorities of the EU counter-terrorism strategy. This mostly focuses on securing external borders, improving transport security, protecting strategic targets and reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.

In this area, the EU adopted a directive regulating the use of passenger name record (PNR) data in April 2016.²⁶

*“Passenger name record (PNR) data is personal information provided by passengers and collected and held by air carriers. It includes information such as the name of the passenger, travel dates, itineraries, seats, baggage, contact details and means of payment. The proposal for a directive presented by the Commission aims to regulate the transfer of such PNR data to member states' law enforcement authorities and their processing for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.”*²⁷

The main aims of the PNR system is to complement the already existing tools to cope with cross-border crime and harmonise member states' legal provisions.²⁸

In April 2017, the Council adopted a directive on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, which includes more strict rules for the acquisition and possession of the most

²³<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/12/european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/> (20 January 2019)

²⁴ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/rules-to-prevent-new-forms-of-terrorism/> (15 January 2019)

²⁵<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/regulation-reinforce-checks-external-borders/> (18 January 2019)

²⁶ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/> (25 January 2019)

²⁷ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/> (25 January 2019)

²⁸ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/passenger-name-record/> (25 January 2019)

dangerous weapons. The directive also incorporates measures that aims to improve the traceability of firearms and to prevent the reactivation or conversion of them.²⁹

The EU also worked on to reach an improved information exchange, while also launched the European Counter-Terrorism Centre in January 2016, and also created a dedicated unit to tackle online terrorist propaganda.³⁰

VII. Conclusion

The Parisian terrorist acts were very well organized, albeit not unpredictable actions. Since 2011 when the Syrian conflict began, thousands of EU nationals travelled to Iraq and Syria in order to join terrorist groups.³¹ According to a study, 30 percent of them had already returned to their home country.³² In the past few years, the European countries faced many terrorist attacks, which caused a threat to our common values and security. Each of them is somehow related to the above mentioned returnees.³³

The threat caused by Europeans being radicalised, travelling abroad, gaining combat experience and returning, thus becoming a ‘foreign fighter’ by definition, has been high on the political agenda for the last couple of years. This phenomenon affects a wide range of policies including e.g. the importance of a high volume information exchange, the criminal justice response system, and policies concerning the prevention of radicalization.

It seems that the threat is likely to exist in the coming years, although no new attack by returnees has occurred since. Having the ability to perform an effective response requires a well-prepared approach both legally and politically. The primary responsibility in dealing with this issue lies with the member states, nonetheless the EU made very important steps and play a supportive role in order to help member states.³⁴

While focusing on the future, it should be borne in mind that a more integrated and coordinated area of freedom and security is the only possible solution.³⁵

²⁹ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/25/control-acquisition-possession-weapons/> (21 January 2019)

³⁰ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/foreign-fighters/#> (20 January 2019)

³¹ Amandine Scherrer: The issue of foreign fighters: the EU framework, Part I., The return of foreign fighters to EU soil, Ex post valuation, European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2018, 5. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU\(2018\)621811_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf) (10 November 2018.)

³² Bibi van Ginkel & Eva Enternmann (eds.): *The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union, Profiles, Threats & Policies*, ICCT Research Paper, April 2016. 3. https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf (11 November 2018)

³³ Thomas Renard & Rik Coolaset: Returnees.. p. 3.

³⁴ Amandine Scherrer: *The issue of foreign fighters*.. p. 5.

³⁵ <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2016/01/08/cooperation-judiciaire-penale/the-paris-terrorist-attacks-failure-of-the-eus-area-of-freedom-security-and-justice/> (25 June 2018)

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