

*Restrictions on private law between in the inter-war period in Hungary: the price gouging and cartel regulation.*

During and after the First World War, Hungary faced serious economic problems which the legislator had to react. Among the economic difficulties, inflation and the proliferation of price gouging behavior were the most essential. These problems affected certain aspects of the price issue. It became clear that the concept of *laissez faire* economic policy had to be changed, and the state had to intervene in economy consequently the civil law private autonomy that was restricted, firstly by Act IX of 1916 about price gouging and then by the Cartel Act of 1931.

In my presentation, I will show how the antecedents of cartel regulation can be placed of the system of state intervention in the light of private law. Firstly I will set the topic in the context of economic history and present the prevailing economic and economic policy narratives of the time. I then present the private law aspects of price gouging abuses and cartel regulation, reflecting on the legislative objective. For my research, I will draw on the private law and commercial law literature of the First World War and the interwar period, including the works' of the most important scholars in private law, such as *Elemér Balás* or *Ödön Kuncz*, and the literature on cartel law (etc. *Károly Dobrovics*, *Ferenc Király*,) as well as a review of the 20th century criminal law literature. Due to the convenient teleological interpretation I also used parliamentary debates from the Hungarian Parliamentary Collection.

In summary the appearance of price gouging abuses and cartel regulation significantly transformed pre-war private law, but we cannot overlook the fact that it established the first roots of modern antitrust law.